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PAPER CHARTER: SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
FAILURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COLLECTIVE
SECURITY SYSTEM
Robert J. Delahunty'
The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, recognized
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,' has come under sustained
scrutiny in recent years. Two interpretative tendencies-moving in oppo-
site directions-can be observed. On the one hand, the United States
government has argued for a broadened understanding of the Article 51
right, contending, for example, that it should be construed to permit
"self-defense" in a range of circumstances in which an armed attack nei-
ther has occurred nor is imminent. On the other hand, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) has taken an increasingly restrictive view of Article
51 and the customary norms associated with it, for example, by constru-
ing it to prohibit self-defense against attacks that do not reach a certain
level of gravity or whose source is not identified by convincing evidence.
The former trend gives great weight to the risk of attack by rogue states
or terrorist groups sponsored by them; the latter trend emphasizes the
risk that in the absence of substantial legal constraints, powerful states
will be too prone to take recourse to violence.
This Article argues that the choice between these conflicting interpre-
tative trends must take greater account of the fact that the United Na-
tions Charter is an integrated whole: Article 51 is not a freestanding pro-
vision, and cannot be read in isolation from the other clauses and overall
structure of the Charter. Rather, Article 51 is a carve-out from a broader
scheme of peace maintenance through the collective security system that
the Charter was designed to embody. Although the original intent of
Article 51 was, and remains, vigorously disputed, it is plausible to con-
strue it as imposing fairly severe restrictions on the "right" of self-defense
previously recognized by international law. States that accepted those
and other limitations on their traditional prerogatives with respect to war
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1. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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and peace when they ratified the Charter acted in reliance on the belief
that the Charter's scheme of collective security would afford them at least
as much protection for their national security as they had agreed to relin-
quish. In the event, however, that belief has proven to be badly mis-
taken: the Charter's collective security system has hardly ever worked
(Korea and the First Gulf War being the main-though arguable-
exceptions), and the post-Charter world has been marked by the persis-
tence of war.
Given that the nations of the world cannot rely on the Charter's collec-
tive security system to protect them from attack, they should be relieved
of any legal obligation to accept the limits prescribed by Article 51, as
construed by the ICJ, when considering the legality of proposed measures
of self-defense. Instead, they should be entitled to resume their pre-
Charter right of self-defense and even, in light of changed circumstances,
to seek to develop more permissive customary norms.
If the Charter's use of force regime is rejected, however, there remains
the question of how collective action against threats to, or breaches of,
the peace can be organized, and what legal rules should regulate such
interventions. The question is ultimately one of designing international
institutions that combine both "legitimacy" and "effectiveness." None of
the currently favored mechanisms for stabilization through the use of
force manage to combine legitimacy and effectiveness in satisfactory
ways. These defective mechanisms include the Charter system itself, the
use of regional security alliances such as NATO, and ad hoc "coalitions
of the willing" led by the United States. Pending a satisfactory solution
to the problem of designing an acceptable international regime governing
the use of force, the United States' policy of acting "multilaterally if pos-
sible, [but] unilaterally if necessary, 2 will and should continue to be fol-
lowed.
Introduction
Few treaty clauses have given rise to as much controversy as Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, which states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
2. E.g., U.S. Pac. Command, U.S. Pacific Command Goals, http://www.pacom.mil/
about/goals.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2007); see also U.S. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, THE




Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.3
In recent years, with the rise of mass terrorism and the threat of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, controversy over the scope
and limits of the Article 51 right of self-defense has sharpened.4  Two
distinct and opposing trends in the law and state practice can be distin-
guished: one trend promoted by the United States, the other contrary
trend promoted by the ICJ.
To begin with, the United States government, in something of a rever-
sal of its earlier position,5 has begun to insist that the right of self-defense
enables it to preempt certain emerging threats:
3. U.N. Charter art. 51.
4. Much of the recent controversy has focused on the question of preemptive or
preventive war. One should, however, take account of the "empirical finding ... that
preemptive wars almost never happen. Of all interstate wars since 1816, only three are
preemptive: World War I, Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and the 1967 Arab-
Israeli War." Dan Reiter, Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost
Never Happen, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1995, at 5, 6. Israel's 1956 Sinai War arguably pro-
vides another example of preemptive interstate war. See Jack S. Levy & Joseph R.
Gochal, Democracy and Preventive War: Israel and the 1956 Sinai War (1999) (unpub-
lished paper presented at the International Studies Association) (on file with Catholic
University Law Review). To these may now be added the Second Gulf War of 2003.
There are at least two ways to read the historical record. One is that preemptive or
preventative interstate wars are likely to remain rare, not so much because of the con-
straints of international law, but the states that initiate such wars often pay substantial
political costs for doing so (e.g., by causing neutral states to ally with the target state
against the state that made the first strike), Reiter, supra, at 25-28, or because the very fear
of preemption can facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis, id. at 28-32.
The other inference that might be drawn from the record is that the Second Gulf War is
the harbinger of an era in which the risk of preemptive war becomes greater. This might
be so because of the confluence, particularly noticeable after September 11, 2001, of three
developments: the rise of mass terrorism by both state and non-state actors; the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction (or at least of the knowledge and capability needed to
create them); and the appearance of "rogue" states or "failed" states willing to host terror-
ists (or unable to repel them) and perhaps ready to furnish them with weapons of mass
destruction.
5. On June 7, 1981, Israel launched a preemptive air attack against an Iraqi atomic
reactor called "Osirak," which was in the final stages of its construction. Iraq complained
to the Security Council, and Israel defended its action as lawful self-defense under Article
51. See Security Council Consideration of a Complaint by Iraq, June 8, 1981, 36 UN
SCOR 228-2288 mtgs (1981). In Security Resolution 487, the Security Council "[sitrongly
condemn[ed Israel's action for being] in clear violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the norms of international conduct." S.C. Res. 487, T 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487
(June 19, 1981) (emphasis omitted). The United States voted in favor of the resolution,
which passed unanimously. However, the U.S. delegate to the Security Council, Ms.
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, did not indicate a position on the claimed right; and the U.S. State
Department later made it clear in testimony to Congress that the United States had not
reached any conclusion regarding the legality of Israel's actions. TIMOTHY L.H. MCCOR-
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For centuries, international law recognized that nations need
not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to de-
fend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger
of attack....
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabili-
ties and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and ter-
rorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means.... In-
stead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of
weapons of mass destruction-weapons that can be easily con-
cealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.
The United States has long maintained the option of preemp-
tive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the
more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of
the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemp-
tively.'
MACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI
NUCLEAR REACTOR 32-34 (1996); Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive
Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 601 (2003).
On other occasions, the United States has taken the position in the United Nations that
Article 51 of the Charter permits "anticipatory" self-defense (as distinct from the kind of
preventative action at issue more recently). See D.W. BowETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 189 (1958) (citing U.S. position in 1952 meeting of the General
Assembly's Sixth Committee discussing definition of aggression). However, on one mo-
mentous occasion when it might have sought to justify its actions as anticipatory self-
defense-the Cuban "quarantine" of 1962-the United States consciously (if mistakenly)
chose not to rely on that argument. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 65
(1974). But see Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force With-
out Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 51, 59 (2001) (rechar-
acterizing "quarantine" claim as anticipatory-self defense); Brunson MacChesney, Edito-
rial Comment, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592
(1963) (defending quarantine as legitimate self-defense); Myres S. McDougal, Editorial
Comment, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963)
(same); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 515 (1991) ("Although President Kennedy spoke of the United
States action as one of self-defense, his State Department, in presenting the case to the
Security Council, the OAS, and the public, sought to justify the American use of force in
Cuba primarily under the Rio Treaty and the action of the Organization of American
States pursuant to that Treaty. This legal argument is untenable .... The only possible
legal basis for the action taken by the United States in the Cuban missile crisis was there-
fore its 'inherent' right of self-defense, reaffirmed by Article 51 of the Charter.").
6. U.S. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 15; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,




Moreover, in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002,7 Congress joined the executive branch in affirming
that preemptive measures against rogue states (there, Iraq) that were
capable of producing and willing to use weapons of mass destruction
were lawful and justifiable forms of self-defense, even when no attack by
such a state had occurred or was imminent.s
Plainly, the United States has taken an expansive view of its Article 51
rights.9 Moreover, although the assertion of a right of preemptive self-
defense in this emphatic form is usually associated with the Bush admini-
stration, it was also made, if sometimes more mutedly, by both the
Reagan and Clinton administrations in the context of actions against ter-
rorism.' ° Other democratic states, including Israel and Australia, hold
similar views." Even the European Council's A Secure Europe in a Better
World: European Security Strategy asserts:
Our traditional concept of self-defence - up to and including the
Cold War-was based on the threat of invasion. With the new
threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad .... [W]e
7. Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
8. The joint resolution stated:
Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass de-
struction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to
launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide
them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm
that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to
justify action by the United States to defend itself....
Id.; see also REPORT IN CONNECrION WITH PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER
PUBLIC LAW 107-243, reprinted in 149 CONG. REC. H1958, H1958-59 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
2003).
9. "Preemptive" self-defense (or "preventative" self-defense) is usually, and rightly,
distinguished from "anticipatory self-defense," although it is also often acknowledged that
the different doctrines lie along the same spectrum. In one recent formulation, it is noted:
The claim to preemptive self-defense is a claim to entitlement to use unilaterally,
without prior international authorization, high levels of violence to arrest an incipient
development that is not yet operational or directly threatening, but that, if permitted
to mature, could be seen by the potential preemptor as susceptible to neutralization
only at a higher and possibly unacceptable cost to itself. Preemptive self-defense dif-
fers from anticipatory self-defense in that those contemplating the latter can point to
a palpable and imminent threat.
W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemp-
tive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 526 (2006) (footnote omitted).
10. Id. at 527-30.
11. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS
211 (2006); Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 9, at 538-45; see also Timothy Kearley,
Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter: A Search for
Original Intent, 3 WYo. L. REV. 663, 664 n.2 (2003).
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should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention
and threat prevention cannot start too early.12
In the countertrend, the ICJ, in a series of decisions originating with
Nicaragua v. United States,13 and continuing through Oil Platforms14 and
the Wall Case,5 has addressed, in a variety of contexts, the scope of the
Article 51 (as well as the customary) right of self-defense. 6 Although the
ICJ has reserved the specific question whether Article 51 permits antici-
patory self-defense, 7 most recently in its December 2005 decision in
Armed Activities on Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of18
Congo v. Uganda), the ICJ appears to be attempting to impose substan-
tial limitations on the right of self-defense. 9 In one scholar's view, the
overall effect of the ICJ's opinions
appears to be that under the UN Charter, (1) a state may provide
weapons, logistical support, and safe haven to a terrorist group;
(2) that group may then inflict violence of any level of gravity on
another state, even with weapons of mass destruction; (3) the
second state has no right to respond in self-defense against the
first state because the first state's provision of such assistance is
not an "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51; and (4)
the second state has no right to respond in self-defense against
the terrorist group because its conduct cannot be imputed to the
first state, absent a showing that the first state "sent" the terrorist
20group on its mission.
12. COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD:
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY 7 (2003), available at http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
13. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
14. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Nov. 6, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 1334.
15. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion (July 9,2004), 43 I.L.M. 1009.
16. These ICJ opinions are surveyed and criticized in Gregory E. Maggs, The Cam-
paign to Restrict the Right to Respond to Terrorist Attacks in Self-Defense Under Article 51
of the U.N. Charter and What the United States Can Do About It, 4 REGENT J. INT'L L. 149
(2006).
17. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103; see also Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Pre-
emptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REv. 699, 702 (2005); Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory
Self-Defence Under International Law, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 69, 93-94 (2003-2004).
18. Armed Activities on Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Dec.
19, 2005), 45 I.L.M. 271.
19. See id. at 306. Indeed, one could argue that Oil Platforms effectively answers "no"
to the question whether anticipatory self-defense is lawful under the Charter. If a state
must meet Oil Platforms' demanding proof standard before it can exercise legitimate self-
defense in response to known uses of force against it, it will often be insuperably difficult
(given the inevitable imperfections of intelligence information) to satisfy that standard
before the attacker strikes. See infra notes 248-253 and accompanying text.
20. Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse
Dixit From the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 66 (2005).
[Vol. 56:871
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Even those who would find that characterization overstated must ac-
knowledge that the ICJ jurisprudence of self-defense is at odds with re-
cent state practice- including that of the UN Security Council. For in-
stance, the ICJ continues to regard it as an open question "whether and
under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a
right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces" 1 such
as al Qaeda, when the attacks cannot be "imputed" to a state, even
though the Security Council had clearly indicated in Resolution 1368, and
in later actions, that the right of self-defense does indeed exist against
such an attacker.22 Indeed, the distinguished German legal scholar Bruno
Simma, now an ICJ judge, took the court to task in his separate opinion
in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda for ignoring the fact that
"Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) cannot but be
read as affirmations of the view that large-scale attacks by non-State ac-
tors can qualify as 'armed attacks' within the meaning of Article 51.'"2
The United States has repeatedly and emphatically disagreed with the
ICJ's emerging jurisprudence of self-defense. In Nicaragua, the United
States initially objected to the ICJ's jurisdiction.24 Nonetheless, the ICJ,
in the jurisdictional phase of the case, rejected that claim. 2 Thereupon
the United States announced that it had "decided not to participate in
further proceedings in this case 2 6 and, about a year later, it withdrew its
consent to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction.27 The ICJ ultimately ruled
on the merits of Nicaragua in 1986, deciding (over dissents from the
American, British, and Japanese judges) that the United States had vio-
lated its obligations under customary international law not to use force
against another state or to intervene in its affairs, and rejecting the argu-
21. Dem Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 45 I.L.M. at 306.
22. Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment, 27 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 737, 748 (2004); Michael C. Wood, Towards New Circumstances in Which the
Use of Force May Be Authorized? The Cases of Humanitarian Intervention, Counter-
Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE
OF FORCE 75, 86-87 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005); see also Thomas Franck,
Comments on Chapters 7 and 8, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 264, 270 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003). Franck
makes the (surely unanswerable) argument that the Security Council itself took Chapter
VII measures against al Qaeda, and that if the Council is competent to act in that manner
against a non-state attacker, member states must be competent to exercise self-defense
against one as well. Franck, supra, at 270.
23. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 45 I.L.M. at 370 (Simma, J., separate opinion).
24. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibil-
ity, 1984 I.C.J. 392, 395 (Nov. 26).
25. See id. at 442.
26. Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in
the International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985).
27. See Letter from George P. Shultz, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Javier Perez de Cuellar,
Sec'y-Gen. of the United Nations (Oct. 7, 1985), in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
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ment that the United States' military and paramilitary activities were
justifiable acts of collective self-defense undertaken in conjunction with
the government of El Salvador.2 The United States then pointedly re-
buffed the ICJ: "It announced that it would not abide by the judgment,
vetoed subsequent proposed Security Council resolutions seeking to en-
force the judgment, and appropriated additional funds for the actions in
question it had taken against Nicaragua." 29
The United States also strongly disagreed with the ICJ's adverse deci-
sion in Oil Platforms, where the scope of the right of self-defense was at
issue again.0 As the United States State Department Legal Adviser read
the Oil Platforms opinion, it implied several unfounded and erroneous
propositions of international law, including the view "that an attack in-
volving the use of deadly force by a State's regular armed forces on civil-
ian or military targets is not an 'armed attack' [within the meaning of
Article 51] triggering the right of self-defense unless the attack reaches
some unspecified level of gravity."'" The Legal Adviser sharply criticized
this view, arguing that it was "inconsistent with well-settled principles of
international law," that it "would make the use of force more rather than
less likely, because it would encourage States to engage in a series of
small-scale military attacks, in the hope that they could do so without
being subject to defensive responses," and that it had "no support in in-
ternational law or practice. 32 Speaking for the government, the Legal
Adviser stated that "[f]or its part, if the United States is attacked with
deadly force by the military personnel of another State, it reserves its
inherent right preserved by the U.N. Charter to defend itself and its citi-
zens."
33
Occupying a position somewhere between that of the United States and
the ICJ (although appreciably closer to the latter), the 2004 report of the
Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,34 took
the position that
notwithstanding the language of ... article [51] referring only to
the right arising "if an armed attack occurs,".. .[p]rovided there
28. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146-47 (June
27).
29. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 263 (2004) (footnote omitted).
30. William H. Taft, IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J.
INT'L L. 295,295 (2004).
31. Id. at 299.
32. Id. at 300-02.
33. Id. at 302.
34. U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Changes, A More Secure World:




is credible evidence of... an imminent threat, and the threatened
state has no obvious alternative recourse available, there is no
problem-and never has been-with that state, without first
seeking Security Council approval, using military force "preemp-
tively."35
"The problem arises," says the High-level Panel, "where the threat in
question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the ac-
quisition, with allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-making capa-
bility. 36 In that situation, the panel says:
The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preven-
tive military action, with good evidence to support them, they
should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such
action if it chooses to....
... [I]n a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to
the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it
continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilat-
eral preventive action.37
Adopting the panel's views on this issue,8 Secretary General Kofi An-
nan's 2005 report, In Larger Freedom,39 also took the position that, while
anticipatory self-defense against an imminent threat was lawful under the
Charter, the preventive use of force (as in the Second Gulf War) required
Council authorization.4°
How is the deepening disagreement over the scope and limits of Article
51 to be decided-or, more modestly, how ought the discussion even be
conducted? Many examinations of the question, including the opinions of
the ICJ, consider the question of Article 51's meaning in isolation from
35. Gareth Evans, President, Int'l Crisis Group, Keynote Address to the Heinrich
Boll Foundation's Fifth Annual Foreign Policy Conference: The Role of International Law
and the United Nations in a Globalizing World (June 24, 2004), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2832&1=1.
36. A More Secure World, supra note 34, 1 188.
37. Id. 190-91.
38. Professor O'Connell takes the reports of the Secretary General and the High-level
Panel and the actions that followed them to express a reaffirmation of the "classic" inter-
pretation of the Charter's use of force rules by both the Secretary General and the major-
ity of member states. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Counter-Reformation of the Security
Council, 2 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 107, 107 (2005).
39. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21,
2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
40. Id. IT 124-25 ("Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards
the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers
have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already
happened.... Where threats are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority
to the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve interna-
tional peace and security.").
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the remainder of the United Nations Charter, treating Article 51 as
though it were a separate, freestanding norm, essentially unrelated to the
document in which it is embedded. The result has been myopic concen-
tration on the text of the Article, or on its negotiating history, or on state
practice relating to "self-defense" before and after the adoption of the
Article, or on the ICJ opinions glossing its meaning, and inattention to
the place of Article 51 within the overall structure, logic, and design of
the Charter system. The closely woven, organic interconnections be-
tween the use of force rules in Chapter II, the military powers of the Se-
curity Council in Chapter VII, and the preservation of a limited right of
self-defense in Article 51, thus tend to be overlooked or discounted. In
particular, insufficient consideration is given to the nature of the collec-
tive security system that was a paramount purpose of the Charter, and
the roles of individual and collective self-defense within that security sys-
tem.
Because this tendency to view Article 51 in isolation neglects the Arti-
cle's integral relationship with other Charter provisions, the legal conse-
quences of the decades-long failure of the Charter's collective security
regime have characteristically been disregarded. Yet the failure of the
Charter's collective security regime is unquestionably relevant to the
questions of whether or how far Article 51 retains normative force. Un-
der commonly accepted legal principles, the failure of the Charter system
to achieve such an essential objective could readily be held to relieve par-
ties to the Charter from any legal obligation they would otherwise have
to observe pursuant to Article 51 (or, for that matter, by Chapter II).
The persistent inability of the United Nations to provide and maintain a
functioning collective security system can reasonably be viewed as a mas-
sive, multilateral breach; a radical failure of consideration; or a funda-
mental and unforeseen change of circumstances that entitles the parties,
if they choose, to suspend or even terminate their performance of the
restrictions encapsulated in Article 51. To be sure, the Charter's rules of
force, including aspects of Article 51, may have wholly or partly acquired
the status of customary law, and be independently binding on those
grounds.4 1 But the Charter itself has been a powerful influence (to say no
more) in shaping that custom (if it exists). Indeed, the ICJ's claim in
Nicaragua, for example, that it was applying "customary" rules for the
use of armed force rather than construing Article 51 was a transparent
legal fiction42: the ICJ managed to find just enough (notional) difference
between Article 51 and customary use of force rules to give itself jurisdic-
41. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94, 96-97
(June 27).
42. See David K. Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United
States and Other Views, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 57, 100 (1991).
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tion to decide the case on the basis of customary law (after accepting the
United States' claim that it lacked jurisdiction to decide it on the basis of
a multilateral treaty like the Charter),43 but not enough difference be-
tween conventional and customary use of force rules to make its decision
under customary law "academic" and "ineffective" as to Charter parties.'
In any event, if the Charter's use of force rules were no longer seen as
legally binding, state practices and normative beliefs might well evolve in
new directions.
The central theses of this Article are that Article 51 fits organically
within a broader Charter scheme for regulating interstate armed conflict
and forms an integral part of the collective security system that the fram-
ers of the Charter intended to establish; that the limitations on sover-
eignty to which member states consented in accepting Article 51 were
reciprocal to, and predicated on, the promise of collective security; and
that the persisting and incurable failure of the Charter's collective secu-
rity system can reasonably be held to relieve member states of their legal
obligations to use self-defensive force within the limitations of Article 51,
especially as construed by the ICJ.
To be sure, the failure of the Charter's collective security system has
been widely acknowledged. But the legal consequences of that failure
remain under-appreciated. Even while acknowledging the system's fail-
ure, many leading legal scholars have regarded it as irrelevant to the con-
tinuing normativity of Article 51. Indeed, this has been an ever-fresh
theme in scholarly apologetics for the United Nations. Thus, David Ken-
nedy's 2006 book Of War and Law45 bolts together a concession of failure
and an apology for it by saying "[o]ver the years, what began as an effort
to monopolize force has become a constitutional regime of legitimate
justifications for warfare." 46 More fully, despite acknowledging that "the
great hope placed by the framers in the role of the Council as 'enforcer of
the collective will' has never fully materialized," Carsten Stahn, writing in
2003 in the American Journal of International Law, nonetheless main-
tained "that the Security Council is needed more urgently than ever in
43. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 121 ("The Court['s] ... decision has to be made on
the basis of customary international law .... ").
44. See id. at 96-97; see also D.W. Greig, Self-Defence and the Security Council: What
Does Article 51 Require?, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 366, 381-82 (1991). In its later cases, the
ICJ has spoken generically of "international law on self-defence," see Oil Platforms (Iran
v. U.S.) (Nov. 6, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1361, indicating that it sees little or no substantive
difference between conventional rules and (what it takes to be) customary rules. Indeed,
the ICJ has even treated the failure to follow the reporting requirement in Article 51,
which is concededly conventional law alone, as evidence of a violation of customary law.
See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 121-22.
45. DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW (2006).
46. Id. at 79.
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the aftermath of the Iraqi conflict."4 7 Thomas Franck observed in 2001
that the Charter's "fundamental promise to provide an effective system
to protect states against violators of the peace. . . has not been kept," but
nonetheless warns against viewing the Charter as "a static instrument" ;48
the Charter is still legally effective because "the system has adapted ....
There is no realistic alternative to the Council and Assembly as the
global juries., 49 In other words, it does not matter that the founders of
the United Nations expected a police force but got a jury instead.
Earlier writers had cleared this apologetic path. In the mid-1990s,
then-Professor Rosalyn Higgins (currently the President of the ICJ)
wrote that "[o]ne cannot understand the post-war debates about the legal
limits to the use of force without appreciating that the contemporary
norms were predicated upon a Charter system that until now [1994] has
been impossible to operate."5° But her ensuing discussion of use of force
rules in the chapter in which this statement appeared virtually ignored
the consequences of the failure of that system." And Louis Henkin, after
acknowledging that (then) forty years of practice had demonstrated that
the United Nations organization was "different from that [originally] con-
templated: in particular, the Security Council has not been effective in
enforcing the principles of the Charter outlawing the use of force, and
efforts to have the General Assembly substitute for the Security Council
have not been notably successful," proceeded only one sentence later to
deny that these failures have or should have any legal effect: "[N]o re-
sponsible voice, surely no government, has suggested that the failures of
the organization vitiated the agreement and nullified or modified the
Charter's norms.,
52
Henkin was, in fact, quite wrong even when he wrote those statements.
For one thing, Judge Jennings of the ICJ, dissenting in the 1986 Nicara-
gua case, had already pointed out that "[t]he original scheme of the
United Nations Charter, whereby force would be deployed by the United
47. Carsten Stahn, Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
804, 806, 810 (2003). Stahn contends that despite its challenge "as an organ of enforce-
ment," the Council remains authoritative as the "framer of the collective will" of the inter-
national community. Id. at 808; see also id. at 806.
48. Franck, supra note 5, at 51, 53.
49. Id. at 53, 68.
50. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How
WE USE IT 238 (1994).
51. In fairness, Higgins does later ask: "Are the shortcomings of the international
system (the failures of the United Nations, the violations of the Charter, the massive viola-
tions of human rights, the frequent absence of democracy) such that the limits on the use
of force contained in Article 2(4) and Article 51 should be set aside?" Id. at 252 (emphasis
added). But she does not dwell on the legal effects of the failure of collective security.
52. Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in LOUIS HENKIN ET AL.,
RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37,38 (1989).
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Nations itself, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII ... has
never come into effect."53 Therefore, reasoned Judge Jennings:
[A]n essential element in the Charter design is totally missing. In
this situation it seems dangerous to define unnecessarily strictly the
conditions for lawful self-defence, so as to leave a large area where
both a forcible response to force is forbidden, and yet the United
Nations employment of force, which was intended to fill that gap,
is absent.1
4
Surely Judge Jennings was saying exactly what Henkin asserted "no re-
sponsible voice" could even suggest-that the failures of the organization
justified modifying one of the Charter's central norms."
Furthermore, in an important article written three years before Hen-
kin's, Oscar Schachter had given fair, if also critical, consideration to a
line of reasoning similar to that of Judge Jennings.56 Schachter traced
back what he called this "revisionist" argument to Julius Stone's Aggres-
sion and World Order (1958);17 and whether one agreed with him or not,
Julius Stone (like Judge Jennings) was surely a "responsible voice." In
more recent years, latter-day revisionists, led by Michael Glennon, have
again urged that the Charter is "dead.,
58
This Article attempts to pursue and develop Stone's and Glennon's
"revisionist" claims still further. Part I seeks to explain the basic design
of the Charter's collective security system, compare it to the paradigm of
collective security favored by political scientists, and show how it was
intended to improve on the inadequate collective security arrangements
created by the League of Nations Covenant. Part II then addresses some
53. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 543-44 (June
27) (Jennings, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
55. Some legal scholars have followed Judge Jennings' lead, arguing, for example,
"that Article 51 should be interpreted so as to facilitate the fulfillment of the purposes of
the Organi[z]ation in the light of the Security Council failure to operate as intended."
MCCORMACK, supra note 5, at 187.
56. See generally Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of
Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1986).
57. Id. at 125 ("As argued by Julius Stone, one of the earliest and most forceful revi-
sionists, the Charter's renunciation of unilateral force was intended to be 'organic[ally]
dependen[t] . . .on the effective establishment of collective institutions and methods.'
Since the U.N. collective security system has failed (as shown by the continued frequency
of violent international acts), states should be released from their unilateral commitments
to eschew force." (alterations and omission in original) (footnote omitted)).
58. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER:
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER Kosovo (2001); Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-
Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 540-41 (2002) [hereinafter Glennon, The Fog of Law]; Michael J.
Glennon, The UN Security Council in a Unipolar World, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 91, 100 (2003)
[hereinafter Glennon, Unipolar World]; Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council
Failed, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2003, at 16, 16.
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of the limitations that Articles 2(4) and 51, as construed by the ICJ and
many legal scholars, impose on the exercise of the right of self-defense or
other uses of force. These limitations should be viewed as concessions of
traditional prerogatives of state sovereignty that were exchanged for the
promise of a viable collective security system. Part III analyzes the fail-
ure of the Charter's collective security system, contending that that fail-
ure was not merely a facet of international politics in the cold war period
but was wired into the original design. Finally, Part IV explores the legal
and policy consequences that can be drawn from the failure of the Char-
ter system.
I. THE DESIGN OF UN CHARTER'S COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM
Foremost among the original purposes of the United Nations Charter
was the maintenance and enforcement of global peace through the crea-
tion of an effective system of collective security. The preamble to the
Charter declares the document's primary purpose to be the determina-
tion "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice
in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind," and to that end, it
affirms that "the Peoples of the United Nations" will "unite our strength
to maintain international peace and security, and ... ensure, by the ac-
ceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force
shall not be used, save in the common interest."59 Likewise, the very first
article of the first Chapter (entitled "Purposes and Principles") of the
Charter, states that "[t]he [p]urposes of the United Nations are: 1. To
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effec-
tive collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace." 6 The Charter's central purpose of achieving peace through
"collective measures" is also reflected throughout the wartime planning
that culminated in the establishment of the United Nations in 1945.6 ' As
59. U.N. Charter pmbl.
60. Id. art. 1. The International Court of Justice has also affirmed that "Itihe purpose
pervading the whole of the Charter and dominating it is that of maintaining international
peace and security and to that end the taking of effective collective measures for the pre-
vention and removal of threats to the peace." Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 186 (July 20) (Spender, J., separate opinion).
61. Scholarly accounts of the origins and antecedents of the United Nations include
BOWEr, supra note 5, at 117-55, 182-84 (1958); INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., POWER AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 155-72 (1962); F.H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT
OF PEACE (1967); PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2006); 1 EVAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: THE YEARS OF WESTERN DOMINATION, 1945-1955 (1982); RUTH B.
RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS' CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES 1940-1945 (1958); STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE
FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2003). The classic account of the League of Na-
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early as the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, President Franklin Roo-
sevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill had proclaimed their belief
that
all of the nations of the world. . . must come to the abandonment
of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if
land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations
which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their fron-
tiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and per-
manent system of general security, that the disarmament of such
nations is essential.62
In his address of June 26, 1945 to the final plenary session of the United
Nations Conference at San Francisco,63 President Harry Truman, ap-
plauded the conference's achievement in creating the Charter, looking
both backward to the successes of the wartime alliances against the Axis
powers and forward to the prolonged peace that he hoped the victors of
the conflict would use their collective force to maintain:
We have tested the principle of cooperation in this war and
have found that it works. Through the pooling of resources,
through joint and combined military command, through constant
staff meetings, we have shown what united strength can do in
war. That united strength forced Germany to surrender. United
strength will force Japan to surrender.
Out of this conflict have come powerful military nations, now
fully trained and equipped for war. But they have no right to
dominate the world. It is rather the duty of these powerful na-
tions to assume the responsibility for leadership toward a world
of peace. That is why we have here resolved that power and
strength shall be used not to wage war, but to keep the world at
peace, and free from the fear of war.6"
The destructiveness and horrors of the world war from which they had
still not fully emerged (the San Francisco Conference took place before
the surrender of Japan, and indeed before the use of atomic weapons
against that nation), coupled with those of the world war that had pre-
ceded it only a generation earlier, undoubtedly convinced the members
tions has long been F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1960). For
an overview of "the Settlement of 1945," of which the United Nations Charter was but one
(if also a major) component, see G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS,
STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 163-
214 (2001).
62. Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1603 (emphasis added).
63. Address in San Francisco at the Closing Session of the United Nations Confer-
ence, PUB. PAPERS 138 (June 26, 1945).
64. Id. at 140-41.
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of the international community of the paramount importance of peace.61
Moreover, the framers of the Charter believed that they had found a vi-
able method of ensuring that the peace would be maintained: the con-
struction of a system of collective security. Indeed, Secretary of State
Stettinius, in explaining the proposed Charter, stated that "[tihe whole
scheme of the Charter is based on this conception of collective force
made available to the Organization for the maintenance of international
peace and security."' In reaching the conclusion that collective security
was the best, perhaps the only, method of structuring international rela-
tions so as to preserve the peace, the Charter's framers consciously built
on a tradition of thinking that reached back to the preceding generation
of statesmen, most notably Woodrow Wilson.67
65. The historian Niall Ferguson has recently shown that:
The hundred years after 1900 were without question the bloodiest century in mod-
ern history, far more violent in relative as well as absolute terms than any previous
era. Significantly larger percentages of the world's population were killed in the two
world wars that dominated the century than had been killed in any previous conflict
of comparable geopolitical magnitude. Although wars between 'great powers' were
more frequent in earlier centuries, the world wars were unparalleled in their severity
(battle deaths per year) and concentration (battle deaths per nation-year). By any
measure, the Second World War was the greatest man-made catastrophe of all time.
NIALL FERGUSON, THE WAR OF THE WORLD: TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONFLICT AND
THE DESCENT OF THE WEST, at xxxiv (2006); see also id. app. at 647-54.
Likewise, military historian John Keegan has pointed out that humanity's experience of
war in the twentieth century was unprecedented in history, and that the fear of war began,
for the first time, to rival the fear of famine or the fear of disease: "Only in the twentieth
century did the fear of war finally overtake in force the primordial anxieties associated
with deprivation and sickness." JOHN KEEGAN, WAR AND OUR WORLD 14 (1998).
66. EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
CONFERENCE 41 (1945) [hereinafter REPORT ON SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE].
67. CLAUDE, supra note 61, at 96-98. Thus, Wilson had argued:
"Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a
force be created ... so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any
alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of na-
tions could face or withstand it."
Id. at 96-97 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Or again:
"There must now be, not a balance of power, not one powerful group of nations set
off against another, but a single overwhelming, powerful group of nations who shall
be the trustee of the peace of the world."
Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
Or again:
"[I]n the last analysis the military and naval strength of the Great Powers will be the
final guarantee of the peace of the world."
Id. at 98 (citation omitted). As Claude later goes on to observe, "[t]here can be no doubt
that the new system-building enterprise [of the United Nations] was broadly conceived as a




What is "collective security"? As a first, rough approximation, "collec-
tive security" can be understood as "the principle of each for all and all
for each: the rule that, wherever an act of 'aggression' occurred, the
whole international community would combine to defend the victim. In
so doing, it would defend not only the particular country concerned, but
peace itself."' Under a collective security system, the object of maintain-
ing the peace of nations is considered to be overriding, taking priority
even over the protection of human rights, for example, if such protection
would entail the otherwise forbidden use of armed force to intervene in
the "essentially ... domestic" affairs of another member state.69 Global
peace, moreover, is conceived to be seamless or "indivisible": should a
breach of the peace occur anywhere, every member state should be will-
ing to render assistance to the victim of the breach, however little interest
it might otherwise have in the affairs of the region or country affected,
because each member had a compelling interest in the maintenance of
peace as such. Finally, at least in a paradigmatic collective security sys-
tem, every member state is expected to rally to the side of the "victim"
against the "aggressor," regardless of any friendly ties that might exist
between the member state and the aggressor, or any hostility between
that member state and the victim. Thus, had a NATO member (say,
Greece) attacked a Warsaw Pact member (say, Bulgaria) during the cold
war, it would have been the duty of the United States to join in collective
action with the Communist bloc against Greece, however close the ties of
friendship between the United States and Greece were, and however
damaging to Western security the defeat of the Greek offensive would
have been.7°
68. 1 LUARD, supra note 61, at 4.
69. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. As Louis Henkin has observed, for the Charter's
framers,
[p]eace was the paramount value. The Charter and the organization were dedicated
to realizing other values as well-self-determination, respect for human rights, eco-
nomic and social development, justice, and a just international order. But those pur-
poses could not justify the use of force between states to achieve them; they would
have to be pursued by other means. Peace was more important than progress and
more important than justice. The purposes of the United Nations could not in fact be
achieved by war.... Nations would be assured independence, the undisturbed enjoy-
ment of autonomy within their territory, and their right to be let alone. Change-
other than internal change through internal forces-would have to be achieved peace-
fully by international agreement.
Henkin, supra note 52, at 38-39.
70. See ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 176-77 (1962). This kind of situation was nearly realized dur-
ing the Suez campaign of 1956, in which Britain, France, and Israel, all close and important
U.S. allies in the cold war, arguably were the "aggressors" against Egypt. Id. at 176 n.2,
198. As it happened, the United States did denounce their campaign, and all three West-
ern allies did recede. Id. at 198. However, it is readily imaginable that they might not have
heeded the United States, and thus have posed for this country the choice between keep-
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Collective security, thus envisaged, was intended to supplant traditional
methods, such as defensive military alliances71 or reliance on a self-
adjusting "balance of powers, 72 that had signally failed to prevent the
catastrophe of world war.7' Further, the Charter scheme was intended to
cure the critical flaws that practical experience had brought to light in the
collective security systems of the League of Nations Covenant 74 or, later,
of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.75
Broadly, the architecture of the Charter system rested on three main
pillars. First, member states pledged themselves in Article 2(4) to "re-
frain... from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations., 76  In substantial part, this
amounted to a commitment (as earlier in the Kellogg-Briand Pact) to
renounce recourse to offensive war as an instrument of national policy,
ing its Charter pledge to maintain international peace and stability against aggression, and
losing the support of crucial allies in its struggle with Soviet communism. See id. at 176-77,
198-99.
71. On the differences between collective security and mutual defense agreements (or
"collective defense"), see id. at 182-204.
72. INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND
PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 17-50 (3d rev. ed. 1964) (analyzing and
evaluating the balance of power concept); Randall L. Schweller, The Problem of Interna-
tional Order Revisited, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 2001, at 161, 169-73 (arguing that bal-
ance-of-power systems may produce more predictability and stability than "constitutional
systems" that "require actors to voluntarily choose to subordinate their immediate inter-
ests to communal or remote ones"). See generally LUDWIG DEHIO, THE PRECARIOUS
BALANCE: FOUR CENTURIES OF THE EUROPEAN POWER STRUGGLE (Charles Fullman
trans., 1962) (discussing workings of balance of power in modern European history).
73. See CLAUDE, supra note 72, at 51-52. Professor Claude perhaps did more to clar-
ify the concept of collective security than any other political scientist:
[C]ollective security is a specialized concept, a technical term in the vocabulary of in-
ternational relations. Its definition may be approached by the process of elimination:
it represents the means for achieving national security and world order which remain
when security through isolation is discarded as an anachronism, security through self-
help is abandoned as a practical impossibility, security through alliance is renounced
as a snare and a delusion, and security through world government is brushed aside as
a dream irrelevant to reality. The concept of collective security may be stated in de-
ceptively simple terms: it is the principle that, in the relations of states, everyone is his
brother's keeper; it is an international translation of the slogan, "one for all and all for
one"; it is the proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by any nation
against any nation will be met by the combined force of all other nations.
Id. at 224 (footnote omitted); see also MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE:
REALISM, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM 168 (1997). See generally CLAUDE, supra note
72, at 94-204.
74. League of Nations Covenant arts. 10-12, 16.
75. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
arts. I-I1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
76. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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although it cut more broadly. 7 Second, in Article 51, the Charter im-
posed restrictions on the purely defensive use of force: "the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence" could be exercised "if an armed
attack occurs against a Member [state]" -but apparently not otherwise .
Moreover, even if a member state had been the victim of "an armed at-
tack," it was bound by Article 51 to report the measures it had taken in
self-defense to the Security Council, and its right to take such defensive
measures appeared to be suspended or terminated once "the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security."79 Further, under Article 39, which vested in the Security
Council the duty to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,"8 ° it appeared that the Council
could override a member state's judgment that it had been using force
only in legitimate self-defense, hold it to have been the aggressor, and
sanction it accordingly. Third and finally, Chapter VII endowed the
Council with the power to recommend or take a variety of measures, in-
cluding "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 81 In order to en-
able the Council to enforce its decisions militarily (should that prove nec-
essary), each member state undertook "to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agree-
ments, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of pas-
sage."8' Apart from the right (now of course moot) of a member state to
wage war against the Axis powers 3 and the plainly transitional arrange-
ments set forth in Article 106, 4 each member state thus committed itself
not to use armed force, except as authorized by the Council under Article
42, or as part of a Chapter VIII "regional" organization acting under the
Security Council's authorization under Article 53(1),8 or in the restricted
77. Id. Article 2(4) goes beyond the Kellogg-Briand Pact in several ways, among
them the renunciation of even the "threat" to use force in a forbidden manner.
78. Id. art. 51.
79. Id. To be sure, the exact meaning and application of the quoted language-as of
much else in Article 51 -is disputed. For a review of different interpretations, see Malvina
Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council Takes Action, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 229 (1996); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 452, 459 (1991) (noting that during debates over Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, no
government denied that the Council could prohibit even self-defensive military action by a
state).
80. U.N. Charter art. 39.
81. Id. art. 42.
82. Id. art. 43.
83. Id. art. 53, para. 2; art. 107.
84. Id. art. 106.
85. For an explanation and illustrations of Chapter VIII enforcement actions, see
Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM.
RTs. Q. 57, 62-67 (2000).
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circumstances that Article 51 allowed for the exercise of self-defense. In
return for those commitments, each other member state agreed to furnish
the Council with forces and assistance sufficient to enable the Council to
suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of (or threats to) the peace
against that state.
It is illuminating to measure the Charter scheme against a prominent
political science model of a collective security system. According to po-
litical scientist John J. Mearsheimer, the core premises of a paradigmatic
collective security system are three. "First, states must renounce the use
of military force to alter the status quo. They must not launch wars of
aggression, but instead must agree to settle all disputes peaceably."
86
Second:
[S]tates must believe that their national interest is inextricably
bound up with the national interest of other states, so that an at-
tack on any state is considered an attack on every state. Thus,
when a troublemaker appears in the system, all of the responsible
states must automatically and collectively confront the aggressor
with overwhelming military power. The aim is "to create auto-
matic obligations of a collective character.
8 7
Third (and for Mearsheimer most important), "states must trust each
other. States must not only act in accordance with the first two norms,
but they must trust that other states will do likewise. '' 8
The original design of the Charter system broadly matches
Mearsheimer's construct, albeit imperfectly. First, by accepting Article 2
(especially paragraphs 3 and 4), member states agreed to renounce the
use (or threat) of military force to change the territorial boundaries or
political independence of other member states, and undertook instead to
"settle their . . . disputes by peaceful means."8 9 Second, by vesting the
Security Council with the powers to determine whether a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" has arisen or occurred,
and enabling it to take actions -including the deployment of military
force-to maintain or restore the peace,9° and by requiring all member
states to give the Council "every assistance in any action it takes,"9' the
Charter at least approximates the paradigmatic requirement for an auto-
matic, collective military response to any aggressor. True, the allocation
to each of the Council's five permanent members of the power to "veto"
86. John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, in THEORIES
OF WAR AND PEACE 329,357 (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1998).
87. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at 359.
89. U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3-4.
90. Id. art. 39.
91. Id. art. 2, para. 5.
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any proposed collective enforcement action9' represents-and was from
the beginning acknowledged to represent-a very significant departure
from the model of automatic responsiveness. But the Charter's framers
rightly judged that the League of Nations' collective security arrange-
ment had failed in part because of the nonmembership of several of the
93great powers, and they realistically understood that no great power
would accept the Charter unless it had the ability to block enforcement
(or indeed other) measures," particularly in cases where it was a party to
the dispute. Further, they believed that if one of the great powers em-
barked on a course of aggression, it would not be dissuaded merely by
the decision of the Council to invoke force against it over its contrary
vote, and "[a]nother world war [would] come, vote or no vote." 95 So,
although the veto of a permanent member could function as a kind of
circuit-breaker, interrupting the flow of collective power against an ag-
gressor, that design feature was considered necessary in order to create
any form of collective security.9 Third, the Charter's framers also ac-
knowledged that the system they had created would not work unless the
members of the United Nations-especially the great powers-had the
92. See id. art. 27, para. 3.
93. Owing to the refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the
United States had never become a member of the League of Nations. Germany, although
a League member for a time (1926-1933), withdrew soon after Hitler came to power. 1
LUARD, supra note 61, at 10. Japan likewise withdrew in 1933, and Italy withdrew in 1937.
The Soviet Union, although also briefly a member (1934-1939), was incensed because of
what Stalin interpreted as the League's decision to eject it.
The Charter's framers believed that on this occasion, the global collective security re-
quired accommodating the great powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion. Id. at 10-11. As Secretary of State Stettinius explained at the time:
The five permanent members of the Security Council have at their disposal an
overwhelming proportion of the men and material necessary to enforce peace. Their
permanent membership in the Security Council therefore becomes essential, for with-
out their strength and their unanimous will to peace the Council would be helpless to
enforce its decisions.
Press Release, U.S. Sec'y of State, Report on the San Francisco Conference (May 28,
1945), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1945, at 1010.
94. Claude notes:
The truth is that the [San Francisco] Conference paid its glowing respects to the prin-
ciple of collective security and then announced its firm conviction that it would be im-
possible to create a collective security system which could cope with threats to the
peace posed by great powers. This is the central meaning of the famous veto power
granted to the permanent members of the Security Council.
CLAUDE, supra note 72, at 158.
95. Press Release, U.S. Sec'y of State, supra note 93, at 1010.
96. See CLAUDE, supra note 72, at 160. Claude notes that this circuit-breaking func-
tion was of particular value to the small states, because it ensured that they would not, as a
result of Council action, have to support one group of great powers against another. See
id. at 160-61.
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will to make it succeed, and cooperated to build up the trust that was an
essential element for its success.97
Despite the inclusion of a veto power for the five permanent members,
the Charter represented as close an approximation to the model of a pure
collective security system as was realistically attainable. Moreover, in at
least three key respects, it seemed to mark a clear improvement over the
collective security arrangements in League of Nations Covenant. First,
all of the five remaining great powers of the post-war world (even if the
war had sadly reduced the standing of some of them) were to be mem-
bers of the United Nations. In particular, the United States' decision, not
only to join to United Nations, but also to support it enthusiastically,
gave the Charter much fairer prospects at its birth.98 Second, under the
League Covenant, each member state retained the discretion, in the last
resort, whether to respond to a clear call from the League Council to join
collective action against an aggressor.99 Under the Charter, however,
member states placed themselves under a binding legal obligation to fur-
nish assistance against aggression whenever the Council required their
support.1°° Third, the Charter incorporated "the basic principle of mak-
97. See Ernest A. Gross, International Organization and Collective Security: Changing
Values and Priorities, 138 RECUEIL DES COURs 413, 431-34 (1973); see also RUSSELL,
supra note 61, at 456.
98. See WALTERS, supra note 61, at 72-73 ("The abandonment of the League by the
United States was a blow whose effects can hardly be over-estimated.... The immediate
loss in the power and influence of the [League] Council and Assembly, due to the absence
of the United States, was great; it was destined to show itself in a hundred ways as the
years went by.").
99. See League of Nations Covenant arts. 10, 16. Article 10 of the Covenant provided
that in the event of aggression or the threat or danger of it, "the Council shall advise upon
the means by which" the obligation to counter aggression "shall be fulfilled." Id. art. 10.
Article 16 provided that if a League member "resort[ed] to war in" violation of its Cove-
nant obligations, "it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all
other Members of the League," which thereby committed to subject the aggressor to vari-
ous nonmilitary sanctions. Id. art. 16. Further, under the same Article, the Council was
ascribed the duty of "recommend[ing] to the several Governments concerned what effec-
tive military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the
armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League." Id. But the Council had
no authority to order such military contributions. Niels Blokker, The Security Council and
the Use of Force: On Recent Practice, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF
FORCE, supra note 22, at 1, 5-6.
100. Interestingly, however, one influential observer of the Charter's founding-the
British international law scholar J.L. Brierly-argued in 1946 that the League system was
better than the Charter insofar as it had based collective security on the principles of una-
nimity and voluntarism. J.L. Brierly, The Covenant and the Charter, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
83 (1946). Thus, Brierly wrote that "before international institutions can be raised from
the co-operative to the organic type ... we need a society far more closely integrated than
the society of states is to-day." Id. at 92.
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ing contingents of national armed forces available to the Security Council
for enforcement purposes.''
This third feature perhaps deserves some attention, if only because its
history illustrates how rapidly the Charter's collective security system
began to disintegrate. Article 43(1) provided that all member states un-
dertook "to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in ac-
cordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assis-
tance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security."' 2 Article 47 envisaged
the creation of a "Military Staff Committee" consisting in part "of the
Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the" Council, which would
be responsible, in subordination to the Council, "for the strategic direc-
tion of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council."' 3
Knowing that the mobilization of military forces from different member
states ordinarily would take considerable time and effort, and that an act
of aggression could present a fait accompli even while the forces to com-
bat it were being mustered, the framers of the Charter intended to create
a standby force, put it at the disposal of the Council, and place it under
the command of the Military Staff Committee that could deploy it, even
in advance of the outbreak of a crisis, into international trouble spots.
These forces were intended to "represent the 'teeth' which the League
had so conspicuously lacked and which the UN, it was believed, would
require if it were to be an effective agent for peace-enforcement.'
The scheme soon ran aground. Some of the original plans for the pro-
posed military force were quite ambitious: the United States envisaged a
"force of twenty divisions, nearly 4000 aircraft, three battleships, fifteen
cruisers, six carriers and eighty-four destroyers.'"1' 5 Owing chiefly to in-
tractable differences between Western and Eastern blocs over the size,
composition, equipment, supply, and stationing of such a force, however,
the Council was unable to reach agreement, "and the Security Council
force, which was to have been the centre-piece of the new UN system,
never came into existence at all."'4 Interest in the idea of implementing
Article 43 was briefly rekindled after the United Nations' forces' initial
101. RUSSELL, supra note 61, at 467. A similar idea had been proposed during the
creation of the League, and was occasionally raised in later years, but had come to nothing.
See WALTERS, supra note 61, at 62-63.
102. U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 1.
103. Id. art. 47, paras. 2-3.
104. 1 LUARD, supra note 61, at 98. Likewise, the Report of the Secretary of State to the
President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference declared that the national air
forces to be held in reserve for international enforcement action would provide the "edge
of the sword which will ultimately be placed in the hands of the Security Council."
REPORT ON SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, supra note 66, at 96.
105. See 1 LUARD, supra note 61, at 101.
106. Id. at 103.
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successes in the Korean War-an interest reflected in the celebrated
Uniting for Peace Resolution of the General Assembly in 1950.'7 But as
the Korean War proved more difficult, the Assembly's recommendation
"was quietly discarded.' ' 8  After the end of the cold war, the Secretary
General again revived the proposal-which once more fell on deaf ears.'O9
II. ARTICLE 51 AND THE LIMITS OF SELF-DEFENSE
Enjoyment of the benefits of the Charter's collective security system
entailed, for member states, a willingness to accept the burdens of sus-
taining that system. But it also involved other important, and more im-
mediate, costs to member states, particularly in the form of concessions
of some of their "traditional" prerogatives with respect to war and self-
defense. Article 2(4) of the Charter made aggressive war, and indeed
other uses or threats of force against another state, a delict. And Article
51 circumscribed lawful self-defense. In order to measure the extent of
these concessions, we will need to compare the extent of state "sover-
eign" prerogatives with regard to war and self-defense before the Charter
with what remains to member states after it. To do that, it is helpful to
identify at least an approximate pre-Charter baseline. After first outlin-
ing the "traditional" idea of sovereign war prerogatives, this Part will
examine in some detail what seems to be the most relevant and useful
pre-Charter "baseline," the Kellogg-Briand Pact. (This is not to deny
that many other elements of pre-Charter international law are also highly
relevant in determining the pre-Charter Law of War.) Thereafter, this
Part will consider how Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter represent de-
partures from that baseline-in the direction, of course, of establishing
107. G.A. Res. 377 (V), T 8, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 3, 1950). In attempting to reas-
sign Security Council functions to the General Assembly, the Uniting for Peace Resolution
is of doubtful legality. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1962 I.C.J. 151,164-65.
108. CLAUDE, supra note 61, at 171; see also Keith S. Petersen, The Uses of the Uniting
for Peace Resolution Since 1950, 13 INT'L ORG. 219, 220 (1959) (noting that recommenda-
tion had "become moribund"; only four of sixty nations circularized with requests for how
they intended to implement recommendation responded, and total offers of contingents
came to only 6,000 personnel).
109. See The Secretary General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-
making and Peace-keeping, 43, delivered to the Members of the United Nations, U.N. Doc.
A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992). There, the Secretary General opined-quite incor-
rectly-that "[u]nder the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the
Charter was adopted, the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agree-
ments [pursuant to Article 43] should no longer prevail." Id.
Most recently, Secretary General Annan has called on member states to "creat[e] stra-
tegic reserves that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework of United Nations ar-
rangements," for peacekeeping operations. In Larger Freedom, supra note 39, 112. This
appeal does, however, fall far short of the original conception of Article 43.
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far more demanding jus ad bellum requirements, and correspondingly,
diminishing state power drastically.
The "Classic" Theory of Sovereign Prerogatives with Regard to War
There would be no reason for international law to ban war if states
were not drawn to it. States are usually drawn to it "not from any irra-
tional and emotive drives, but from almost a superabundance of analytic
rationality."" For modern states, war has been "preeminently a function
of Staatspolitik,'' . and has usually been undertaken because of the "ra-
tional apprehension of future evil" from another state.11 2 To persuade a
state to renounce its right to make war at the times and in the circum-
stances of its own choosing is, therefore, to extract from it something of
great value.
The classic law of war of the modern period implicitly recognized the
value of warmaking to states by taking it to be integral to their sover-
eignty to be free to make war or not as they chose. The decision to wage
war simply could not be appraised in the dimension of legality.13 By the
"classic" international law of sovereign war powers is meant, of course,
the theory that prevailed from at least the latter part of the nineteenth
century to at least the end of the First World War. Robert Jackson, the
chief prosecutor for the United States at the Nuremberg Trial of the ma-
jor Nazi war criminals and an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, explained the theory in his opening statement at the trial as fol-
lows:
110. MICHAEL HOWARD, The Causes of Wars, in THE CAUSES OF WAR: AND OTHER
ESSAYS 7, 14 (1983).
111. Id. at 13.
112. MARTIN WIGHT, POWER POLITICS 139 (Hedley Bull & Carsten Holbraad eds.,
1978). For an evaluation and critique of "rationalist" and "neorealist" theories of war, and
an attempt to solve the problem why rational political leaders might chose war rather than
a negotiated settlement, see James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 INT'L
ORG. 379 (1995).
113. Thus, William Hall opined that international law has "no alternative but to accept
war, independently of the justice of its origin, as a relation which the parties to it may set
up if they choose." WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW §
16, at 62 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 7th ed. 1917). In a similar vein, Henry Wheaton described
war merely as "[a] contest by force between independent sovereign States." HENRY
WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 212 (Da Capo Press 1972) (Carey, Lea
& Blanchard 1836).
114. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 135 (1994);
STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 161 (2005) ("In the nineteenth cen-
tury, war reached its pinnacle of legal prestige .... To a degree unequalled any time be-
fore or since, it was frankly recogni[z]ed by international lawyers as an accepted and rou-
tine means of conducting everyday international business.").
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There was a time, in fact I think the time of the first World War,
when it could not have been said that war inciting or war making
was a crime in law, however reprehensible in morals.
*. . The age of imperialistic expansion during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries added the foul doctrine... that all wars
are to be regarded as legitimate wars."'
In holding that the waging, planning, and preparing of an aggressive
war were international crimes for which the political and military leader-
ship of the aggressor state could be held personally criminally liable, the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg contributed significantly to
the demise of the "foul doctrine." Reflecting the new spirit of interna-
tional legal scholarship in the immediate aftermath of the Second World
War, Philip Jessup observed in 1948 that "[s]overeignty, in its meaning of
an absolute, uncontrolled state will, ultimately free to resort to the final
arbitrament of war, is the quicksand upon which the foundations of tradi-
tional international law are built.',1 6 Nonetheless, even pre-Charter in-
ternational law had discarded the "classic" conception that states had the
unfettered discretion to decide on war or peace; it was also the case that
their discretion was only relatively limited. To see that, we must turn to
the chief legal development in the law of war during inter-war years.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact as Pre-Charter Baseline
In order to establish some baseline for determining what sovereign pre-
rogatives with respect to war and self-defense were yielded or abridged in
the Charter, we must start by considering the most relevant and impor-
tant treaty on the subject before the Charter itself: the General Treaty for
115. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NURNBERG CASE 82-83 (1947); see also C.A. POMPE,
AGGRESSIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 301-02 (1953) ("War was a fact, an inter-
national phenomenon, and classic international law was indifferent towards it .... A 'le-
gality' of war supposed distinction between just and unjust wars, which may have lingered
on in public opinion and may have been defended by some authors, but was not, according
to the majority of them, part of international positive law."); Hans Wehberg, L'Interdiction
Du Recours A La Force, Le Principe et Les Problemes Qui Se Posent, 78 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 27-28 (1951); cf. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY
AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 189 (1922); Robert H. Jackson,
Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Niirnberg in Retrospect, Address to the Thirty-
First Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association (Sept 1, 1999), in 27 CANADIAN
BAR REV. 761, 762 (1949) (stating that international law at start of twentieth century had
taught that "each state is sovereign, its right absolute, its will unrestrained, and free to
resort to war at any time, for any purpose").
116. PHILIP C. JESSuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 2 (1948); see also id. at 157
("The most dramatic weakness of traditional international law has been its admission that
a state may use force to compel compliance with its will."). See generally Louis Henkin,
That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing post-war diminution of sovereignty).
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the Renunciation of War of August 27, 1928,117 more generally referred to
as the "Pact of Paris" or the "Kellogg-Briand Pact" (Kellogg and Briand
being the American and French diplomats who had drafted it). The im-
portance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in determining the pre-Charter state
of international law is underscored by the fact that it served as the lynch-
pin of the judgments of the Nuremberg Tribunal-the other main source
of pre-Charter war law-with regard to aggressive war.1 ' Accordingly,
we must consider the pact in some detail.
The operative clauses of the pact were Articles I and II:
Article I.
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.
Article II.
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or so-
lution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of what-
ever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall
never be sought except by pacific means.
How was the pledge to renounce war "as an instrument of national pol-
icy" to be enforced? The preamble declared "that any signatory Power
which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to
war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty. ',12 ° Apart
from that enigmatic language, the treaty made no provision whatsoever
for enforcement mechanisms. The preambulatory language was appar-
ently intended to operative effect, however. It states that "the benefits
furnished by" the pact "should be denied" to those in breach of it.12 The
language can be read to mean that in the event of a breach by one party,
the other parties might or "should" take recourse to war against the of-
fender. In other words, the pact's enforcement mechanism was a (very
weak) type of collective security: in the event of a breach, the offending
party would expose itself to the risk of forceful countermeasures by any
other party willing to take them.
That interpretation of the pact is confirmed by the remarks of one of its
two co-authors, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, in his ad-
dress on the occasion of the signing of the pact. Briand stated to the as-
sembled dignitaries:
117. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 75.
118. See JACKSON, supra note 115, at 779 ("Most important of all, of course, was ...
the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact ....").




Catholic University Law Review
"But, you say, there is no true realism in this Pact. And where
are [the] sanctions? Well, is that realism which excludes from the
realm of facts all moral forces, among them that of public opin-
ion? Indeed, any state which would so act as to incur the repro-
bation of all its co-signatories would run the positive risk of see-
ing them gradually and freely unite against it, with results which
very soon it would have reason to fear. And where is the coun-
try, a signatory to this Pact, whose leaders would on their own re-
sponsibility expose it to such danger?"'2
Likewise, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, in a 1932 address stated:
"The [Kellogg-Briand] Pact provides for no sanction of force. It
does not require any signatory to intervene with measures of
force in case the Pact is violated. Instead, it rests upon the sanc-
tion of public opinion, which can be made one of the most potent
sanctions of the world." 12
Significantly, the main parties to the pact construed it to preserve their
ability to wage defensive wars.124 Furthermore, they understood the con-
cept of "self-defense" very capaciously. And they insisted that each party
had the right to determine for itself when the occasions for legitimate self-
defense arose.125
Although the United States did not take a formal reservation to the
treaty, the actions and statements of both the Senate and the executive
branch made plain that the United States did not regard the pact as pre-
cluding a war of self-defense. 126 The Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee reported the "'treaty with the understanding that the right of self-
defense is in no way curtailed or impaired by [its] terms or conditions,"'
that "'[e]ach nation ... is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of
self-defense and the necessity and extent of the same,"' and that "'[t]he
United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as part of its national security
122. JAMES T. SHOTWELL, WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY: AND ITS
RENUNCIATION IN THE PACT OF PARIS 185 (1929) (quoting Aristide Briand).
123. SHELDON GLUECK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR 17-18
(1946) (quoting Henry L. Stimson, The Pact of Paris, Three Years of Development (Dep't
of State Pub. 357, 1932)). Stimson's remarks in 1932 corresponded to remarks he had
made in 1929, after succeeding Frank Kellogg as Secretary of State. On that earlier occa-
sion, he had said that "'the Pact contains no covenant similar to that in the Covenant of the
League of Nations providing for joint forceful action by the various signatories against an
aggressor. Its efficacy depends solely upon the public opinion of the world and upon the
conscience of those nations who sign it."' George A. Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and
International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 31 (1947) (citation omitted) (quoting Henry L.
Stimson).
124. See DENYS P. MYERS, ORIGIN AND CONCLUSION OF THE PARIS PACT: THE
RENUNCIATION OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 50-56 (1929).
125. See id.
126. Id. at 50-51 ("'[T]he right of self-defense is ... implicit in every treaty."' (omission
in original) (citation omitted)).
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and defense. ' '"1 27  The executive branch's position was essentially the
same as the Senate's position. In remarks to the American Society of
International Law on April 28, 1928, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg,
who like Briand had given his name to the pact, emphasized that the right
of national self-defense was "inherent," "inalienable," and "implicit in
every treaty," and that each state "alone is competent to decide whether
circumstances require recourse to war in self defense.' ' 8  Kellogg's
speech "was ultimately made a part of the official record and [was to]
stand alongside the treaty.., as an authoritative commentary.'
29
Other major powers put forward similar interpretations. The French
government was unwilling to accept the treaty without an understanding
that it alone could determine what was necessary for its self-defense.'
The British government went even further-so far indeed as to provoke
an objection from the Soviet Union, another treaty party.' The British
made a reservation,132 stating that there were certain unspecified "regions
of the world" that "constitute[d] a special and vital interest for [the]
peace and safety" of the British Empire, "that interference with these
regions can not be suffered," and that Britain accordingly retained its
"freedom of action" to protect those regions against attack.'33
Not only was the pact construed to preserve a broad (and unilaterally
determined) right of self-defense, but it was further weakened by the
absence of any definition of, or test for, "aggression." Both flaws were
widely perceived; indeed, on the theory that "self-defense" and "aggres-
sion" are the reciprocals of each other, the flaws are, in fact, but one.
4
Secretary of State Kellogg, in an address to the Council on Foreign Rela-
127. Id. at 68-69 (quoting Exec. Report No. 1 (1929), reprinted in 70 CONG. REC. 1730,
1730 (1929)); see also id. at 89 (noting that the State Department was in accord with the
Senate regarding the Monroe Doctrine).
128. Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Sec'y of State, The French Draft of the Multilateral Treaty
for the Renunciation of War, Address Before the American Society of International Law,
in 1 SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE PACr OF PARIS 112, 113 (James Thayer Gerould com-
piler, 1929); see also SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 726 (5th ed. 1965); MYERS, supra note 124, at 135-36 (citing a diplomatic note of
the United States government from June 23, 1928).
129. SHOTWELL, supra note 122, at 157.
130. MYERS, supra note 124, at 45-46.
131. Letter from M. Litvinov, to the French Ambassador in Moscow (Aug. 31, 1928),
reprinted in MYERS, supra note 124, at 167, 171.
132. Some viewed the British statement as less than a formal "reservation," seeing it
instead as an interpretation or explanation of the Pact. See SHOTWELL, supra note 122, at
167, 194-95, 200-08. But see Edwin M. Borchard, Editorial Comment, The Multilateral
Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 116, 116-17 (1929).
133. Letter from Austen Chamberlain, Sec'y of State for Foreign Affairs of Gr. Brit., to
Alanson B. Houghton, Am. Ambassador in London (May 19, 1928), reprinted in MYERS,
supra note 124, at 124, 126; see also BEMIS, supra note 128, at 727.
134. On some accounts, a definition of aggression would, of necessity, set a limit to
what counted as lawful self-defense. Cf. Linnan, supra note 42, at 70.
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tions on March 15, 1928, acknowledged "the absence of any satisfactory
definition of the word 'aggressor' or the phrase 'wars of aggression,"' but
found it "difficult... to see how a definition could be agreed upon which
would not be open to abuse., 135 Legal scholars of the period argued that
the parties' sweeping understanding of self-defense, coupled with the
absence of any definition of "aggression" in the pact, rendered it all but a
nullity.136 Diplomats and international lawyers throughout the 1930s also
faulted the Pact of Paris for lacking a definition of "aggressive war." '37
Even apart from those difficulties, the scope of the legal commitments
that the parties had made remained extremely uncertain. They had re-
nounced "war" as "'an instrument of national policy"'; but what was
"war" and when was it used as "'an instrument of national policy"?138 In
the classic international law jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, war had been considered a legal condition as
135. Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Sec'y of State, The War Prevention Policy of the United
States, Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 15, 1928), in 1 SELECTED
ARTICLES ON THE PACT OF PARIS, supra note 128, at 98, 108.
136. See, e.g., C.G. Fenwick, Editorial Comment, War as an Instrument of National
Policy, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 826, 827-28 (1928). Fenwick argued:
[IIt is the very lack of a definition of self-defense that makes the renunciation of war
as an instrument of national policy so vague as to be almost misleading....
... It is the remoter aspects of national defense which create the real difficulty.
Due to the lack of an effective organization for preventing resort to force, interna-
tional law developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a tradition of na-
tional defense which included practically the whole range of the causes of war....
... In each case [of the contemporary defensive policies of the United States, Brit-
ain, France, Italy, and even Japan in Manchuria] the principle of national defense is
given an interpretation extending far beyond the conception of resistance to actual
armed invasion. There is ever present the necessity of anticipating conditions which,
if allowed to come about, might ultimately embarrass the resistance of the state to di-
rect attack. By a very simple manipulation of the circumstances leading to a crisis all
wars can be made out to be defensive wars ....
Id. Likewise, Professor Edwin M. Borchard of Yale Law School, writing in 1929 in the
American Journal of International Law, found that the Pact of Paris "will have constituted,
instead of an outlawry of war, a solemn and practically universal declaration that wars of
self-defense, League wars and the others provided for in the Pact, are lawful. It is not
believed that any conceivable wars have been excluded from the list of permitted wars."
Borchard, supra note 132, at 117-18.
137. See, e.g., JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF
UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 33 (1958) (noting that the First Committee
of the Assembly of the League of Nations reported in 1931 that the Pact (like the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations before it) did not exclude the belligerent exercise of "the
right of 'legitimate self-defence' (citation omitted)). Moreover, the Committee found
"that 'the satisfactory enumeration of the distinctive characteristics either of aggression or
of legitimate self-defence appears difficult and even impossible."' Id. (citation omitted).
138. Fenwick, supra note 136, at 826. The Soviet Union called attention to these and
related questions in a diplomatic note of August 31, 1928, responding to the invitation to
adhere to the Pact. See Wehberg, supra note 115, at 49-50.
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well as a factual one.'39 Aggressors might therefore attempt to circum-
vent the pact by arguing that their use of armed force against another
nation lacked the legal quality of war, and hence was not a violation.
' °
Furthermore, the traditional law of war recognized measures short of
war-for example, "reprisals" or "interventions"-that arguably did not
fall within the pact's proscriptions.14' And when was a party using war "as
an instrument of national policy"? Suppose that a nation went to war to
recover a lost province that had wrongfully been taken from it by an ag-
gressor. If the lapse of time between the loss of the province and the at-
tempt at recovering it were long enough, the war might no longer appear
to be "defensive." And the lapse might well be long, if the victim had to
wait until the aggressor was weakened or distracted by another conflict.
But if the goal of the war were simply to undo a past injustice, would it be
fair to say that the erstwhile victim had used war "as an instrument of
national policy"? More generally, if a nation waged war to vindicate its
clear and unambiguous legal rights (as determined, for example, by an
international arbitration panel), would the pact forbid that war?
142
If the Kellogg-Briand Pact can serve as the main, or at least an ap-
proximate, baseline of the pre-Charter war rights of sovereign states,
then, those states will have retained some, or perhaps a substantial,
measure of their traditional prerogatives. To be sure, the pact, as power-
fully reinforced by the Nuremberg judgment, denied states the right to
wage aggressive war. And that decision, undoubtedly, constituted a very
significant reduction of sovereign prerogatives. But the pact (at least
arguably) did not annul states' rights to wage offensive wars in at least
some circumstances or for at least some purposes. Further, as discussed
below, even if the pact did ban all offensive wars, it may not have forbid-
den all measures short of war, such as reprisals. And more clearly still,
the pact did not negate states' (rather generously conceived) right of self-
defense; nor (accepting statements like Secretary Kellogg's at face value)
did it diminish their second-order rights to determine for themselves what
was permissible self-defense. In all these respects, therefore, acceptance
139. On the doctrine of war (or de jure war) as a "legal status," see IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 26-28 (1963).
140. See id. at 84 (finding the question whether the Pact prohibited the use of force in
the absence of "war" in the formal sense to be "extremely difficult to resolve"). Efforts in
the 1930s to extend the Pact's condemnation of war to all recourses to force met with some
success, but were ultimately inconclusive. See Wehberg, supra note 115, at 54-56.
141. See BOWETT, supra note 5, at 136.
142. See BROWNLIE, supra note 139, at 89 (noting, but disagreeing with, the view of
Hans Kelsen that the Pact considered war waged against a violation of international law
not to be use of war "'as an instrument of national policy'); see also YORAM DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 84 (4th ed. 2005) (noting the thesis of J.H.W.
Verzijl that League Members could resort to war if necessary to enforce an arbitral award
or judgment).
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of the Charter scheme arguably involved concessions, of varying degrees
of significance, of states' pre-existing sovereign rights and powers.
Pre- and Post-Charter Rules Regarding "Armed Reprisals"
The pre-Charter law of war (or, strictly, law of peace) recognized vari-
ous uses of force that were considered to fall short of war. These in-
cluded "reprisals" and "interventions." The overwhelming consensus of
opinion is that both reprisals and at least some forms of interventions are
illegal after the Charter. 4 1 On the other hand, both statesmen and publi-
cists maintained before the First World War that these measures, like war
itself, could be taken at the unfettered discretion of states.1 " Were these
measures illegal in the period immediately before the Charter? If their
illegality in that period was uncertain, then the surrender of any claim to
retain such "rights" can be said to represent a form of consideration that
was exchanged for the Charter's promise of collective security. I consider
here only the question of "armed reprisals."
Under pre-Charter law, the prevailing definition of reprisal was drawn
from the Naulilaa Case (Portugal v. Germany).' That 1928 opinion
stated:
A reprisal is an act of self-help (Selbsthilfehandlung) on the part
of the injured state-after an unsatisfied demand-responding to
an act contrary to the law of nations on the part of the offending
state. [The reprisal] has the effect of momentarily suspending, in
the relations of the two states, the observance of one or another
rule of international law.... It would be illegal if a prior act, con-
trary to international law, had not furnished the reason for it.'46
Reprisals, so understood, involved a prior delict under international law,
a prior demand for redress, and proportionality in an otherwise illegal
response.
Were peacetime armed reprisals unlawful before the Charter? Nothing
in the language of the Kellogg-Briand Pact expressly forbade them, al-
though the undertaking in Article II of the pact not to seek "the settle-
ment or solution of [any inter-Party] disputes or conflicts of whatever
nature or of whatever origin... except by pacific means" could reasona-
bly be read to imply such a proscription.47 The Institut de Droit Interna-
tional opined in 1934 that armed reprisals in peacetime were forbidden
143. On the illegality of interventions, see, for example, Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106-10 (June 27); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.),
1949 I.C.J. 4, 34 (Apr. 9). The legality of reprisals will be considered below.
144. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 216
(1986).
145. Naulilaa (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1012 (Special Arb. Panel 1949).
146. Id. at 1025-26 (translation provided by author).
147. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 75, art. III.
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on the same conditions as recourse to war. J.L. Brierly thought it
"clear" that the pact rendered armed reprisals illegal.149 Ian Brownlie,
however, is far more doubtful, finding that "the question was not effec-
tively settled by the coming into being of the Kellogg-Briand Pact."'50
Roberto Ago, the special rapporteur for the International Law Commis-
sion's 1980 Report on State Responsibility, also concluded that it would
"be straining the meaning of [the pact] to infer from it that the prohibi-
tion it contained was to extend also to recourse to force other than
war.""' And six years after the pact, Hans Lauterpacht was convinced
that it had not forbidden reprisals.1
2
The Charter eliminated any persisting uncertainty: there is a clear con-
sensus that Chapter II, and especially Article 2(4), makes peacetime
armed reprisals illegal."' Various organs of the United Nations have de-
148. R6gime des r6pr6sailles en temp de paix art. 4, Oct. 19, 1934, reprinted in
R sOLUTIONS DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1873-1956, at 169 (Hans We-
hberg ed., 1957).
149. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 421 (6th ed. 1963); accord Quincy
Wright, Editorial Comment, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L.
112, 115 (1959).
150. BROWNLIE, supra note 139, at 222; see also Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945-
Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law,
13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (2003).
151. Roberto Ago, Int'l Law Comm'n, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Re-
sponsibility, [19801 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 13,59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7.
152. See Hans Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of Interpreta-
tion, 20 TRANS. GROTIUS SOC'Y 178, 178-80 (1934) (criticizing interpretation of pact that
construed its obligations "as extending not only to war in its technical meaning, but also to
armed force in general," and that read pact to prohibit not only "war," but also "resort to
force short of war, like reprisals or pacific blockade").
153. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 50, at 240; Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Re-
course to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1972); Robert W. Tucker, Reprisals and
Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 586, 594 (1972). There are, however,
plausible arguments that the distinction between (illegal) armed reprisal and (legal) armed
self-defense is tenuous insofar as both involve a purpose to deter, and that even if the
Charter prohibits reprisals under Article 2, it nonetheless permits substantively similar
actions as lawful self-defense under Article 51. See Bowett, supra, at 2-4; Tucker, supra, at
594.
United States practice lends support to that conclusion. In recent years, the United
States has undertaken military actions that, although characterized as self-defense, could
also be viewed as armed reprisals. These actions include the 1986 U.S. bombardment of
targets in Libya in response to the bombing of a Berlin nightclub frequented by U.S. mili-
tary personnel, see Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya, 1
PUB. PAPERS 468 (Apr. 14, 1986); the 1993 firing of U.S. Navy missiles at Iraqi intelligence
headquarters in response to a thwarted Iraqi attempt to assassinate former President
George W. Bush; and the retaliatory air strikes launched in 1998 against Osama bin
Laden's base in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan in response to al Qaeda attacks on two
U.S. embassies in Africa. See Franck, supra note 5, at 61-62 (noting that "there was
scarcely any criticism and no recourse to the UN" in response to the 1998 air strikes);
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nounced armed reprisals as Charter violations. For example, in Resolu-
tion 188, the Security Council "[c]ondemn[ed] reprisals as incompatible
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations."' 4 The General
Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations 5 affirmed that "States
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.
156
The ICJ stated in its advisory opinion in Legality of Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons'57 that "armed reprisals in time of peace ... are considered
to be unlawful." '58 Likewise, the U.S. missile strikes at issue in Oil Plat-
forms, which the ICJ refused to countenance as valid acts of self-defense,
might alternatively have been characterized as illegal armed reprisals.159
Accordingly, by agreeing to renounce any legal claim (however debat-
able) to be able to engage in peacetime armed reprisals, the parties to the
Charter were indeed conceding some measure of their pre-Charter sov-
ereignty.
The condemnation by United Nations organs of armed reprisals as
Charter violations presupposes the functioning of the collective security
system envisaged by the Charter: without that presupposition, the distinc-
tion between illegal acts of armed reprisal and lawful acts of self-defense
is unrealistic.' 60 Especially when a nation acts in the context of continuing
(if intermittent) conflict with adversaries (as is the case with Israel and
some of its Arab neighbors), armed reprisals may be a necessary or useful
measure to counter small-scale but damaging attacks and to deter their
repetition. Some commentators, pointing to the yawning "'credibility
Kelly, supra note 150, at 16-18; W. Hays Parks, Lessons from the 1986 Libya Airstrike, 36
NEW ENG. L. REV. 755, 760 (2002).
154. S.C. Res. 188, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/188 (Apr. 9, 1964).
155. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(Oct. 24, 1970).
156. Id. pmbl.
157. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8).
158. Id. at 246; see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U.
PITr. L. REv. 889,894 (2002).
159. See William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror
Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 474 (1990) (characterizing U.S. actions as "reasonable
reprisals").
160. See id. at 470 ("The systemic model reflected in the Security Council's handling of
reprisals is a pristine 1945 U.N. Charter model. It is assumed that effective collective secu-
rity and machinery for peaceful resolution of disputes exist. Recourse to force or the
threat of force is strictly limited by article 2(4), the enforcement provisions of chapter VII
and article 51. Self-help measures of armed coercion are strictly limited to immediate
defense against an armed attack."); see also id. at 475-76.
161. See Bowett, supra note 153, at 4.
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gap ' 62 between the legal norm promulgated by the United Nations or-
gans and the actual practice of states, have urged the adoption of a doc-
trine of "reasonable" reprisal.163 If, as argued in this Article, the failure of
the Charter's collective security system entitles member states to resume
at least some of their pre-Charter jus ad bellum rights, then states should
indeed be free to develop a new customary norm of "reasonable" repri-
sal.
Pre- and Post-Charter Rules Regarding Self-Defense:
The Competence to Decide
As noted above, in joining the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United States,
among others, insisted that it had the sole competence to decide whether
its actions constituted legitimate self-defense. If this position represented
prevailing pre-Charter law, then the Charter was close to a complete re-
pudiation of it. Article 51 seems to give member states only the right to
determine what is legitimate self-defense in the first instance, until such
time as "the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."' ' Moreover, Article 39 vests in the
Council the sole authority to "determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."' 65 It appears to fol-
low that the Security Council has the authority to review and override a
Member State's claim (even if made in good faith) to have exercised its
right of self-defense, and to find instead that such action was itself a
breach of the peace, a threat to the peace, or an act of aggression.
Intervening between the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Charter, how-
ever, the Nuremberg judgment provided a more coherent and more au-
thoritative formulation of pre-Charter customary law. Counsel for some
of the Nuremberg defendants sought to argue that Germany's 1940 inva-
sion of Norway was not an act of aggressive war, but rather anticipatory
self-defense against an expected British invasion of the same country.166
Further, relying on the statements made at the time of the adoption of
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, they contended that Germany's determination
that it was acting defensively in invading Norway was conclusive on all
other nations.1 67 The International Military Tribunal (IMT) accepted the
possibility of a defense of anticipatory self defense, but denied that each
nation had the sole and unreviewable discretion to decide unilaterally
whether its actions were lawful self-defense:
162. Id. at 1.
163. See id.; O'Brien, supra note 159.
164. U.N. Charter art. 51.
165. Id. art. 39.
166. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 99 (Int'l Military Trib. 1946).
167. Id. at 100.
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It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in ac-
cordance with the reservations made by many of the Signatory
Powers at the time of the conclusion of the Briand-Kellogg Pact,
whether preventive action was a necessity, and that in making her
decision her judgment was conclusive. But whether action taken
under the claim of self-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive
must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if in-
ternational law is ever to be enforced. 168
The IMT's ruling was surely sound: if no other nations could assay Ger-
many's claim to be acting in lawful self-defense, then there would have
been no need for Germany even to have entered such a claim. The very
fact of raising a defense of lawful self-defense, and of attempting to sus-
tain it by argument, proved that international review of that defense was
possible.
The difference between pre-Charter and Charter law on the issue of
competence to decide was, therefore, not as great as might at first appear.
Still, there was a gap. The Nuremberg judgment had merely indicated
that any claim of self-defense "must ultimately be subject to investigation
and adjudication,"' 69 without specifying what international agency or
agencies were to perform those functions or how their determinations
were to be enforced. Further, the judgment's formulation was consistent
with the position that each nation's claim of self-defense, at least if made
in good faith, should be considered presumptively correct or was entitled
to substantial deference. ° Article 39 of the Charter does, however, ap-
point an international agency to investigate and adjudicate claims of self-
defense and to enforce sanctions if those claims prove unsound: the Secu-
rity Council. 71 Moreover, the Charter indicates no bias in favor of the
validity of the claim of self-defense. Under the Charter scheme, nations
may act under a claim of self-defense, but they do so at their peril; and if
the Security Council hears and rejects their claims, they are subject to any
of the sanctions in the Council's repertoire, including an enforcement
action.
Furthermore, as the Charter has been interpreted, a nation's claim of
self-defense has been held to be subject to investigation and adjudication,
not only by the Security Council, but also by the ICJ. Implicit in each of
the ICJ's decisions in Nicaragua, Oil Platforms, the Wall Case, and De-
168. Id. Previously, the League of Nations' Lytton Commission had rejected a similar
Japanese claim, also rooted in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, that Japan had the sole and unre-
viewable competence to determine whether its 1931 invasion of Manchuria was justifiable
self-defense. See BOWETr, supra note 5, at 32-33. A League committee also rejected a
Japanese claim to be acting in self-defense in 1937. See BROWNLIE, supra note 139, at 78.
169. Nurnberg, 6 F.R.D. at 100.
170. See BROWNLIE, supra note 139, at 237-38.
171. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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mocratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda is the assumption that the ICJ can,
in proper cases, review and reject a defense of self-defense. In Nicara-
gua, the ICJ went so far as to reject the United States' claim that it could
not review the validity of such claims in the context of an ongoing con-
flict. The ICJ assumed the same stance in the Wall Case, where again
the claim of self-defense was raised in connection with actions taken in a
conflict that was still active during the adjudication. 17' Although one
might naturally read Article 39 of the Charter to provide for a political
rather than a legal determination of the validity of claims of self-defense,
along the lines of the "political question" doctrine in constitutional law,
74
the ICJ has added a layer of judicial review to the political review for
which the Charter expressly provided. Indeed, Judge Simma's separate
opinion in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda appears to read the
Charter as vesting the ICJ with the primary role in deciding such ques-
tions, and seems to consider the Security Council's determinations as less
significant precisely because they are political; this, he says, is the very
172. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibil-
ity, 1984 I.C.J. 392, 436-38 (Nov. 26).
173. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1026-27.
174. Frederic Kirgis has noted:
It was recognized at San Francisco that the Security Council ... would interpret
Charter provisions relating to its own functions....
The Security Council was clearly empowered from the outset to make some other
determinations that could be seen as quasi-judicial. Thus, it could expressly, or by
necessary implication, brand a state as a potential or actual violator of international
law. The obvious example is the Article 39 authority to determine the existence of a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 527
(1995). The Council's authority to brand a state as an aggressor-or to withhold that de-
termination-is undercut if the ICJ has a parallel authority and might reach the opposite
conclusion. Thus, for instance, the Council has consciously refrained from condemning
Turkey's cross-border incursions against Iraq against the bases of Kurdish separatists op-
erating in the latter country, despite Iraq's repeated protests. The Council's inaction might
be seen as an implicit acceptance of the argument that Turkey was acting in lawful self-
defense under Article 51. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 115-17 (2d ed. 2004). But if the ICJ had jurisdiction to review the Turkish incur-
sions, it might come to a different conclusion. For a very different view, see Karl Doe-
hring, Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal Consequences, 1 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 91, 100 (1997) (arguing that individual states should be
able to sue United Nations before the ICJ for allegedly illegal Security Council decisions,
and recommending referrals by Council to ICJ when states complain of illegality of Coun-
cil decisions before Council acts on them).
Applying the "political question" doctrine to Article 51 would not, of course, preclude
the ICJ from ruling upon other clauses of the Charter-a function of the ICJ that is well-
established. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962
I.C.J. 151, 155-56 (July 20).
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"division of labour between" political and judicial organs that the Char-
ter envisaged. 5
Giving the ICJ rather than the Council the lead role in deciding
whether actions are unlawful "aggression" or valid "self-defense" may
well be standing the Charter on its head. Moreover, pace Judge Simma,
the ICJ's performance in cases involving the Charter's use of foice rules
hardly shows it to be "apolitical." Thus, the ICJ was unwilling, ostensibly
for jurisdictional reasons, to decide Serbia's case that NATO had violated
the Charter by waging a "humanitarian" war against it in 1999 in Kos-
ovo.176  Given its expansive reading of its jurisdiction elsewhere, as in
Nicaragua, the ICJ's reluctance to decide the merits of Serbia's case sug-
gests that it was more preoccupied with protecting its own image than
with neutrally enforcing Charter rules: no matter how valid Serbia's read-
ing of Charter rules was, 77 Serbia's then ruler, Slobodan Milosevic, was
175. Armed Activities on Territory of the Congo (Dem Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Dec.
19, 2005), 45 I.L.M. 271, 369 (Simma, J., separate opinion).
176. See Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
Belgium): The Court Rejects the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Sub-
mitted by Yugoslavia, but Remains Seised of the Case (June 2, 1999). On March 24, 1999,
NATO forces began an air war over Serbia without a pre-existing Security Council resolu-
tion authorizing such use of force. Joseph C. Sweeney, The Just War Ethic in International
Law, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1865, 1890 (2004). No claim was made that NATO forces
were acting in self-defense under Article 51. NATO forces struck Serbian targets unremit-
tingly for the following seventy-eight days. See Timothy William Waters, Unexploded
Bomb: Voice, Silence, and Consequence at the Hague Tribunals: A Legal and Rhetorical
Critique, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1015, 1022 (2003). The question of the legality of
NATO's air war became the subject of litigation in the ICJ when the government of Ser-
bia, then under Slobodan Milosevic, sought an interim ruling on April 29, 1999 to enjoin
the NATO defendants' campaign. See Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. BeIg.), Provi-
sional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. 124, 124-28 (June 2). This was the first occasion on which the
ICJ had dismissed a request for such interim relief on the basis of lack of prima facie juris-
diction. Christine Gray, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) (Yugoslavia v.
Canada) (Yugoslavia v. France) (Yugoslavia v. Germany) (Yugoslavia v. Italy) (Yugosla-
via v. Netherlands) (Yugoslavia v. Portugal) (Yugoslavia v. Spain) (Yugoslavia v. United
Kingdom) (Yugoslavia v. United States of America): Provisional Measures, 49 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 730, 732 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2000). Later efforts by Yugoslavia to per-
suade the ICJ to take jurisdiction and decide its suit on the merits have also been unsuc-
cessful. Id.; Peter H.F. Bekker, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) (Yugo-
slavia v. Canada) (Yugoslavia v. France) (Yugoslavia v. Germany) (Yugoslavia v. Italy)
(Yugoslavia v. The Netherlands) (Yugoslavia v. Portugal) (Yugoslavia v. Spain) (Yugosla-
via v. United Kingdom) (Yugoslavia v. United States), 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 928, 928-30 (Ber-
nard H. Oxman ed., 1999).
177. See Eric A. Posner, Op-Ed., All Justice, Too, Is Local, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004,
at N ("[T]here is no doubt that, in strictly legal terms, NATO's intervention [in Kosovo]
violated international standards. What was unclear was whether the [ICJ] had jurisdiction
to act against it. In this, the court was in an unenviable position: if it had held against the
NATO states, they would surely have ignored the judgment. By holding in favor of these
states, the court showed its irrelevance."). See generally Abraham D. Sofaer, International
Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2000).
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simply too repulsive a plaintiff.178 Whether the ICJ is entitled to priority
over the Council in interpreting Charter use of force rules is not, how-
ever, the present question; if the ICJ has usurped the Council's preroga-
tives, the Council seems to have acquiesced. What matters here is that
the Charter is now authoritatively understood to have superimposed two
different layers of international review over a nation's claim to be acting
in self-defense- one political, the other judicial. And by no account can
that result be considered to have been pre-Charter law.
Pre- and Post-Charter Rules Regarding Anticipatory Self-Defense
The question whether Article 51 negates the customary law doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense has long stirred controversy. This is not the
place in which to try to untangle that question. Rather, we need only
consider the scope of the pre-Charter right, and how far Article 51 may
have contracted it.
Three leading legal precedents contributed to the general pre-Charter
understanding of anticipatory self-defense: the Caroline incident, the
Nuremberg judgment, and the judgment of the Tokyo trials. In addition,
state practice during the Second World War, including the United States'
assistance to Great Britain in its conflict with Nazi Germany before the
United States officially entered the Second World War, furnishes impor-
tant guidance as to pre-Charter law relating to anticipatory self-defense.
Legal Precedents: The Caroline Incident
The Caroline incident occurred during the Canadian Rebellion of
1837.179 Some U.S. nationals along the border sympathized with the Ca-
nadian rebels and sought to assist them.ln The United States government
attempted to suppress these activities by its own nationals, but was un-
178. In oral arguments in Yugoslavia, the NATO defendants had urged the ICJ to use
its discretion to deny interim relief because Serbia had come before the court without
"clean hands." Aaron Schwabach, Yugoslavia v. NATO, Security Council Resolution 1244,
and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 77, 89-90
(2000). In other cases as well, the ICJ has adroitly avoided having to decide the merits in
favor of unpopular plaintiffs such as Antonio Salazar's Portugal. See Right of Passage
Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 30-31 (Apr. 12) (declining to decide
whether India had violated international law by tolerating the presence on its soil of "sub-
versive elements" who were to overthrow part of Portugal's authority in its Indian territo-
ries).
179. See generally R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L.
82 (1938) (providing the standard account of the factual background of the Caroline inci-
dent); see also Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Lord Ashburton, British
Special Minister (July 27, 1842), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/diplomacy/britain/br-1842d.htm [hereinafter Webster Letter] (providing this letter
and other important primary materials of the Caroline case).
180. Jennings, supra note 179, at 82.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
successful.181 In December 1837, a group of armed men, many of them
U.S. nationals, seized Navy Island on the Canadian side of the Niagara
River, and used it as a base for attacking the Canadian mainland.'8 2 The
Caroline, a steamer bearing the U.S. flag, was used to make trips between
New York and Navy Island and convoy men and material to the Cana-
dian rebels.1n The British commander, observing this activity, resolved to
destroy the Caroline while it was in Canadian territory at Navy Island.
84
As it happened, however, the Caroline had returned to U.S. territory,
carrying twenty-three U.S. nationals on board, when the British fell upon
it and destroyed it. 5 American diplomatic protests, originally made in
1838, were renewed by Secretary of State Daniel Webster beginning in
1841.186 Webster's letter of July 27, 1842, to the British Special Minister
Lord Ashburton is the now-classic statement of the Caroline doctrine. In
that letter, Webster maintained that under the circumstances, "[i]t will be
for [the British g]overnment to show a necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
tion.""'
Timothy kearley has reexamined the development of the Caroline doc-
trine and shown that it was reformulated and misstated by many legal
writers in the post-Charter period. 8' As Kearley has demonstrated, the
prevailing pre-Charter understanding limited the doctrine's restrictions
on self-defense only "to extra-territorial uses of force by a state in peace-
time against another state which was unable or unwilling to prevent its
territory from being used as a base of operations for hostile activities
against the state taking action. ' 89 The doctrine was originally not con-
ceived to impose requirements applying to every occasion of lawful self-
defense. For example, a state could properly use armed force to defend
its own sparsely inhabited territory from forcible incursions by another
state's military even if the need for such counter-force was "neither 'in-
stant' nor 'overwhelming."" 90 The common post-Charter view "that the
narrow restrictions of the Caroline doctrine apply to all uses of force by a
181. Id.
182. Id. at 83.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 83-84.
185. Id. at 84.
186. Id. at 85.
187. Webster Letter, supra note 179.
188. See Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 325 (1999).
189. Id. at 325; see also id. at 336-38.
190. Id. at 326.
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state in self-defense under customary international law"'' is, therefore,
mistaken.' 92
The Nuremberg Judgment: The Invasion of Norway
The second major pre-Charter legal precedent is the Nuremberg judg-
ment's ruling on whether the German invasion and conquest of Norway
in March, 1940 was a criminal act of aggressive war or, as the German
defendants argued, a lawful defensive measure against an anticipated
British intervention to secure Norway as a base for operations against
Germany. The Nuremberg judgment is, unfortunately, somewhat con-
fused. The IMT misstated the Caroline doctrine, formulating it as the
view "that preventive action in foreign territory is justified only in case of
'an instant and over-whelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation."" 93 But the Caroline
doctrine was framed for peacetime conditions; and although Germany
and Norway were at peace, the fact that a general European war was rag-
ing may have argued for a relaxation of the doctrine's highly restrictive
conditions. More importantly, as the IMT was aware, Britain had indeed
been planning an occupation of harbors and airports in Norway, and
there was evidence that a convoy would have left Britain in early April to
begin mining Norwegian harbors.'94 Such British action, at least in the
absence of Norway's consent, would itself have been a case of anticipa-
tory self-defense against Germany had the German invasion of Norway
not occurred first;' 95 and the IMT's opinion says nothing to indicate that
that British action would have been unlawful. Rather, the IMT went to
some pains to demonstrate that the German invasion of Norway had
been contemplated "long in advance of the Allied plans" to occupy that
country, and was therefore "not made for the purpose of forestalling an
imminent Allied landing" in it.196
Although the Nuremberg judgment does not say so, one may reasona-
bly infer from it that anticipatory self-defense would be lawful in circum-
stances other than those found in the Caroline incident. For example, if
state A and state B are or are about to be at war, and B knows that A's
191. Id. at 330.
192. For the common post-Charter reading, see, for example, Michael Bothe, Terror-
ism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 227,231 (2003).
193. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 99 (Int'l Military Trib. 1946) (citing the Caroline
case).
194. Id. at 100.
195. There was evidence that the Germans believed that the Norwegian government
would have tacitly consented to a British occupation. Had it been established that Norway
did consent or would have consented, the German defendants could have argued that their
actions constituted lawful, anticipatory self-defense against both Norway and Britain.
196. Id.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
armed forces are on the verge of occupying the territory of neutral state
C for use as a base against B, then B may preempt A's action and occupy
C itself. Here, B would be acting to forestall an attack from A that is
twice removed: A would first have occupied C, then used C as a base from
which to attack B. Although an "imminence" requirement would have to
be satisfied in this situation (as in the Caroline incident), an attack by A
on B would not have to be imminent for B to be justified in acting pre-
emptively; rather, only an attack by A on C would have to be "immi-
nent."
The Tokyo Judgment. The Dutch Declaration of War Against Japan
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMTFE) in the post-World War II Tokyo trials of the major Japanese
war criminals also upheld the right of anticipatory self-defense. The de-
fense was made that the Netherlands, then a major colonial power in
Southeast Asia, had declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941, in ad-
vance of a Japanese declaration of war on it or attack upon its posses-
sions in Asia.'97 However, the Japanese government, having already at-
tacked the United States at Pearl Harbor one day before, was known to
be planning to attack the Dutch East Indies. 98 The IMTFE upheld the
anticipatory action of the Dutch government, stating:
"The fact that the Netherlands, being fully apprised of the immi-
nence of the attack, in self-defence declared war against Japan on
the 8th December and thus officially recognized the existence of
a state of war which had been begun by Japan cannot change that
war from a war of aggression . . . into something other than
that.""9
State Practice in the Second World War:
U.S. Aid to Great Britain in
Violation of Neutral Obligations
In addition to the Caroline doctrine and the Nuremberg and Tokyo de-
cisions, pre-Charter state practice also sheds light on the customary un-
derstanding of anticipatory self-defense. Three episodes from the Second
World War are particularly pertinent. First, the United States provided
substantial assistance to Great Britain in its struggle with Germany before
the United States officially entered the war. The United States, although
formally neutral, aided Britain in a variety of ways, including supplying
197. See MCCORMACK, supra note 5, at 258-59.
198. See id. at 259.




war material, furnishing military escorts to the convoys that carried such
supplies to Britain, training British air force personnel, and engaging in
an "undeclared" naval war against German naval vessels in the North
Atlantic. ° The United States also occupied Iceland so as to secure it
against German invasion and to provide a forward defense perimeter
against an anticipated war with Germany.2°' All of these measures, which
presumably the United States and Britain considered lawful under the
pre-Charter regime, can properly have been regarded as forms of an-
ticipatory self-defense by the United States .20  The upshot is that in a
case in which state A has begun an aggressive war on state B, state C,
which is not a party to the conflict, may legitimately (under pre-Charter
law) furnish B with military assistance, training, and war material of vari-
ous kinds, and even engage in low-level combat with the forces of A, if C
anticipates that B will eventually be at war with C. In these circum-
stances, the "imminence" test for lawful anticipatory self-defense is even
weaker than before.
The British Destruction of the French Fleet
Another example of state practice in the immediate prelude to the
Charter is relevant: the British Royal Navy's destruction on July 3, 1940,
on the orders of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, of the French war
fleet at Mers-el-Krber and Oran in French North Africa, to prevent that
fleet from falling into the hands of Germany.2° Only shortly before, on
June 22, 1940, France had concluded an armistice with Germany,0 5 under
200. See, e.g., Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y
Gen. 58, 58-60 (1941).
201. See JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 70-
71 (1945). This was done with the consent of Iceland's prime minister. Id. at 70.
202. During the Anglo-American discussions at the San Francisco Conference over the
drafting of Article 51, British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden posited the case "of an
attack on Turkey by Bulgaria . . . at the instigation of the Soviet Union." United Nations
Conference, Minutes of the Third Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on Proposed
Amendments (Part I) (May 12, 1945), in 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 1945, at 691, 700 (1967). In that scenario,
Eden said, "Great Britain, as a matter of self-defense of the Empire, wished to have the
opportunity to act at once." Id. That is fundamentally the same situation of anticipatory
self-defense as the one discussed in the text above.
203. Cf. George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era:
What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 346-47 (1998).
204. See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 114, at 211. The episode had a memo-
rable precedent in British naval history. In 1807, the Royal Navy seized the Danish fleet,
following a severe bombardment of Copenhagen, in order to prevent Napoldon from cap-
turing that fleet. See Carl J. Kulsrud, The Seizure of the Danish Fleet, 1807, 32 AM. J. INT'L
L. 280, 280 (1938).
205. See Armistice Agreement Between the German High Command of the Armed
Forces and French Plenipotentiaries, Fr.-Ger., June 22, 1940, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawwweb/avalon/wwii/frgearm.htm.
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Article VIII of which France had agreed to collect its fleet in ports to be
designated by the Germans and, except for units needed to protect the
French colonial empire, demobilize it and lay it up.' 6 Churchill, fearing
that once the French fleet had come under German control, it might be
used against Britain, issued an ultimatum to French Admiral Gensoul,
offering him the opportunity to surrender the parts of the fleet under his
command or risk their destruction. Gensoul did not give way.20 In the
ensuing conflict, the French lost one battleship and saw several other
battleships damaged; more than 1,000 persons lost their lives.2O At the
time of the event, Britain and France were not, of course, at war. This
episode too would presumably have been considered a lawful act of an-
ticipatory self-defense before the Charter's adoption. It is, so to say, the
converse case to the United States' 1940-1941 aid to Britain: if A and B
are at war, then B may lawfully attack and destroy weaponry and other
military equipment belonging to state C, which pursuant to an armistice
has suspended hostilities against A and is thus effectively a neutral, if B
believes that those means of war will fall into the hands of A. Here again,
the imminence test would be applied quite flexibly.
The Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran
The third relevant example of state practice in the period shortly be-
fore the Charter is the Anglo-Soviet invasion of neutral (but Axis-
leaning) Iran in August, 1941.20 Britain, which had significant oil inter-
ests in Iran, was concerned about Nazi activities in that country, and
feared that Germany's armies, then surging toward Soviet Caucasia in
Operation Barbarossa, would soon reach the Iranian border.' Further,
without being able to use the Trans-Iranian Railway to transport supplies
from the Persian Gulf, the British would have been hard pressed to de-
liver desperately needed aid to their Soviet ally. 2  Iran did not comply
with British and Soviet ultimatums to expel resident Germans."' A Brit-
ish force from the south and a Soviet force from the north invaded Iran
on August 25, 1941.1 Iran's ruler, Reza Shah Pahlavi, appealed person-
206. Id. art. VIII.
207. BBC, WW2 People's War, Fact File: Mers-el-Kdbir, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
ww2peopleswar/timeline/index.shtml?1144973 (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See generally RICHARD A. STEWART, SUNRISE AT ABADAN: THE BRITISH AND
SOVIET INVASION OF IRAN, 1941 (1988) (providing an account of the Anglo-Soviet inva-
sion of Iran).
211. See id. at 30-31.
212. See id. at 77.
213. Id. at 107.
214. Id. at 109, 131.
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ally on the same day to President Franklin Roosevelt, the leader of an-
other neutral nation, to use his good offices "to take efficacious and ur-
gent humanitarian steps to put an end to these acts of aggression. 215 Re-
lying on the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the Shah wrote that "this
incident ... brings into war a neutral and pacific country which has had
no other care than the safeguarding of tranquility and the reform of the
country.' '116 Roosevelt declined the Shah's request for assistance, reply-
ing on September 2, 1941 that:
[M]ovements of conquest by Germany will continue and will ex-
tend beyond Europe to Asia, Africa, and even to the Americas,
unless they are stopped by military force. It is equally certain
that those countries which desire to maintain their independence
must engage in a great common effort if they are not to be en-
gulfed one by one as has already happened to a large number of
countries in Europe.
Within a week of President Roosevelt's reply, Reza Shah was deposed by
the occupying powers in favor of his more pliant twenty-one-year-old
son, Mohammed. 8
Prime Minister Winston Churchill considered the Anglo-Soviet inva-
sion to have been a "'technical infringement of international law,"' but
defended it in terms of a higher legality:
Acting in the name of the [League of Nations] Covenant, and as
virtual mandatories of the League and all it stands for, we have a
right, and indeed are bound in duty, to abrogate for a space some
of the conventions of the very laws we seek to consolidate and
reaffirm. Small nations must not tie our hands .... The letter of
the law must not in supreme emergency obstruct those who are
charged with its protection and enforcement.
Alternatively, the intervention might have been justified as lawful pre-
ventative or anticipatory self-defense.2 ° In any case, it seems reasonable
to assume that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union all
would have considered the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran to have been
lawful at the time of the event. If so, the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran
215. Letter from Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President
(Aug. 25, 1941), reprinted in THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 77, 78 (Yonah Alexander & Allan Nanes eds., 1980).
216. Id. at 77-78.
217. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, to Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran
(Sept. 2, 1941), reprinted in THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN, supra note 215, at 79, 80.
218. Cf Letter from Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shahansah of Iran, to Franklin D.
Roosevelt, U.S. President (Jan. 31, 1942), reprinted in THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN,
supra note 215, at 81, 81-82.
219. STEWART, supra note 210, at 3 (quoting WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND
WORLD WAR: THE GATHERING STORM 547 (1948)).
220. See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 114, at 211-12.
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would carry to a further stage the defensive principle at work in the de-
struction of the French fleet in 1940. The imminence test, as before,
would be very undemanding. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that the
Nuremberg tribunal found Germany to have been waging a war of crimi-
nal aggression, it would be difficult to see any principled distinction be-
tween the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and Germany's 1940 inva-
sion of Norway."1
This survey of the leading pre-Charter precedents indicates that cus-
tomary law before the Charter left substantial latitude for various forms
of anticipatory self-defense. If the pre-Charter regime was preserved
intact by Article 51, then the right of anticipatory self-defense goes well
beyond many current interpretations of it-among them, those interpre-
tations that would require that armed counter-measures are lawful in
response to a threat of attack only if the threat is "instant" and "over-
whelming."
How, if at all, did Article 51 alter this pre-Charter regime? The ques-
tion does not permit a straightforward answer. There have been persist-
ing, and perhaps irresoluble, problems in interpreting Article 51, largely
posed by the phrase "inherent right of... self-defence."'22 The use of the
word "inherent" seems to indicate that the Article merely codifies pre-
existing customary law which, as just demonstrated, included a rather
flexible right of anticipatory self-defense. But since Article 51 also goes
on to say that the right of self-defense arises "if an armed attack oc-
curs,"223 it seems almost ineluctable to conclude that self-defense is now
legitimate only after an actual attack, and not in response to the mere
threat of one- even if an attack is known to be imminent. 4
221. Indeed, the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir Stafford Cripps, noted the
resemblance between the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and the German invasion of
"'Norway, where we were prepared to abandon our traditional policy [of respecting neu-
trality],... [but] were not quick enough off the mark."' STEWART, supra note 210, at 61
(first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
222. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. There is a second, less frequently discussed question that also arises out of the use
of the term "inherent." To call the "right" of self-defense inherent (or, in equally authori-
tative French text, "le droit naturer') seems to imply that the right preexists any conven-
tional legal system. An inherent or (still more) "natural" right is one that is logically ante-
cedent to any system of treaty law, or indeed, of customary law. On the other hand, legal
scholars have contended that the concept of self-defense only makes sense within the
structure of a legal system, where it functions (as in criminal law or torts) as a legal defense
to a charge, for example, of assault and battery (or, in international law, of aggression).
See, e.g., Josef L. Kunz, Editorial Comment, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 875-76 (1947) (arguing
that Article 51's reference to an "inherent right" can "only serve to obscure the legal
meaning"). In Nicaragua, the ICJ slid over this question, assuming without analysis that
Article 51 was referring only to customary, rather than to natural, law. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 102-03 (June 27).
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Legal scholars of great weight and authority have long been divided
over which of these interpretations is correct,22 and the controversy
shows no sign of ending.2 Representative of the "restrictive" view of
Article 51 is Ian Brownie, who has argued "that even as a matter of
'plain' interpretation the permission in Article 51 is exceptional in the
context of the Charter and exclusive of any customary right of self-
defence."' ' In Louis Henkin's opinion, "Article 51 permits measures in
self-defense 'if an armed attack occurs'; it does not permit use of force in
self-defense on the ground that an armed attack might occur, or is feared,
however reasonable the fear." Likewise, Michael Bothe finds it "clear
[that] 'armed attack' in the sense of Article 51 is an actual armed attack,
which happens ('occurs'), not one which is only threatened."2 9 Yoram
Dinstein maintains:
When a country feels menaced by the threat of an armed attack,
all that it is free to do- in keeping with the Charter- is make the
necessary military preparations for repulsing the hostile action
should it materialize, as well as bring the matter forthwith to the
attention of the Security Council.... "m
Occasionally the restrictive view is supported by reference to the negoti-
ating history, as for example, when Thomas Franck argues that "[i]n San
Francisco, the founders [of the United Nations] deliberately closed the
door to any claim of 'anticipatory self-defense.'' 31
Critics of the restrictionist view, on the other hand, have urged a vari-
ety of textual and non-textual arguments against it. First, many scholars
have argued that the use of the term "inherent" in Article 51 is a plain
textual signal of the incorporation into the Charter of the views of self-
defense "expressed in connection with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and as
further developed in customary law during the remainder of the" pre-
225. For an objective and well-informed survey of earlier statements of the different
positions, see S.M. Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modern Interna-
tional Law, 136 RECUEIL DES COURs 411, 478-83 (1972). A full and careful recent review
of opinions on the question is given by Sean D. Murphy. See Sean D. Murphy, The Doc-
trine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699, 706-19 (2005); see also Kearley,
supra note 11, at 670-71 (outlining different interpretative positions).
226. For a recent opinion, see generally Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 9.
227. BROWNLIE, supra note 139, at 273.
228. Louis Henkin, War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
817,825 (2005).
229. Bothe, supra note 192, at 229. Bothe does, however, concede that it is "at least
defensible" to consider the Caroline doctrine-or rather, the mistaken post-Charter inter-
pretation of it-as surviving the Charter, although he also thinks that this would be "as far
as pre-emptive self-defence possibly goes under current international law." Id. at 231.
230. DINSTEIN, supra note 142, at 187.
231. Franck, supra note 5, at 59.
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Charter period. 32 A further textual argument against the restrictive view
is that "if an armed attack occurs" need not "mean 'after an armed attack
has occurred"'; and the French text is cited in support. 3  Yet another
textual move has been to claim that "where there is convincing evidence
[that] an [armed attack has] been actually mounted, [that] attack may be
said to have begun to occur," even if the target's territory has not yet
been penetrated. 234  The anti-restrictionist case has also included more
pragmatic arguments: thus, it has been said that "it would be a travesty of
the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending State to allow its as-
sailant to deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow. 2 35 Finally, the anti-
restrictionists contend that, at a minimum, the term "inherent" creates an
ambiguity in the Article, forcing recourse (under general rules of treaty23• 237
interpretation) 6 to the travaux prparatotres.
Scholars who have sought to resolve the textual ambiguity of Article 51
by recourse to the negotiating record have, however, also reached incon-
clusive results.238 Timothy Kearley's massive and probing recent study of
232. Linnan, supra note 42, at 81; see also MCCORMACK, supra note 5, at 178-79
("[T]he word 'inherent' can have no other meaning.... Apart from restricting self-defense
to an interim measure until the Security Council has acted to maintain international peace
and security .... the drafters did not intend to restrict the [customary] right to use force in
self-defense."); Greig, supra note 44, at 370 ("[T]he use of the word 'inherent' provided a
ground for incorporating into the law of the Charter pre-existing customary international
law with regard to self-defence in general .. "); Murphy, supra note 20, at 64 ("Article 51
did not create a right of self-defense; rather, it preserved an inherent right of self-defense,
one that existed in customary international law prior to enactment of the Charter in
1945"); Rostow, supra note 5, at 513 ("Article 51 says that the historic conception of the
right of self-defense is not impaired by the Charter .... "); Schmitt, supra note 22, at 750
(referring to "Article 51, and the customary law it codifies"). On the other side, one
scholar argues that because "[t]he UN Charter was adopted for the very purpose of creat-
ing a far wider prohibition on force than existed under treaty or custom in 1945," the idea
that Article 51's use of the term "inherent" incorporates pre-Charter customary law "re-
quires privileging the word 'inherent' over the plain terms of Article 2(4) and the words
'armed attack' in Article 51. Indeed, it requires privileging one word over the whole struc-
ture and purpose of the UN Charter." Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive
Self-Defense 13 (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law: Task Force on Terrorism, 2002), available at
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
233. See C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 450, 497 (1952). Dinstein also argues "that an
armed attack may precede the firing of the first shot. The crucial question is who embarks
upon an irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the Rubicon." YORAM DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 172 (3d ed. 2001).
234. Waldock, supra note 233, at 498.
235. Id.
236. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151,
184 (July 20) (Spender, J., separate opinion).
237. See Linnan, supra note 42, at 80-81; see also Kearley, supra note 11, at 727.
238. For an earlier study concluding that "it was made quite clear at San Francisco that
the traditional permission of [anticipatory] self-defense was not intended to be abridged
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the history of the Article's drafting found that little attention was in fact
paid to the question of anticipatory (as distinct from collective) self-
defense;' 39 instead, the key consideration was the United States' desire to
integrate its pre-existing hemispheric defense arrangements under the
then-recent Act of Chapultepec240 into the global security system envis-
aged by the Charter.24' Even when the issue of anticipatory or preventa-
tive self-defense was directly broached within the U.S. delegation, it was
considered merely as an aspect of the problem of regional self-defense.2
The negotiating record leaves obscure what purpose was served by intro-
ducing the term "inherent" to qualify "right of self-defense";2 43 although
the intention may have been to incorporate pre-Charter customary law,
we cannot be certain of that.2 "
and attenuated but, on the contrary, to be reserved and maintained," see McDOUGAL
AND FELICIANO, supra note 114, at 235.
239. Kearley, supra note 11, at 669 ("[T]he drafters did not intend to address the right
of individual preemptive self-defense, but they did intend to eliminate preventive self-
defense ...."); see also id. at 724-29 (substantiating those conclusions).
240. Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mar.
8, 1945, 60 Stat. 1831. For an explanation of the relevance of this Act to the Charter, see
Kearley, supra note 11, at 679-84.
241. See MCCORMACK, supra note 5, at 176; RUSSELL, supra note 61, at 699; Kearley,
supra note 11, at 683-700. The American delegate Harold Stassen stated the problem to
his colleagues in this way: "what was involved here was a basic question as to whether we
were setting up a regional system or a world-wide system. It was essential to permit the
Security Council to authorize enforcement action; otherwise, we would find ourselves with
a regional system only. On the other hand, we retained the essential right of self-defense."
United Nations Conference, Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the U.S. Delegation
(May 4, 1945), in 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 202, at 588,592.
The two objectives were eventually to be reconciled chiefly through Article 51's refer-
ence to a right of collective self-defense, the concept of which was then unfamiliar to inter-
national law. See United Nations Conference, Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the
U.S. Delegation (May 12, 1945), in 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 202, at 674, 677.
American delegate Pasvolsky noted that "the British were shocked by the American con-
cept of [collective] self-defense. It was to them a new thought that self-defense can oper-
ate outside of a nation's territorial limits." Id.; see also Greig, supra note 44, at 370-71;
Kearley, supra note 11, at 697-700, 711-12.
242. See Kearley, supra note 11, at 706-07, 710-11. Kearley suggests that the intent of
the American delegation, or at least some of its members, was to negate the possibility of
anticipatory collective self-defense, but to preserve the right of anticipatory individual self-
defense. See id. at 711.
243. See id. at 694-95, 706.
244. One problem in supposing that the use of the term "inherent" was intended to
incorporate pre-Charter customary law into Article 51 arises from the fact that the concept
of "collective" self-defense was not known to that body of law. See supra note 241. Yet
"inherent" seems to qualify both the individual and the collective right of self-defense in
Article 51. The ICJ has failed to notice this issue. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) ("[T]he existence of the right of collective
self-defence is established in customary international law .. ").
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There are scattered references to the right of self-defense in the negoti-
ating history of Article 2(4). For example, in reporting on the wording of
a draft of what is now Article 2(4), the subcommittee at the San Francisco
Conference charged with drafting an acceptable proposal rejected the
idea that no force at all should be used unless approved by the Security
Council, and stated: "'[I]t was clear to the subcommittee that the right of
self-defense against aggression should not be impaired or diminished."'2 45
It would be wrong to read too much into that brief statement: even if
"'the right of self-defense against aggression' was supposed to have been
left unaffected, there was no discussion of criteria for evaluating a pur-
ported exercise of that right.246 Nor does the statement explicitly address
the question of anticipatory self-defense. In short, the negotiating history
does not resolve the impasse over Article 51's meaning.
While scholars continue to debate whether Article 51 incorporates the
pre-Charter right of anticipatory self-defense, organs of the United Na-
tions have been addressing the issue. As pointed out above, then Secre-
tary General Kofi Annan recently endorsed the view that Article 51 does
indeed preserve pre-Charter law in that respect.247 In practical terms,
Annan's statement might seem to settle the matter. Unfortunately, how-
ever, it does not. The ICJ has persistently reserved the question, and
until the United Nations organs speak with a single voice, one cannot be
sure how Article 51 should be construed.
Worse still, the ICJ's decisions can be read to imply an answer different
from the Secretary General's. The court's opinions thus far have tilted
heavily in favor of the restrictive view of anticipatory self-defense -or, at
least, in favor of what might be called a "restrictive plus" view, in which
the right of anticipatory self-defense, even if "preserved," is only vestig-
ial. First, the "gravity" test for determining whether an armed attack has
occurred, laid down in Nicaragua248 and affirmed in Oil Platforms,249 may
often make it difficult to characterize an anticipatory measure in response
to an imminent threat as lawful "self-defense," because until the threat
actually materializes, it can be hard to demonstrate its likely scale and
245. MCCORMACK, supra note 5, at 163 (quoting the report of United Nations Sub-
committee I/l/A).
246. Id. at 163-64.
247. See In Larger Freedom, supra note 39, 124 ("Imminent threats are fully covered
by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves
against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as
well as one that has already happened."). The Secretary General's report also firmly rules
out the preventive use of armed force against what it calls "not imminent but latent"
threats. See id. 125.
248. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
249. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Nov. 6,2003), 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1358.
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effects. ° Second, Oil Platforms' requirement for clear and convincing
proof of an armed attack' -even in the context of actual, repetitive mili-
tary operations against a defending state-also makes it difficult to dem-
onstrate that an anticipatory measure is lawful self-defense. Characteriz-
ing an attack as "imminent" requires a determination of the threatening
actor's intent, a determination that is nearly always extremely difficult to
make, because an aggressor's war plans are usually heavily concealed.2
By both placing the burden of proof on the defending state and making
the evidentiary standard very high, the ICJ has effectively precluded
much anticipatory self-defense. Third, if the ICJ were really open to find-
ing that Article 51 preserved the customary right of self-defense (at least
to the extent of the Caroline doctrine), it would not be taking the position
that self-defense can only be exercised against an attack by (or imputable
to) another state."' For in the Caroline incident, the claim was made to a
right of anticipatory self-defense against an armed band of private irregu-
lars whose violence was in no way sanctioned, supported, or even acqui-
esced to by another state. The Article 51 "state action" requirement for
lawful self-defense thus logically precludes the continuing vitality of the
Caroline doctrine. The ICJ seems, in substance, to have answered nega-
tively the question of the legality of anticipatory self-defense, even while
purporting to leave the question open. Very little, if any, of the pre-
Charter right of anticipatory self-defense can remain if even the Caroline
doctrine is not preserved in Article 51.
250. Although some scholars believe that Nicaragua set "the threshold for an armed
attack.., very low," this is not at all clear. See Schmitt, supra note 22, at 751. Other schol-
ars consider that "the Court set the legal bar for the initiation of actions in self-defense at a
rather high notch and, in effect, asked targeted populations simply to endure the conse-
quences of protracted low-level conflict." W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, As-
sessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (2003). The ICJ has
declined to "exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessel might" count
as an armed attack, see Oil Platforms, 42 I.L.M. at 1360. The mining of a military vessel
does not seem to the author to be a "very low" threshold.
251. See Oil Platforms, 42 I.L.M. at 1356-57, 1361; see also Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 62;
O'Connell, supra note 158, at 895 ("[A]ny state engaging in [anticipatory] self-defense...
must show by clear and convincing evidence that future attacks are planned.").
252. See BROWNLIE, supra note 139, at 259.
253. See, e.g., Armed Activities on Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda) (Dec. 19, 2005), 45 I.L.M. 271, 306; Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall
in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1049-
50; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
254. The effect of the ICJ's understanding of Article 51 on other UN organs may con-
ceivably be seen in the Security Council's Resolution 1701, calling for the cessation of the
hostilities that began last summer along the Lebanese-Israeli border. S.C. Res. 1701, T 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006). The language of operative paragraph one of that
Resolution bears careful reading. In it, the Council "[c]alls for a full cessation of hostilities
based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the im-
mediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations." Id. Neither in the peram-
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In sum, the right of anticipatory self-defense "preserved" in Article 51
seems to be at best a vestige of that right as understood in pre-Charter
law. To begin with, even those readings of Article 51 that interpret an
incorporation of the Caroline doctrine generally differ in their under-
standing of it from the prevailing pre-Charter view: they attach to all
forms of anticipatory self-defense the constraints that the pre-Charter
Caroline doctrine imposed only on some forms of anticipatory self-
defense. Further, the usual post-Charter view of anticipatory self-defense
would seem to rule out various kinds of state practice, such as the de-
struction of the French fleet at Mers el Kber, which would probably
have been considered lawful anticipatory self-defense in the pre-Charter
period. Finally, although there is a continuing scholarly controversy over
whether Article 51 preserves at least some form of the pre-Charter cus-
tomary law of anticipatory self-defense, the ICJ's construction of Article
51 effectively bars nearly all kinds of anticipatory self-defense, except in
highly unusual circumstances. It follows, then, that the difference be-
tween the pre-Charter baseline and the post-Charter rules relating to
anticipatory self-defense is, indeed, very substantial.
bulatory paragraphs nor in the operative ones did the Council say or imply that Israel's
actions in response to what the Secretary General called Hezbollah's "unprovoked attack
on Israel" on July 12, 2006 was an exercise of the right of self-defense (even if perhaps a
disproportionate one). See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Calls for
End to Hostilities Between Hizbollah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701
(2006), U.N. Doc. SC/8808 (Aug. 11, 2006) (statement of the Secretary General). Further,
operative paragraph one calls for the cessation of Hezbollah's "attacks," but not its "armed
attacks." See S.C. Res. 1701, supra, 1 1. This might reflect the Council's judgment that
Hezbollah's July 12 border incursion, though causing eight Israeli military deaths and the
abduction of two Israeli soldiers, see Press Release, Security Council, supra, did not satisfy
the ICJ's "gravity" test in Nicaragua for an "armed attack." Moreover, the Council's un-
willingness to acknowledge any right to self-defense on Israel's part against Hezbollah
might signal the Council's support for the ICJ's "state action" requirement in Nicaragua
and the Wall Case. Certainly, the Council's unwillingness to refer to Israel's right of self-
defense is in sharp contrast with its earlier reference in Resolution 1368 to the United
States' right of self-defense against al Qaeda-like Hezbollah, another non-state terrorist
actor. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). The Council's silence on
the point contrasts also with the statements of the G-8 leaders gathered in their 2006 sum-
mit, which had spoken of Israel's "exercising the right to defend itself' against Hezbollah.
See Press Release, G-8 Summit Leaders, Statement by Group of Eight Leaders-G-8
Summit 2006 (July 16, 2006), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/
2000_2009/2006/ (follow "Statement by Group of Eight Leaders-G-8 Summit 2006" hy-
perlink). Finally, operative paragraph one of Resolution 1701 implicitly views Israel as an
aggressor, at least to some degree. Israel's "offensive military operations" must cease. S.C.
Res. 1701, supra, 1 (emphasis added). The ambiguity in the language seems intended:
were all of Israel's operations "offensive," or were some offensive and others defensive?
In either case, Israel must have been considered to have acted outside the scope of lawful
self-defense. In short, Council practice, in at least this recent instance, appears to be con-
forming to the very restrictive view of Article 51 found in the ICJ's opinions.
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Pre- and Post-Charter Rules Regarding "Armed" Attacks
Article 51 specifies that for an "attack" to give rise to the right to exer-
cise self-defense, the attack must be "armed." As reflected in Article 3 of
the General Assembly's definition of "aggression," 5 an attack should
probably not be considered to be armed under Article 51 if it consists
solely of economic, psychological, or ideological modes of warfare, de-
spite the severity of the hardship such measures might cause. Indeed, in
the view of some scholars, some significant uses of armed force, such as
naval blockades, even if unlawful under Article 2(4) of the Charter, do
not rise to the level of armed attacks for purposes of Article 51.25' As
warfare has evolved, however, the distinction between armed attacks and
other kinds of aggression has come under increasing strain. In particular,
contemporary warfare relies critically on information and communica-
tions technologies that reflect the truly revolutionary changes in those
areas in recent decades. Given this dependency, it makes sense to ask
whether information operations can constitute armed attacks on an ad-
versary:
Should the term include state-sponsored or conducted hacker at-
tacks on a country's banks, communications networks, or stock
exchange? Does it make a difference if the operations are con-
ducted to "prepare the battlefield" in anticipation of an actual
conflict by, for instance, destroying military deployment plans
and reserve force records, corrupting intelligence systems, or
sending satellites off-course?
257
Alternatively, consider the potential that the accumulation of foreign
currency reserves could cause financial havoc in a country targeted by
their possessor. China was recently reported to hold over one trillion
dollars in foreign currencies and securities, most of it consisting in U.S.
dollar-denominated debt, including U.S. Treasury bonds. 258 A decision
suddenly to flood world currency exchanges with these Chinese holdings
could wreck the United States' economy in short order. Would such a
decision count as an armed attack under Article 51?
It seems most unlikely that actions such as these could count as armed
attacks on any fair reading of Article 51.29 The framers of the Charter
255. See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974).
256. See BROWNLIE, supra note 139, at 365-66.
257. Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The US. View of Twenty-First Century
War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051,
1070 (1998).
258. See Andrew Browne, China's Reserves Near Milestone, Underscoring Its Financial
Clout, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17,2006, at Al.
259. See Wright, supra note 149, at 117 (stating that the scope of "armed attack" can-
not extend "to attacks upon a state by propaganda, infiltration, subversion or other acts
sometimes called 'indirect aggression"'); cf. DINSTEIN, supra note 142, at 196. But see
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were well aware that economic, psychological, or other nonforcible
measures could injure, indeed devastate, a targeted nation, yet seem con-
sciously to have chosen not to permit armed force to be used in response
to these measures.26 Indeed, the negotiating record suggests that that
was precisely why the qualifier "armed" was introduced. 261 Moreover, in
referring to armed attacks, Article 51 is plausibly construed to mean only
attacks "upon the territory" of a state-as distinct from its political inde-
262pendence, ideological system, or influence over a particular region.
War in cyberspace or on a state's financial architecture would not be ter-
ritorial attacks.
Whether responses to such "attacks" would also have been considered
legitimate self-defense in the immediate pre-Charter period is, however,
more uncertain. The 1933 Convention Defining Aggression, signed by
the U.S.S.R. and several of its neighbors,263 after expressing the signato-
ries' belief that the Kellogg-Briand Pact "forbids all aggression," defined
"the aggressor in an international conflict" as the first state to have com-
mitted any of certain proscribed acts, none of which could be considered
purely economic, psychological, or ideological warfare.264 Further, the
Convention excluded from the definition of aggression such "interna-
tional conduct of [a] state" as the "infringement or a threat of infringing
the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign state or its citizens,"
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 114, at 240-41 ("To say, however, that Article 51
limits the appropriate precipitating event for lawful self-defense to an 'armed attack' is in
effect to suppose that in no possible context can applications of nonmilitary types of coer-
cion (where armed force is kept to a background role) take on efficacy, intensity, and pro-
portions comparable to those of an 'armed attack' and thus present an analogous condition
of necessity. Apart from the extreme difficulty of establishing realistic factual bases for
that supposition, the conclusion places too great a strain upon the single secondary factor
of modality-military violence.").
260. Thus, the League of Nations' Lytton Commission found in 1932 that China's boy-
cott of Japanese-made goods was an act of hostility but not an act of armed force. See
Wehberg, supra note 115, at 69.
261. See United Nations Conference, Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the U.S.
Delegation (May 11, 1945), in 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 202, at 663, 667. Ameri-
can delegate John Foster Dulles explained that the term "armed" was introduced with an
eye on the Monroe Doctrine, so as to exclude "political efforts from outside the continent
to overthrow the political institutions of the American Republics." Id.
262. See Wright, supra note 149, 116; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of
Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 209, 212 (2003) (stating that "[m]ost international lawyers
construe" Article 51 to permit self-defense only "in response to attacks on the territory of a
member state" (emphasis added)).
263. See Convention Defining Aggression, July 3, 1933, reprinted in 27 AM. J. INT'L L.
supp. at 192 (1933) [hereinafter Convention Defining Aggression I]. Virtually identical
Conventions were concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
Lithuania. See, e.g., Convention Defining Agression, July 4, 1933, reprinted in 27 AM. J.
INT'L L. supp. at 194 (1933).
264. See Convention Defining Aggression I, supra note 263, at 192-93.
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the "rupture of... economic relations," "measures of economic or finan-
cial boycott," and "conflicts in the sphere of economic, financial or other
obligations in connection with foreign governments., 26 If this Conven-
tion could be taken to represent the international community's general
understanding of the limits of legitimate self-defense after the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, then the parties to the Charter would not have foregone a
significant diminution of their right of self-defense in undertaking to limit
its exercise to responses to armed attacks in a restricted sense.
It seems unlikely, however, that this was the prevailing view. The Con-
vention followed the path of a Soviet policy marked out in a diplomatic
note of August 31, 1928, in which the Soviets responded to the invitation
to adhere to the Kellogg-Briand Pact by objecting that the pact did not
proscribe all wars.2 Joined by Germany and by several of the states that
later signed the 1933 Conventions, the Soviets urged the proscription "of
all mutual aggression and of all armed conflict whatsoever., 267 The Soviet
note pointed out that "other Governments passed this proposal over in
silence," and "still others declined it. '26 It would seem, then, that the
understanding of aggression embodied in the 1933 Conventions, and the
correlative limitation of the occasions on which legitimate self-defense
might be exercised, was not generally accepted. Moreover, the Soviet
note was apparently alluding to the position of Great Britain in relation
to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The British government's reservation to the
pact stated:
There are certain regions [referring to India, Egypt, and the Per-
sian Gulf] ... the welfare and integrity of which constitute a spe-
cial and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's
Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that
interference with these regions can not be suffered.269
The pre-Charter British view would therefore seem to have permitted
self-defense against external attempts to subvert or destabilize a region of
"special and vital interest" to the British Empire. Such attempts would,
of course, not necessarily have been armed attacks upon British territory.
Likewise, as we have seen, the United States did not interpret the pact to
preclude it from resisting, in the name of self-defense, violations of the
Monroe Doctrine. In the Anglo-American view of the pact, therefore, it
seems that some measures other than strictly "armed" attacks (especially
"interference" in regions of special sensitivity) could trigger the right to
self-defense.
265. Id. at 194.
266. Letter from M. Litvinov, to the French Ambassador in Moscow, supra note 131, at
170.
267. Id. at 169.
268. Id.
269. Chamberlain Letter, supra note 133, at 126 (emphasis added).
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In any event, the fact that the matter cannot be considered to have
been conclusively settled at the time of the Charter's adoption indicates
that states accepted a restriction on their self-defense rights that may not
have existed before.
Summary
The adoption of the Charter unquestionably marked a massive change
in the international legal order respecting jus ad bellum. Even taking the
widely disregarded Kellogg-Briand Pact as the benchmark of prevailing
pre-Charter law, acceptance of the Charter required member states to
make enormous concessions of their national sovereignty with regard to
the all-important questions of war and peace. As our review has indi-
cated, states that accepted the Charter yielded important prerogatives (or
at least colorable claims to possess them), including the right to engage in
armed reprisals; the competence to decide, at least without intrusive ex-
ternal review, whether action in self-defense was lawful and justified;
most, if not all, of the right to anticipatory self-defense; and the right, or
the claim to the right, to respond with defensive force to external threats
to subvert or destabilize regions of vital national interest. These were
indeed sweeping concessions, which, if put into practice, would have sig-
nificantly disenabled states from protecting themselves against outside
aggression. In exchange for making these concessions, and thus assuming
the risk of much greater vulnerability to outside threats, member states
received the Charter's promise of a viable, functioning collective security
system. The unqualified failure of that system relieves member states of
any legal obligation to respect the limits that the Charter fixes for valid
self-defense.
III. THE RADICAL FAILURE OF THE CHARTER'S COLLECTIVE SECURITY
SYSTEM
It has long seemed obvious to informed commentators that the Charter
system of collective security has failed.270 Indeed, this failure was becom-
270. See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure
of the Charter Framework, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 735, 751-53 (2002); Jean Combacau, The
Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF
THE USE OF FORCE 9, 32 (A. Cassese ed., 1986); Franck, supra note 5, at 51-53; Thomas M.
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 809-10 (1970); Glennon, Unipolar
World, supra note 58, at 98; W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in
International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 280 (1985); Eugene V. Rostow, The Legality of
the International Use of Force by and from States, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 286, 286-88 (1985);
Sofaer, supra note 177, at 2-6; John C. Yoo & Will Trachman, Less Than Bargained For:
The Use of Force and the Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 379,
381-82 (2005). But see Louis Henkin, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Devel-
opments in International Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 571, 574 (1997) ("In my view, the health of
the U.N. Charter is good. The Charter has had important deterrent influence. The Secu-
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ing obvious almost as soon as the Charter was ratified: the emergence of
selective security systems like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in 1949-in effect, traditional defensive military and political
alliances -attests to the swiftness with which the Charter system broke
down.271
The record of six decades proves that collective security has not kept
the peace: in the post-Charter world, war and aggression have been only
272too common. Major wars in which the Security Council had not in
terms authorized the use of force include: the Second Gulf War and ensu-
ing conflicts in Iraq (2003- ); the Arab-Israeli conflict (1948- ); the Iran-
Iraq war (1980-1988); the civil wars in Sudan (1983- ), Congo (1998- ),
Rwanda and Burundi (1963-1995), Mozambique (1975-1993), Ethiopia
(1962-1992), and Nigeria (1966-1970); the post-colonial and civil wars in
Indo-China (1960-1975); and the Bangladeshi war of independence
(1971). Writing in 1986, the British scholar Evan Luard found that since
1945, there had been 144 "wars," of which he classified 29 as "interna-
tional wars ... in which at least two sovereign states were in direct con-
flict," 16 as wars of decolonization, and 66 as civil wars.273 In 1997, A.
Mark Weisburd found that "states used force so frequently in the period
1945 through 1991 (over 110 times) that it seems impossible to say that, in
rity Council has been revived and has worked."); Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, The
Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544, 544
(1971).
271. See, e.g., Marten Zwanenburg, NATO, Its Member States, and the Security Coun-
cil, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 22, at 189, 190
("NATO was established as a result of the perceived failure of the UN Security Council, as
part of the Charter's collective security system, to function as originally envisaged.").
There is evidence, however, that when founding NATO, American leaders continued to
believe that the Charter system might yet work. Indeed, some of them even argued that
NATO would enhance the ability of the Charter system to deliver on its promises. But as
Senator Tom Connally, one of the most influential members of the U.S. delegation to the
San Francisco Conference of 1945, said in a speech of July 5, 1949 on the subject of the
new NATO alliance:
[N]o sincere and realistic person can blind himself to the fact that peace is still remote
and the security we long for is yet to be attained. The long catalog of 30 Soviet vetoes
and the frustrated efforts to write a peace treaty with Germany bear eloquent witness
of how effectively the peace and security machinery of the world has been hampered.
95 CONG. REC. 8816-17 (1949) (statement of Sen. Connally). See generally E.P. Braucher,
The Original United States Concept of NATO, 17 AIR U. REV. (1966), available at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1966/sep-oct/braucher.htm].
272. But see JOHN MUELLER, THE REMNANTS OF WAR 1-3 (2004) (arguing that war,
at least between developed countries, is in decline and will eventually disappear as an
institution, like slavery or dueling); cf Carl Kaysen, Is War Obsolete? in THEORIES OF
WAR AND PEACE, supra note 86, at 441 (critiquing the Mueller thesis).
273. EVAN LUARD, WAR IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 69 (1986).
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practice, states do not use force against one another., 27 4 Michael Glen-
non wrote in 2002:
Between 1945 and 1999, two-thirds of the members of the United
Nations- 126 states out of 189-fought 291 interstate conflicts in
which over 22 million people were killed. This series of conflicts
was capped by the Kosovo campaign in which nineteen NATO
democracies representing 780 million people flagrantly violated
the Charter.
Not only has the Charter's collective security system failed to prevent
war, it has apparently not even reduced the rate of war. John Yoo re-
cently noted:
According to the Correlates of War database, from 1816 to 1945,
fifty-six interstate wars occurred, a rate of 0.43 per year. From
1945 to 1997, that rate is 0.44 per year. A different study found
that from 1715 to 1814 there were thirty-six interstate wars, from
1815 to 1914 there were twenty-nine wars, from 1918 to 1941
there were twenty-five interstate wars, and then from 1945 to
1995 there were thirty-eight wars. According to these figures, the
rate of interstate wars either roughly remained the same or in-
creased during the period of the UN Charter and the League of
Nations.276
True, it might be argued that these facts and statistics alone do not
prove that the Charter's collective security system has failed. At least
two arguments in defense of the effectiveness of the Charter system
might be offered.
First, many or most of the conflicts in question are civil wars,277 which
274. A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD
WAR 11308 (1997).
275. Glennon, The Fog of Law, supra note 58, at 540 (footnote omitted). More recent
statistics are collected by the Center for Systemic Peace. See Monty G. Marshall, Ctr. for
Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2006, http://members.
aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
276. John C. Yoo, Force Rules: UN Reform and Intervention, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 641, 645
(2006) (footnote omitted). Yoo points out, however, that when corrected for the number
of states, the frequency of interstate war has dropped in the post-Charter period. Id.
277. See RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY 18 fig.2
(2006) (chart entitled "Number of armed conflicts by type, 1946-2003"); LUARD, supra
note 273, at 69 ("Since 1945, wars have overwhelmingly been civil wars, fought between
the adherents of different political philosophies."). In 2001, Peter Wallensteen and Marga-
reta Sollenberg found that of the 111 conflicts recorded for the period 1989-2000, only 7
were interstate. See Peter Wallensteen & Margareta Sollenberg, Armed Conflict, 1990-
2000, 38 J. PEACE RES. 629, 632 tbl.II (2001). Ninety-five were intrastate, but nine of these
were accompanied by foreign intervention. Id.
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the Charter system was not designed to forestall or suppress.278 Meas-
ured only in terms of the incidence of interstate conflict, the Charter sys-
tem does not seem to have worked nearly as badly. However, even ex-
cluding civil wars from the calculations, the amount of post-Charter inter-
state conflict remains high. Moreover, post-Charter civil wars often
served as means of carrying on superpower conflicts indirectly, as with
the civil wars in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in Vietnam in the 1960s.279
At least some civil wars could, therefore, be regarded as de facto inter-
280state wars.
278. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state .... )_
To be sure, the Security Council, at least on a broad interpretation of its powers, has
found the spillover effects of civil war to constitute a "threat to the [international] peace,"
id. art 39, and thus a basis for authorized external intervention. See THAKUR, supra note
277, at 16 ("[F]ew modern conflicts are purely internal. The networks that sustain them
can involve a range of ancillary problems like trafficking in arms, drugs and children; ter-
rorism; and refugee flows. Whole regions can be quickly destabili[z]ed."). Moreover, it is
fair to say that whether or not it has jurisdiction to intervene in civil wars, the Council's
interventions in such conflicts, which have included enforcement actions under Chapter
VII, have had some success. See Michael J. Matheson, The Twelfth Waldemar A. Solf
Lecture in International Law, 161 MIL. L. REV. 181, 182-83, 187-89 (1999); cf Martti
Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 455, 458-59
(1996).
279. See LUARD, supra note 273, at 317 ("The super-powers... have almost invariably
been committed to the success of opposite sides in the [civil] war[s] under discussion.").
280. Furthermore, there are signs that interstate conflict may again be on the rise, and
reliance on the Charter's collective security system seems most unlikely to suppress it. See
DANIEL S. GELLER & J. DAVID SINGER, NATIONS AT WAR: A SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 110-11 (1998). Geller and Singer note:
In the post-World War II period ... newer regional subsystems of Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa now account for roughly half of all militarized interstate disputes.
Since capabilities appear to be strongly related to war behavior, it may be projected
that as the capacity of these new states to conduct military operations increases, their
frequencies of war will also increase.
Id. See generally COLIN S. GRAY, ANOTHER BLOODY CENTURY (2007) (arguing that
significant interstate conflict will recur).
Further, the rising level of discontent with the "unipolar" world of post-cold war Ameri-
can hegemony may also presage a future in which interstate conflicts occur with greater
frequency. For example, there is an increasing European dissatisfaction with U.S. leader-
ship and rivalrous challenges to it, while "rogue" states attempt to acquire nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction. Cf. William R. Thompson, Principal Rivalries, 39 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 195, 200-03 (1995) (explicating concept of interstate "rivalry"); id. at
205-06 (arguing that "[p]ositional rivalries" between incumbents and challengers for global
or regional leadership "can take on life or death qualities" and "provide the conflict arma-
tures of the world's regional and global systems"); John Vasquez & Christopher S. Leskiw,
The Origins and War Proneness of Interstate Rivalries, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI., 2001, at 306-
13 (citing evidence that "enduring" rivals are highly war-prone). Worse, an "apolar" world
might generate a still higher level of conflict, both interstate and other, than was seen in
the period from 1945 to the present. See Niall Ferguson, A World Without Power,
HOOVER DIG., Fall 2004, available at http://www.hooverdigest.org/044/ferguson.html.
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The second defense of the Charter system relies on the observation
that post-Charter Europe enjoyed (at least until the outbreak of war in
the Balkans) what some have called "[t]he Long Peace."2 1 But it seems
most implausible to attribute Europe's long peace primarily to the Char-
ter's collective security arrangements. To begin with, pre-Charter long
peaces were not rare; Peter Wallensteen found four major periods of
peace (or what he called periods of "major power universalism") between
1815 and 1976.282 Moreover, the post-Charter peace in Europe can be
explained more readily by reference to other factors. Thus, some schol-
ars argue that the bipolar system of the cold war was an important force
in maintaining the peace, finding such a system to be intrinsically more
283stable than a multipolar, or apolar, system. 8 Relatedly, the threat that a
conventional war in Europe might lead to a nuclear exchange may also
have deterred recourse to armed force.28 Since war is often caused by
imperfect information regarding rivals capabilities and intentions, the
And some writers foresee the rise of interstate competition and conflict caused by a grow-
ing scarcity of oil, water, and other essential natural resources. See, e.g., Michael T. Klare,
RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2001).
Some analysts forecast that intrastate conflict may also become more frequent. Wallen-
steen and Sollenberg, noting that "more than 300 actors have been involved in armed
conflict since the end of the Cold War," foresee "a bleak future," because "t]he prolifera-
tion of actors probably accounts for the difficulties in ending conflicts." Wallensteen &
Sollenberg, supra note 277, at 634. But others consider the prevalence of intrastate war in
the 1990s to have been an effect of the dissolution of great empires and federations, and
envisage a world in which intrastate warfare is less common. Colin S. Gray, How Has War
Changed Since the End of the Cold War?, PARAMETERS, Spring 2005, at 14, 19.
281. See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LONG PEACE: INQUIRIES INTO THE HISTORY OF
THE COLD WAR 215-45 (1987).
282. See Peter Wallensteen, Universalism vs. Particularism: On the Limits of Major
Power Order, 21 J. PEACE RES. 243, 243-46 (1984); see also Jeffery J. Schahczenski, Ex-
plaining Relative Peace: Major Power Order, 1816-1976, 28 J. PEACE RES. 295, 305-06
(1991) (finding empirical support for hypothesis that "universalistic" periods are relatively
more peaceful); Randolph M. Siverson & Michael D. Ward, The Long Peace: A Reconsid-
eration, 56 INT'L ORG. 679 (2002) (finding that long peaces comprise about thirty percent
of all non-war periods among major powers).
283. See GADDIS, supra note 281, at 221-23; John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe after the Cold War, in THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 86,
at 3, 24-25; see also Eyal Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegem-
ony and the Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677, 687 (2004). But
see GELLER & SINGER, supra note 280, at 115-17 (surveying empirical studies of relation-
ships between "polarity" and warfare, and reporting that some findings show "high num-
bers of crises during bipolar periods" but also "lower war magnitudes than with multipolar
systems," and that other findings indicate "the lack of a substantive linear relationship
between the number of great powers and warfare").
284. GADDIS, supra note 281, at 230-31; Mearsheimer, supra note 283, at 25-26; see also
EVAN LUARD, THE BLUNTED SWORD: THE EROSION OF MILITARY POWER IN MODERN
WORLD POLITICS 31-32 (1988); Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More




incentives to go to war may well have been reduced by the development
of photo-reconnaissance and other technologies, or by the arms inspec-
tions regimes fostered by disarmament treaties that made the superpow-
ers more transparent to each other 85 Other analysts see the U.S.-Soviet
conflict, which pitted a large land power against a commercial maritime
republic, as "an elephant-whale" confrontation in which the specific
power-projection capabilities of the antagonists made full-scale conflict
unlikely.' 6 The greater political stability of European states, the per-
sisting memories of the devastation of the two great twentieth century
wars fought largely on the European continent, and the power of the two
cold war hegemons (the United States and the Soviet Union) to maintain
the peace within their European spheres of influence 8 were also likely to
have been important contributory factors.289
Perhaps the most compelling arguments for concluding that the Char-
ter's collective security system has failed, however, come from the fact
that the system has been invoked so rarely over the Charter's sixty years
of existence to maintain or restore international peace and stability. The
two main occasions on which the Charter system might be considered to
have "worked" -Korea in 1950290 and Iraq in 1991 291-were the products
of quite exceptional circumstances. 292
In the first case, the Security Council was able to authorize collective
action to repel the North Korean invasion of South Korea only because
285. See GADDIS, supra note 281, at 232-33; STEPHEN VAN EVERA, CAUSES OF WAR
24-33, 137-42 (1999).
286. See Thompson, supra note 280, at 209-10.
287. LUARD, supra note 273, at 68.
288. Thus, the NATO Alliance might be viewed, not only as a means of deterring at-
tack by Soviet forces, but also as a device by which American hegemony over Western
Europe was subtly enforced. See Christopher Layne, America as European Hegemon,
NAT'L INT., Summer 2003, at 17, 19.
289. Other factors coloring recent Western attitudes to war, including cultural changes,
are surveyed in JEREMY BLACK, WHY WARS HAPPEN 222-26, 229-32 (1998); see also
MICHAEL HOWARD, THE INVENTION OF PEACE 98-113 (2000).
290. See S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950) (recommending that member
states assist South Korea as might be necessary to repel the attack and restore peace); S.C.
Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (June 25, 1950) (determining that the North Korea invasion of
South Korea constituted "a breach of the peace"). Resolution 83 passed only by a narrow
majority of seven of eleven members, and merely "recommend[ed]" that the necessary
"assistance" be furnished. S.C. Res. 83, supra.
291. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
292. The Council did occasionally authorize the use of force in other instances in the
period between 1945 and 1990, but these occasions were not of major significance. They
included S.C. Res. 161, U.N. Doc. S/RES/161 (Feb. 21, 1961), and S.C. Res. 169, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/169 (Nov. 24, 1961), authorizing the United Nations itself to use force, if necessary,
to prevent the occurrence of civil war in Congo, and S.C. Res. 221, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221
(Apr. 9, 1966), calling on the United Kingdom to prevent, by force if necessary, oil ship-
ments from reaching Southern Rhodesia.
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of the absence of the Soviet Union from the critical Security Council
votes.293 Furthermore, the United Nations-sanctioned military response
to North Korea's aggression was hardly "collective": "[f]or all their sym-
bolic panoply of the United Nations flag and other emblems, the forces
which finally prevailed in Korea were national forces carrying out a mis-
sion of collective self-defense under American direction, not a Security
Council enforcement action.,
294
The second main case of Council-authorized collective action against
interstate aggression occurred during the brief interlude between the end
of the two superpowers' cold war struggle and the more recent emer-
291gence of rivalrous challenges to American global hegemony. Only in
those unusual and likely unrepeatable circumstances was the United
States able to gather sufficient votes within the Security Council to obtain
authorization to use force to address what it and its coalition allies con-
sidered to be a serious breach of the peace in the Middle East. More-
over, like the Korean intervention, the First Gulf War was the handiwork
of U.S. diplomatic resourcefulness and military strength, rather than a
genuine example of "collective security." Although the presence in the
U.S.-led coalition of military forces from thirty-three countries contrib-
uted significantly to the political success of the endeavor, "militarily all
aspects of this war were dominated by U.S. forces." Rather than con-
sidering the First Gulf War as evidence that the Charter's collective secu-
rity system can work, it is more realistic to view the episode as a he-
293. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION 34-38, 164 (1985); 1
LUARD, supra note 61, at 272 ("If [the Soviet Union] had been [occupying its seat in the
Security Council at the time the attack on South Korea occurred], it is beyond doubt that
[it] would have vetoed almost all the Council's resolutions on the subject, especially that
calling on members to come to the aid of South Korea."). The Truman administration was
prepared to defend South Korea even without Security Council authorization. See CHAE-
JIN LEE, A TROUBLED PEACE: U.S. POLICY AND THE Two KOREAS 27 (2006).
294. Rostow, supra note 5, at 508; see also 1 LUARD, supra note 61, at 272
("[P]articipation in that action was limited to a certain group of politically interested states.
Only a quarter of the [United Nations'] membership sent military assistance to South Ko-
rea. And the sixteen nations which did so were all Western countries, which had a com-
mon national interest in securing the defeat of communist aggression wherever it occurred.
The episode was thus more an example of alliance strategy than of enforcement action by
an international organi[z]ation; of collective defen[s]e rather than collective security.");
WOLFERS, supra note 70, at 176 ("Instead of being a case of nations' fighting 'any aggres-
sor anywhere' and for no other purpose than to punish aggression and deter potential
aggressors, intervention in Korea was an act of collective military defense against the rec-
ognized number-one enemy of the United States.
295. It was during this brief interlude that President George H.W. Bush delivered an
address to Congress, ironically on September 11, 1990, in which he first envisaged "'a new
world order."' See Adam Roberts, A New Age in International Relations?, 67 INT'L AFF.
509, 519 (1991) (citation omitted).
296. Trevor N. Dupuy, How the War Was Won, NAT' REv., Apr. 1, 1991, at 29,29.
[Vol. 56:871
Paper Charter
gemon's intervention to stabilize a troubled region.297 If it was true that
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait presented an extraordinary opportunity to
revitalize the Charter's collective security arrangements, then why was
the opportunity not taken in the early 1990s to conclude special agree-
ments under Article 43 to provide national military contingents as
standby forces for the Council's future use?
98
The failure of the Charter's collective security system is also shown by
those cases in which it should have been invoked to deter or punish
breaches of the peace, but was not. Three cases can illustrate the point:
the Indian invasion and occupation of Portuguese Goa in 1961; India's
intervention in the civil war between East and West Pakistan in 1971,
resulting in the creation of the state of Bangladesh; and the July-August
2006 conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon.
Goa (1961)
On December 11, 1961, faced with the massive build-up of Indian
forces surrounding its colony of Goa, which Portugal had possessed for
some 450 years, Portugal appealed to the Security Council.29 The Secre-
tary General, U Thant, wrote to Indian Prime Minister Nehru to urge
him not to use force.3 Thereafter, on December 18, Portugal com-
plained to the Council "of 'a full-scale unprovoked armed attack"' by
India.31' A Council debate ensued at which the U.S. Ambassador, Adlai
Stevenson, condemned India's action in terms that restated the basic as-
sumptions of the Charter system. Stevenson argued:
"The fabric of peace is fragile .... If it is to survive, if the United
Nations is not to die as ignoble a death as the League of Nations,
we cannot condone the use of force in this instance .... In a
world as interdependent as ours, the possible results of such a
trend are too grievous to contemplate.,
3
01
Stevenson's appeal to the idea that peace is indivisible and that all the
member states of the United Nations have an overriding interest in pre-
serving it-a basic postulate of collective security-fell on deaf ears. A
U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostili-
297. See Koskenniemi, supra note 278, at 460-61 (noting arguments that the Council's
action "has not reflected the collective interests of United Nations members as a whole,
but only the special interests and factual predominance of the United States and its West-
ern allies within the Council").
298. See id. at 461.
299. FRANCK, supra note 293, at 53.
300. Id. at 54.
301. Id.
302. Id. (quoting U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 987th mtg. at 15-18 (Dec. 18, 1961)).
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ties and the withdrawal of Indian forces was vetoed by the Soviet Union,
and the Council took no further action 3
Bangladesh (1971)
A second leading case of Council inaction in the face of international
breaches of the peace occurred ten years later, when India intervened in
the civil war that had broken out between East and West Pakistan.
India had long hoped to weaken its traditional adversary Pakistan, and
the Pakistani civil war afforded it an irresistible opportunity to break that
country up. Despite several attempts by the Secretary General to interest
the Council in the question, the Council took no action, even after India's
armed intervention on November 29, 1971.305 In default of Council ac-
tion, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on India and Paki-
stan to return to their former boundaries; 30 but the Resolution went un-
heeded. The Council met to reconsider the question on December 12,
but by the next day, Indian forces had taken Dacca, East Pakistan's capi-
tal.3 Commenting on the episode, Thomas Franck has written that the
Council's "performance must have shattered whatever hopeful illusions
were still cherished by small and middle-sized states-that the U.N. could
guarantee their safety, either by imposing pacific settlement procedures
at an early stage of a dispute or by providing collective security once the




Much more recently, in July-August 2006, the Security Council failed
to act for over a month while a devastating conflict was being fought out
between Israeli armed forces and the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. The
conflict broke out on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah crossed Lebanon's
border with Israel, killed eight Israeli soldiers and kidnapped another
two, and simultaneously launched Katyusha rockets against Israeli com-
munities near the border.3°9
303. Id. at 56.
304. See generally id. at 166-68.
305. Id. at 166-67.
306. G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI), 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 7, 1971).
307. FRANCK, supra note 293, at 167.
308. Id.
309. Israel's Ambassador to the UN, Dan Gillerman, reported on the hostilities to the
Security Council on July 14, 2006, describing the events of July 12 and stating that "Israel
had no choice but to react .... Having shown unparalleled restraint for six years... Israel
had to respond to this absolutely unprovoked assault whose scale and depth was unprece-
dented in recent years." See Statement from Dan Gillerman, Israeli Ambassador, to the
UN Security Council (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/
foreign%20relations/israel%20and%20the%20un/speeches%20-%20statements/ (follow
"Statement by Israeli Amb Gillerman to the UN Security Council" hyperlink).
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According to a spokesman for the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), the damage done in the month-long conflict "'annihi-
lated"' fifteen years' work of reconstruction in Lebanon 1° UNDP esti-
mated overall economic loss in Lebanon to have amounted to "'at least
15 billion dollars, if not more.""'3 " Over 35,000 Lebanese homes and
businesses and "a quarter of the country's road bridges or flyovers were
[destroyed].31  A report by four UN experts to the UN Human Rights
Council found that the "Israel[i] Air Force attacked more than 7,000 tar-
gets in Lebanon, [while the Israeli] Navy conducted 2,500 bombard-
ments., 313 As a result of Israeli operations, 1,191 persons were killed,
4,405 persons were wounded, and over a million persons were dis-
placed.314 Israel's losses were also severe. According to the Israel Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, more than 3,970 rockets landed on Israel from the
outbreak of the fighting, 901 of which struck urban areas.315 Some 4,262
316Israeli civilians were hospitalized for injuries. Hezbollah's bombard-
ments hit 6,000 Israeli homes, causing the displacement of 300,000 resi-
dents and forcing one million people to live in shelters.317 Lost Israeli
revenues amounted to approximately $1,400,000,000.318
From the very outset of this obviously significant conflict, leading fig-
ures in the international community urged what was variously called an
Some commentators were skeptical of Israel's claim that the attacks were "unpro-
voked." See, e.g., George Monbiot, Comment, Israel Responded to an Unprovoked Attack
by Hizbullah, Right? Wrong, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Aug. 8, 2006, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/Columnists/Column/O,,1839282,00.html. Other commentators doubted whether
Hezbollah's incursions amounted to an "armed attack" sufficient to trigger the right of
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, The UN
Mideast Ceasefire Resolution Paragraph-by-Paragraph, JURIST, Aug. 13, 2006, http://jurist.
law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/08/un-mideast-ceaseflre-resolution.php ("Hezbollah's attack on
12 July 2006 was a border incident that under international law does not amount to an
armed attack against a nation. Violent border incidents occur between India and Pakistan
almost on a daily basis. If either side regarded these as armed attacks, the two sides right
now would be engaged in total war, perhaps even using nuclear weapons.... Israel's im-
mediate and massive retaliation, however, was arguably an act of aggression.").




313. Press Release, United Nations Office at Geneva, Major Violations on Both Sides
in Israel-Lebanon Conflict, Say UN Experts (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.unog.
ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear.en)/79475F7031032363C12571FD00568CA9.
314. Id.
315. News Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hizbullah Attacks Northern Israel
and Israel's Response (July 12, 2006), available at http://www.mfa.gov.illMFA (follow
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"immediate cessation of hostilities" or (more ambitiously) a "ceasefire."
These included Secretary General Kofi Annan (on July 13319 and again on
July 20320), the eight leaders of the G-8 Summit (July 16),321 and the Coun-
cil of the European Union on the Middle East (July 17).322 Indeed, the
Security Council itself managed to issue a unanimous policy statement on
July 30 condemning the Israeli attack on the Lebanese village of Qana 3
Nonetheless, largely because of United States resistance, 24 complicated
by French and Russian disagreements with the United States' policy, the
Council was unable to take effective action until August 11, 2006, when it
adopted Resolution 1701, calling "for a full cessation of hostilities based
upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks
and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military opera-
tions."3 5
Resolution 1701 was a compromise measure whose intractable ambi-
guities reflected the inconclusive nature of the conflict between Israel and
Hezbollah, the exhaustion of both combatants, and the desire of all the
interested parties to bring hostilities to at least a temporary halt. The
point to be stressed here, however, is that the Council, as in the Goa and
Bangladesh situations, was unable to act until a military outcome satisfac-
tory to one of the belligerents had been achieved. In 1961 and 1971, In-
dia was able to act decisively to achieve its military goals because it could
shelter under the Soviet veto. In 2006, Israel, though apparently falling
short of its original goals, was able to pursue its campaign against Hezbol-
lah without outside interference because it enjoyed the cover of the U.S.
veto. In all three cases, to the great detriment of the Charter's collective
319. See Secretary General Sends Top Advisers to Middle East to Defuse Crisis; Calls
Key Leaders, UN DAILY NEWS, July 13, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.un.org/
news/dh/pdf/english/2006/13072006.pdf.
320. Press Release, Security Council, 'Immediate Cessation of Hostilities' Urgently
Needed in Lebanon, Says Secretary-General, As He Briefs Security Council, U.N. Doc.
SC/8780 (July 20, 2006).
321. See Press Release, G-8 Summit Leaders, supra note 254.
322. See Press Release, Council of the European Union, Statement by the Council of
the European Union on the Middle East (July 17,2006), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/
MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2006/ (follow "Statement by the Council of the European
Union on the Middle East" hyperlink).
323. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Expresses 'Shock and Dis-
tress' at Israeli Shelling in Qana; Strongly Deplores Loss of Innocent Lives in Present
Conflict, U.N. Doc. SC/8791 (July 30,2004).
324. See, e.g., Evelyn Leopold, US Resists UN Calls to Stop Mideast Fighting,
REUTERS, July 21, 2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.orglsecurity/issues/
lebanon/2006/0721resists.htm. It was widely suspected that the United States had been
aware in advance of Israel's plan before the July 12 incident to attack Hezbollah, and had
approved of them. See Seymour M. Hersh, Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interests in
Israel's War, NEW YORKER, Aug. 21, 2006, at 28.
325. S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 254, 1 (emphasis omitted).
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security system, a great power was able to use its position on the Council
to protect an allied, or at least friendly, state, even though that state was
arguably the aggressor. In order to function, that system demands that all
member states make an overriding commitment to the maintenance of
peace as such, whether the state that threatens or breaches the peace is
perceived as friendly or hostile, sympathetic, or unsympathetic. 26 The
failure of collective security again in 2006 merely reinforces the lessons of
six decades that the system has failed. Even worse, the system is inher-
ently unworkable.
Many influential commentators have disagreed, even while acknowl-
edging the Charter's failures. The failures, they once said, were chiefly
due to the vicissitudes of cold war international politics. 27 Even if we are
now much too far into the post-cold war period for that explanation to
seem plausible any longer, the Charter's defenders nonetheless continue
to propose "reforms" of one kind or other to reinvigorate the Charter
security system.32 But it seems mistaken to think that a sixty-year record
of unbroken failure can be attributed simply to unfavorable historical
contingencies or the happenstances of ill will. Any collective security
system, as even defenders of the concept have admitted, is intrinsically
liable to fall prey to the common problems of collective action, including
free-ridership. 39 Thus, in exposing the inherent design flaws in collective
security theory, John Mearsheimer noted that "even if states agree to act
automatically and collectively to meet aggression, there would surely be
difficulty determining how to distribute the burden. States will have
strong incentives to pass the buck and get other states to pay the heavy
price of confronting an aggressor. ' '330 More generally, states will have
incentives to enjoy their share of the public global goods-peace and
order-produced by a collective security system, while avoiding the costs
of providing those goods. Since enforcement costs can be high, while the
national interests of particular great powers in addressing a particular
threat to the peace may be marginal, the incentives to be a free rider may
be irresistible. Moreover, if a hegemonic power like the United States is
326. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 50, at 238 ("And the immediate replacement of
wartime co-operation with the Cold War made the collective security system envisaged by
the Charter impossible to achieve."). Likewise, surveying the state of opinion about the
prospects of collective security in the immediate aftermath of the First Gulf War, two
analysts concluded that "the requirements for collective security are better satisfied today
than ever before. Most important, prospects are good for a major-power concert able to
respond collectively to aggression." Andrew Bennett & Joseph Lepgold, Reinventing
Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict, 108 POL. SC. Q. 213, 233 (1993).
328. See infra text accompanying notes 358-65.
329. See Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, 93 GEO.
L.J. 993, 1011-12, 1019 (2005).
330. Mearsheimer, supra note 86, at 361.
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willing to assume most of the burden of providing the relevant public
global goods (as, one might argue, it sought to do in the Second Gulf
War), its challengers might have incentives to exploit their positions
within the system in order to weaken the hegemon's power (as, one might
also argue, France and Russia did in the Security Council debates preced-
ing that war),331 even if the result might be to reduce the overall supply of
public goods. On the other hand, a collective security system also de-
mands that great powers refrain from unilateral use of force even when
their vital interests are threatened-which seems an unlikely outcome.332
Considerations like these strongly suggest that the failure of the Charter's
collective security system was inherent in its design and is therefore irre-
mediable.
The failure of the collective security system has undermined, and will
continue to undermine, the claim that the Security Council is and should
be "a normative framer of the collective will. ' 3 3 As discussed further
below, the "legitimacy" of the United Nations depends in great measure
on its "effectiveness." If the United Nations is no more effective than the
League of Nations was in maintaining world peace, then it will eventually
become no more legitimate than the League. Yet, it has long been obvi-
ous that the threat of United Nations collective action against "aggres-
sion" is not a credible deterrent. If state A perceives state B's nuclear
weapons program as an impending-if not yet "imminent" -threat to its
existence or security, then A will have strong reason to bypass the Secu-
rity Council altogether and to act (either unilaterally or with its allies) to
preempt the threat from B. Given the chronic failure of the Council to
mobilize in collective defense against threats to the peace, A will know
that the Council is unlikely to come to its assistance against B. A's as-
sessment will be still more plausible if, as is often the case, B enjoys the
support of a permanent member of the Council, which can be counted on
331. France, Russia, China, and even Germany have all avowed, with greater or less
explicitness, their challenges to the United States' hegemony. See Glennon, Unipolar
World, supra note 58, at 946. See generally ROBERT J. LIEBER, THE AMERICAN ERA
(2005); Norman Bowen, Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: The French For-
eign Policy Discourse, 16 MEDITERRANEAN Q. 94, 106-08 (2005); Irwin M. Wall, The
French-American War Over Iraq, BROWN J. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 2004, at 123, 137
("The British project is to make Europe the junior partner of the United States. The
German project seeks to make of Europe a Switzerland. The French are alone in their
project to make Europe a superpower.... ").
332. For precisely these reasons, Winston Churchill originally advocated, as an alterna-
tive to what was to become the centralized collective security system of the Charter, a
much more decentralized group of regional councils, including a council for Europe, one
for the Far East, and one for the American hemisphere. See RUSSELL, supra note 61, at
105-07. Churchill argued that such a system would accommodate the great powers' re-
gional interests but not require them to concern themselves with distant, out-of-region
states. Id. at 107.
333. Stahn, supra note 47, at 806.
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to veto or weaken collective action against it. On the other hand, given
the existence of great power rivalries on the Council, A will know that the
Council is most unlikely to sanction it by measures of collective defense
should it attack B preemptively to eliminate the threat. Again, A's as-
sessment will normally be confirmed if A is aligned with a permanent
member of the Council. The retort of the Secretary General's High-level
Panel-"that if there are good arguments for preventive military action,
with good evidence to support them, [state A] should ... put [them] to
the Security Council,"'3 will hardly seem sufficient to A when it is faced
with such an existential threat. Rather than expecting states to submit to
the Council's "normative" authority in such situations, we would expect
to find-and we do find-states pressing for a more expansive under-
standing of "self-defense."
None of this is meant to deny that the United Nations has had its share
of success in areas other than providing collective security.335 Over six
decades, the organization has acquired unforeseen but useful functions,
including "peacekeeping" of different kinds.336 Thomas Franck wrote in
1985 that:
To the extent that the Council has succeeded, it has not been in
the two areas assigned to it by the Charter: pacific settlement of
disputes, and collective measures to deal with threats to the
peace. Instead, it has been in truce observation and in policing
the disengagement of warring armies, two "peace-keeping" func-
tions not visualized by the Charter.337
Beginning in the mid-1990s, moreover, the Security Council began under-
taking much more complex "peacekeeping" operations in countries such
as Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), East Timor (1999), and Kosovo (1999).
Unlike the earlier, consensual peacekeeping operations, these new, mul-
tidimensional operations were chiefly aimed at creating "stable, tolerant,
more liberal and democratic regimes out of the wreckage of war-torn
societies., 338 As the Secretary General pointed out in 1995, this novel
334. A More Secure World, supra note 34, at 63.
335. The United Nations' most recent historian, Paul Kennedy, finds that "as the
United Nations moved into the twenty-first century, not even its most ardent supporters
could claim that its performance in the areas of peacekeeping and enforcement since 1945
constituted a great success story." KENNEDY, supra note 61, at 110.
336. Also not to be discounted is the United Nations' record in other areas, including
the promotion of human rights. For a survey of these accomplishments, see generally id.
337. FRANCK, supra note 293, at 168.
338. KIMBERLEY ZISK MARTEN, ENFORCING THE PEACE: LEARNING FROM THE
IMPERIAL PAST 5 (2004); see also THAKUR, supra note 277, at 19 ("The system of collec-
tive security proved illusory from the start and the procedures for resolving disputes peace-
fully have also proven to be generally elusive. The major UN contribution to peace and
security during the Cold War took the form of consensual peacekeeping operations. After
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
kind of peacekeeping was proving to be "far more complex and more
expensive than when its tasks were mainly to monitor cease-fires and
control buffer zones with the consent of the States involved in the con-
flict." '339 Chapter VII enforcement operations, sometimes coupled with
peacekeeping operations, have also become more frequent.340 One ex-
ample is the enlarged responsibilities of the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the aftermath of the 2006 conflict in
Lebanon under Resolution 1701.341 The general verdict on the United
Nations' recent peacekeeping efforts is mixed but acknowledges impor-
tant successes. 342 Nonetheless, the central point remains: the Charter has
not, and cannot, achieve its primary purpose -protection of world peace
from interstate violence through the system of collective security.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY
The Legal Consequences
Assuming, then, that the Charter's collective security system, as origi-
nally designed, has proven to be a failure, what legal consequences fol-
low? In particular, what consequences follow as to the obligations of
member states to adhere to the restrictions on self-defense imposed by
Article 51, together with the interpretations of Article 51 by the ICJ?
The starting point must be the recognition that the Charter's restric-
tions on self-defense are the reciprocal of its promise of collective secu-
rity. As Secretary of State Stettinius said at the time of the Charter's
framing, "[t]he whole scheme of the Charter" rested on that promise. '
The Charter's use of force rules are not a random collection of unrelated
norms. They form a unified and coherent scheme, the various parts of
the Cold War, this expanded to multidimensional peace operations to reflect the more
demanding complex humanitarian emergencies.").
339. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Or-
ganization, 15, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
S/1995/1, A/50/60 (Jan. 25,1995).
340. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?: HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-23 (2001).
341. Although Resolution 1701 was not in terms framed under Chapter VII, it contem-
plates an enforcement action. See S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 254, 1 11-13.
342. See MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND
BUILDING PEACE 2 (2006) ("[T]he United Nations has proven to be a very ineffective
peace enforcer, or war-maker, in the many intrastate, civil conflicts that emerged in the
post-Cold War world. But that is only half the story .... [T]he UN [has] succeeded in
fostering peace through consent, building on an enhancement of Chapter V-based peace-
making negotiations and a creative, multidimensional implementation of the transitional
authority that the peace agreements provided.").
343. REPORT ON SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, supra note 66, at 41.
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which are organically connected with and dependent on each other.'"
Not being protected by the Charter's use of force rules, states are also not
bound by them.
These legal consequences can be drawn under both pre- and post-
Charter rules governing treaty law. Consider the position of Alfred von
Verdross, the distinguished Austrian jurist who reintroduced the concept
of ius cogens into international law.34' According to von Verdross, trea-
ties are void if they are contra bonos mores. Specifically, von Verdross
maintained that "treaties are regarded as being contra bonos mores which
restrict the liberty of one contracting party in an excessive or unworthy
manner or which endanger its most important rights." 346 Von Verdross
then examined the functions that "most certainly devolve upon a state
recognized by the modern international community," and argued that any
treaty that prevented a state from performing any of these functions
"must be regarded as immoral," contrary to ius cogens, and void.347 These
functions were, he said, "maintenance of law and order within the state[],
344. Oscar Schachter is perhaps alone among the Charter's principal defenders to
attempt to rebut this argument. But Schachter's arguments rest upon several mistakes.
For one thing, he assumes that the Charter's framers "preserved the right of self-defense to
respond to armed attack" precisely because they envisaged the failure of collective security
and wanted to guard against it. Schachter, supra note 56, at 126. But this argument seems
to assume that Article 51 preserves the pre-Charter right of self-defense in its entirety-an
assumption that has been shown above to be false. Schachter's analysis fails to explain
why, if the framers expected collective security to break down, they also truncated the pre-
Charter right of self-defense. Those limitations do, however, make sense on the expecta-
tion that collective security would work.
Schachter also contends that "[t]he legislative history of article 2 of the Charter does
not support the notion that effective enforcement of collective security was a prerequisite
to renouncing the use of force." Id. at 125. But Schachter cites only one secondary source
to underpin that claim. Id. at 125 n.56. Moreover, the legislative history of Article 2(4)
does indeed show that some states wanted a guarantee of a collective response by the
United Nations in order to uphold and enforce that clause. See MCCORMACK, supra note
5, at 158-59 (noting that New Zealand, Ecuador, and Uruguay argued for such a guaran-
tee).
Finally, Schachter misstates the position that he is attacking, claiming that "[i]t is hardly
plausible to infer... that the failure to prevent illegal force now allows an individual state
to use force freely." Schachter, supra note 56, at 126. But that is a straw man. The conse-
quence that is said to follow from the failure of the Charter system to provide collective
defense is that states may resume their pre-Charter rights to use force, subject, of course, to
the relevant customary law limitations on such use. That is by no means to say that States
may use force "freely."
345. See Bruno Simma, The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the Theory of Interna-
tional Law, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) (offering a fine appreciation of Verdross, including
both his reconceptualization of ius cogens and his influence on the conception of the Char-
ter as "constitutional" law).
346. Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law: Comments on
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defense against external attacks, care for the bodily and spiritual welfare
of citizens at home, [and] protection of citizens abroad." Of these, the
second is of chief interest here. Von Verdross illustrates the principle by
the example of "[a]n international treaty binding a state to reduce its
army in such a way as to render it defenseless against external attacks. It
is immoral to keep a state as a sovereign community and to forbid it at
the same time to defend its existence." 49 From this perspective, a treaty
that deprives a state of the means to protect itself against external threats
to its existence is immoral and void.35°
Accepting that pre-Charter account of treaty law, one should conclude
that Article 51 is now void." Strict adherence to the constraints that this
Article imposes upon self-defense could, in many contemporary circum-
stances, prevent a state from protecting the lives of its people, the integ-
rity of its territory, or the independence of its political institutions.
Granted, compliance with those constraints might not entail such conse-
quences if the Charter's collective security system were in working order,
for then the community of nations might be counted on to cover the de-
fensive deficit that compliance produced. But with the radical, incurable
failure of collective security, compliance is no longer obligatory; if any-
thing, noncompliance is.
Post-Charter treaty doctrine also permits the conclusion that Article
51's constraints are no longer binding. Although the United States has
not ratified the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that
Convention can be regarded as setting forth customary international
law.352 Moreover, the Vienna Convention, although not generally appli-
cable to treaties concluded before 1969, does apply "to any treaty which
is the constituent instrument of an international organization,, 353 and thus
to the Charter. Article 48(1) of the Vienna Convention is among the
provisions of that treaty that might be cited in support of the conclusion
that Article 51 of the Charter is not binding. Article 48(1) states:
A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent
to be bound by the treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation
348. Id. (emphasis omitted).
349. Id. at 575.
350. Cf. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the
United Nations Revisited, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 1, 8 n.17 (1997) (find-
ing that Article 51's reference to the "inherent" right of self-defense suggests that that
right may be non-derogable by treaty).
351. As discussed in Part III, supra, the correctness of the restrictionist (or restriction-
ist-plus) account of Article 51 is assumed.
352. See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REv. 869, 921
n.275 (2007).
353. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 4-5, opened for signature May 23,
1969, S. EXEC. Doc. L, 92-1 (1970), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the
treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent
to be bound by the treaty.
The emergence of a functioning, effective collective security system was
"a fact or situation" erroneously assumed by every state that consented
to the Charter, and particularly to Article 51, in 1945; moreover, that mis-
taken belief was surely "an essential basis of" each state's consent.355
Likewise, Article 62(1) of the Vienna Convention, which permits termi-
nation of or withdrawal from a treaty in the event of "[a] fundamental
change of circumstances" since the treaty's conclusion,356 is also available
as a legal basis for regarding the Charter as nonbinding, assuming again
that the belief that a functioning collective security system would emerge
was "an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
[Charter].3
Policy Options for the Future
Even apart from the decades-long record of failure, many observers
agree that the United Nations is facing a crisis. In both the Kosovo War
and the Second Gulf War, the Security Council proved unable either to
sanction a massive military intervention by outside forces or to prevent
one. These episodes of Council failure were too dramatic, too large-
scale, and too bitterly contentious to be ignored. Forced by these recent
episodes to reevaluate the Charter system, legal scholars and United Na-
tions administrators have suggested at least four distinct options.
First, scholars such as Professors Richard Falk and Mary Ellen
O'Connell argue that the Charter system needs little or no change;
change must instead come from greater compliance with Charter norms
by states that have acted in breach of them, especially the United
358States. Thus, Richard Falk proposes that member states should "take
more seriously their own obligations to uphold the Charter" and offers
354. Id. art. 48(1).
355. See id. Ironically, it might be argued that Article 48(2) barred the permanent
members of the Security Council from invoking "error" under Article 48(1) to avoid their
Charter obligations, if it could be said that each of those states had "contributed by its own
conduct to the error." Id. art. 48(2). But if the failure of collective security is inherent in
the flawed design of the Charter, and not the result of the permanent members' "bad con-
duct," then Article 48(2) is no barrier.
356. Id. art. 62(1).
357. Id. art. 48(1).
358. See O'Connell, supra note 38, at 107-08 (welcoming the fact that "[t]he Secretary
General, his experts, and the vast majority of UN members have endorsed a return to
orthodoxy," stating that "recommitting to the Charter is a start toward repairing the dam-
age to the international legal system generally wrought by the 1999 Kosovo intervention
and the 2003 Iraq invasion," and chastising the United States for displaying "an even
stronger sense of its own exceptionalism").
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that "it may be appropriate in this spirit to revive attention to the so-
called Uniting for Peace Resolution 337A that confers a residual respon-
sibility on the General Assembly to act when the Security Council fails to
do so." 9 Falk does nothing to explain how the members could be per-
suaded to take their Charter obligations more seriously, or why the Unit-
ing for Peace Resolution of 1950 should be any more efficacious fifty-six
years later than it was when originally adopted, or what reason there is to
think that the General Assembly would make a more effective custodian
of international peace than the Security Council. In an earlier article,
Falk further argued that the United States "would benefit from a self-
imposed discipline of adherence to the UN Charter system governing the
use of force" because such a policy "would overcome the absence of geo-
political limits associated with countervailing power in a unipolar world,"
correct "tendencies of the United States and others to rely too much on
military superiority," and enable the United States to "avoid[] the worst
policy failures, including that of Vietnam," which Falk associates with
"[d]eviations from the Charter system.''360 But most of these asserted
benefits could accrue to the United States even if it did not adhere to the
Charter system. For example, the United States could mitigate resent-
ment of its dominant global position by playing a less interventionist role
in world affairs and reverting to its traditional role of "offshore balan-
cer."361 Or again, if the United States is indeed overreliant on military
superiority, it could simply reduce its military budget and scale down its
military presence abroad, or perhaps emphasize foreign aid and free
trade programs more heavily. Moreover, Falk provides little reason to
think that adherence to the Charter regime would produce a more peace-
ful, less violent world overall. A world in which the United States and its
allies were fully compliant with Charter rules, but their adversaries op-
portunistically exploited such compliance and disregarded the same use
of force rules would create asymmetric vulnerabilities for the United
States that would become increasingly hard to tolerate. Strict legality, far
359. Richard Falk, Assessing the United Nations After the Lebanon War of 2006,
NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUND., Aug. 16, 2006, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/
2006/08/16_falkafter-lebanon.htm. Nigel White advocates similar disinterestedness, urg-
ing that "each permanent member [should] takie] its Council responsibility for interna-
tional peace and security seriously, rather than each being primarily concerned with
threats to its own security." Nigel D. White, The Will and Authority of the Security Council
After Iraq, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 645,672 (2004).
360. Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 598 (2003). Professor O'Connell advances a subtler and more persua-
sive formulation of these arguments. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The United Nations Secu-
rity Council and the Authorization of Force: Renewing the Council Through Law Reform,
in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 22, at 47, 55-56, 62-63.
361. See CHRISTOPHER LAYNE, THE PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND
STRATEGY FROM 1940 TO THE PRESENT 159-92 (2006).
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from creating favorable conditions for global peace, is likely to mean that
because of the rival interests of the Council's permanent members, the
dangers posed by states like North Korea or Iran will grow unattended.
Still less does Falk show that a world of stricter Charter compliance by
the United States would be a world in which human rights were better
protected or democratic institutions more prevalent. Greater compliance
with the Charter would mean that the United States would be less likely
to participate in collective humanitarian efforts, such as in Kosovo, or to
seek to democratize regimes that brutally oppressed their populations, as
in Iraq. Finally, Falk is on weak grounds in claiming that American in-
fractions of the Charter have coincided with policy failures. The 1962
Cuban "quarantine" was a Charter infraction, but it protected a vital na-
tional security interest. Nearer in time, the U.S.-led intervention in Kos-
ovo-another clear Charter infraction362 -helped suppress ethnic conflict
in the area and led eventually to the collapse of the Milosevic govern-
ment.
Second, at the opposite extreme, some legal scholars-most notably
Michael Glennon-argue that the Charter is "dead," with the apparent
implication that United States should henceforth ignore its use of force
rules.3 63 While this Article has defended the central insights of that school
of thought, it remains that the legal availability of noncompliance does
not entail the necessity of noncompliance. Whether, and to what extent,
the United States should impose on itself the restrictions of the Charter's
use of force rules is a significant policy decision, even if (as argued here)
the United States has a legal right to suspend or terminate performance
of its Charter obligations.
A third perspective is held by those who advocate substantive "re-
forms" of the United Nations, in the shape, for example, of new "guide-
lines" to govern the deliberations of the Security Council. Secretary
General Annan's 2005 Report In Larger Freedom illustrates this ten-
dency. Annan recommends that the Council should adopt a resolution
setting forth agreed-upon guidelines for authorizing or endorsing the use
of military force, and then declare its intention to be bound by those
guidelines.3'6 The contemplated guidelines would, in substance, incorpo-
362. Professor Falk himself served as a member of the Independent International
Commission on Kosovo, whose lengthy report concluded "that the NATO military inter-
vention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval
from the United Nations Security Council." INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE
KOSOVO REPORT (2001), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/the
kosovoreport.htm.
363. See, e.g., Glennon, Unipolar World, supra note 58, at 98-100. It should be noted
that Professor Glennon also calls for the creation of new collective, international mecha-
nisms to deal with problems of global disorder. Id. at 111.
364. See In Larger Freedom, supra note 39, 126.
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rate principles derived from just war theory: proper purpose; grave
threat; the availability of non-forcible measures; proportionality; and a
reasonable prospect of success. But to be effective, Annan's guidelines
require good faith from the Council members, and how is that to be guar-
anteed in a world of self-interested state actors? Moreover, even if
Council members could be relied upon to act in perfect good faith, rea-
sonable disagreements about the application of the guidelines' elements
might nonetheless arise among them. Annan seems to assume that if
such good faith disagreements arose, the states calling for the Council's
authorization of a proposed intervention would be bound to remain inac-
tive, even in the face of what they saw as an urgent and intolerable threat.
But that normative belief is questionable; and as a predictive matter, it is
unlikely to be accepted in state practice.
Fourth, some legal scholars recommend that the United States, al-
though remaining within the general legal framework of the Charter,
nonetheless seek gradually to alter it by making episodic international
"common law" at variance with written Charter norms.36 While as a
practical matter there is much to recommend this policy, it does not pro-
vide a reason to remain within the broad Charter framework, rather than
abandoning it entirely in favor of an explicit return to purely customary
use of force rules. Further, even assuming that the Charter use of force
system could over time be supplanted by a better set of customary rules,
the very effort to construct an alternative system would postpone a fun-
damental reexamination of the Charter system for the indefinite future.
Finally, the proposed policy would seem to require more than a little dis-
ingenuousness, in that it calls for working within the Charter scheme in
order to displace it.
Accordingly, each of the four approaches has flaws. Contrary to the
first view, the Charter's problems are too deeply embedded, too signifi-
cant, and too likely to cause future harm to be ignored. Contrary to the
second view, the United States should not simply walk away from the
United Nations. The organization still performs useful functions, even if
collective security is not one of them, and even a more limited disen-
gagement confined to the Charter's use of force rules alone would re-
quire defense and explanation. The modest, piecemeal "reforms" sug-
gested by the third view do not begin to reach the structural problems in
the Charter system. And the fourth view also hews too closely to current
practice to be a truly effective remedy.
Political scientists and historians may have seen more deeply into the
sources of the Charter's failure than legal scholars and United Nations
365. See Sofaer, supra note 177, at 8-15; see also Peter van Walsum, The Security Coun-
cil and the Use of Force: The Cases of Kosovo, East Timor, and Iraq, in THE SECURITY
COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 22, at 65, 73-74.
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administrators. Accordingly, their insights into that failure, and their
prescriptions for its cure, deserve respectful consideration. Among the
political scientists in question are Francis Fukuyama366 and Robert Keo-
hane"' among the historians is Harold James.3'6 Fukuyama correctly sees
the problem as one of enabling collective action through designing inter-
national institutions that will combine a high degree of legitimacy with a
high degree of effectiveness.369 The United Nations (at least in the judg-
ment of Secretary General Annan) possesses "the unique legitimacy"
needed by states if they propose to use force beyond self-defense in order
to deal with "threats to international peace and security."37 But assum-
ing that the United Nations can provide legitimacy, it has certainly proven
itself to be ineffective in addressing those same threats to peace and secu-
rity. Rather, action by states, either unilaterally or in coalition with other
states, has alone been effective in that regard. Indeed, it appears that the
United States deliberately sought to keep the United Nations at arm's
length during its 2002 military campaign in Afghanistan, fearing that the
organization's "assistance" would only compromise American effective-
ness.
Both the United Nations' legitimacy and its ineffectiveness spring from
a common source: its multilateralism. Even though the Security Council
does not represent nearly as many peoples or governments as the Gen-
eral Assembly, it is nonetheless able to express a fair variety of view-
points and interests. Moreover, the Council serves as a forum for ex-
pressing a greater range of viewpoints and interests than the United
States' political process can accommodate by itself.37' This kind of multi-
lateralism arguably gives the Council's deliberations a higher quality and
a greater epistemic reliability than our domestic process alone can
achieve.372 These considerations give the Council a comparative advan-
366. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY,
POWER, AND THE NEOCONSERVATIVE LEGACY 157-62 (2006).
367. See Robert 0. Keohane, The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism 17-23
(Garnet Working Paper No. 09/06, 2006), available at http://www.garnet-eu.org/file
admin/documents/workingpapers/0906.pdf.
368. See generally HAROLD JAMES, THE ROMAN PREDICAMENT: HOW THE RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL ORDER CREATE THE POLITICS OF EMPIRE (2006).
369. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 366, at 155-80.
370. Kofi Annan, Sec'y-Gen. of the United Nations, Address to the General Assembly
(Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.
371. This is not to discount the influence of foreign governmental and public opinion
on the American domestic political process. Indeed, the open and consultative nature of
the United States political process has historically been one of the main reasons why many
foreign nations have accepted its outcomes.
372. See Keohane, supra note 367, at 5. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Ameri-
can public relies on the Council's validation of a proposed United States armed interven-
tion as a means of reducing the agency costs of monitoring its own political leaders. See
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tage over the United States in terms of "legitimacy." At the same time,
however, the multilateral nature of the Council tends to create paralyzing
conflicts of national interests within it, limiting its effectiveness. Time
and again, Council intervention has either come too late or not at all: in
Rwanda; in Bosnia; in Kosovo; in Sudan; and even, at least arguably, in
Iraq.7 3 The persisting ineffectiveness of the Security Council in address-
ing these crises has done much to undercut any claim it might have to
"unique legitimacy. ' '374
The situation for the United States is the photographic negative of the
United Nations' situation. Legitimacy depends critically upon process-
upon the participation of a broad group of nations, interests, and perspec-
tives in the formulation of policy. The United States, however, is but one
nation among others, with interests and perspectives that are peculiarly
its own. However benign its intentions (in its own judgment) may be, its
conduct is likely to be perceived as threatening, aggressive, or even "im-
perialistic" by other governments and peoples. 75 When it uses force uni-
laterally or even together with coalition partners, its actions are apt to
seem arbitrary and tyrannical, and thus, it suffers from a serious legiti-
macy deficit. Worse still, the existence of such perceptions tends to un-
dercut the United States' effectiveness: in contemporary warfare, action
in conformity (or perceived conformity) with jus ad bellum and jus in
bello norms is a force multiplier-a strategic asset that weakens the en-
emy, attracts neutral sympathy, and strengthens the domestic popula-
tion's support for the war.376 Putting the matter crudely (but not too
much so), American unilateralism may well be effective, but it lacks le-
gitimacy. Compare the First Gulf War of 1991, the Kosovo intervention
of 1999, and the Second Gulf War of 2003 in both dimensions-
effectiveness and legitimacy. It might seem that the First Gulf War,
which the Security Council authorized, combined maximum effectiveness
with maximum legitimacy. Next, the Kosovo intervention, which in-
volved NATO, an established multilateral organization, but which lacked
Council authorization, exhibited a high degree of effectiveness, but also
Terrence L. Chapman & Dan Reiter, The United Nations Security Council and the Rally
'Round the Flag Effect, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 886, 887-88 (2004).
373. See Keohane, supra note 367, at 6; see also Benvenisti, supra note 283, at 682-83
(explaining difficulties in obtaining coordination of collective action among the United
States and other key actors, including other permanent members of the Council).
374. For a scathing but deserved critique of the performance of the United Nations
bureaucracy in Bosnia and Rwanda, see ADAM LEBOR, "COMPLICITY WITH EVIL": THE
UNITED NATIONS IN THE AGE OF MODERN GENOCIDE (2006).
375. See JAMES, supra note 368, at 24-38.
376. See generally KENNEDY, supra note 61. Equally, however, compliance with the
laws of war, especially perhaps in asymmetric conflict with a lawless enemy, can create
severe, even intolerable, vulnerabilities. See ROGER W. BARNETT, ASYMMETRICAL
WARFARE: TODAY'S CHALLENGE TO U.S. MILITARY POWER 61-81 (2003).
[Vol. 56:871
Paper Charter
less legitimacy. Lastly, the Second Gulf War, which the Security Council
did not authorize and which prominent NATO members opposed, dem-
onstrated substantially reduced effectiveness, arguably owing in part to
its having significantly less legitimacy. Decreasing legitimacy may, in-
deed, impede effectiveness.
Fukuyama's insight that the design of international institutions must
trade off "legitimacy" against "effectiveness" is thus a powerful one. It
permits the Charter system's use of force regime to be evaluated more
carefully against the leading alternatives to it. The Charter system incor-
porates (arguably) a comparatively high degree of legitimacy but a com-
paratively low degree of effectiveness.377 How do the leading alternatives
fare by comparison?
The two most obvious alternatives are: (1) a network of regional secu-
rity alliances, along the lines of the system originally advocated by
Winston Churchill in opposition to the centralized, global security system
that emerged in the Charter; and (2) the creation of ad hoc "coalitions of
the willing" to maintain international security-coalitions that at least for
now would usually emerge from the United States' domestic political
process, coupled with coalitional diplomacy.
Fukuyama himself leans toward the alternative of reconfiguring the
search for global security around a system of regional organizations like
NATO. (Other regional security alliances could include the Organiza-
tion of American States, the African Union, and the European Union.)
He argues that NATO in particular "has fewer legitimacy problems than
the United Nations," because, unlike the Security Council, all of its
members are liberal democracies and also because, like the Security
Council, it operates by multilateral consensus. 8 Furthermore, NATO
includes many friends of the United States (especially since the accession
of new Eastern European democracies), largely excludes France, and is
not subject to Russian or Chinese vetoes-all valuable characteristics
from the United States' perspective.179 Fukuyama acknowledges that
377. But see Keohane, supra note 367, at 5-7 (noting objections to the "legitimacy" of
the Charter system, including the facts that the permanent membership of the Security
Council does not reflect any principled set of criteria for representation but is merely the
product of the power politics of 1945, that the Council does not include several large, af-
fluent, or powerful states as permanent members but does include two powers of only
middling size, and that several of the Council's permanent members cannot be considered
"democratic"). Further, even if responsibility for protecting global security could some-
how be reallocated from the Security Council to the General Assembly, the "legitimacy"
of the United Nations would still be clouded. The General Assembly, though more nu-
merous and representative than the Council, also includes many states that are highly
undemocratic, routinely abuse the human rights of their populations, and serve only the
interests of ruling families or tyrannical cliques.
378. FUKUYAMA, supra note 366, at 173.
379. Id.
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precisely because NATO is consultative and consensual, it sacrifices a
large amount of effectiveness; but he contends both that this sacrifice is a
necessary and tolerable prerequisite to legitimacy, and that NATO has
proven its usefulness to the United States in recent operations including
Afghanistan and Darfur.3l
If NATO arguably brings a legitimacy generated by democratic multi-
lateralism,38' however, Fukuyama may overestimate its effectiveness, and
hence its serviceability as a model, most of all perhaps in alliance actions
outside Europe. The Second Gulf War has brought to light deep rifts in
the Western alliance -rifts that existed even before that war, and that are
likely only to worsen in the future.38 Although Kosovo was a paradigm
of successful collective action by NATO members to eradicate a threat to
regional peace and security, Kosovo may well be uncharacteristic of fu-
ture interventions: Western Europe had substantial equities in addressing
the violence of the Milosevic regime, and the United States, though lack-
ing the vital national interests of its European partners, was nonetheless
willing to spearhead the common effort. But when the reverse situation
emerged in 2003 in Iraq-a perceived threat of great magnitude to crucial
United States interests, but one felt to be of little concern to Europe-the
older European members of NATO either failed to support the United
States, or else actively opposed it. Moreover, NATO's performance thus
far in Afghanistan 3 - a matter, assumedly, of concern to all members of
380. Id.
381. Fukuyama likely understates the extent to which NATO operations would resem-
ble, or be perceived by local populations as resembling, a form of neo-colonization. See
Gerald Knaus & Felix Martin, Travails of the European Raj, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2003, at
60, 61-63; Yaroslav Trofimov, Occupational Hazard: In Postwar Bosnia, Overruling Voters
To Save Democracy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2004, at Al; Ian Traynor, Ashdown 'Running
Bosnia Like a Raj,' GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, July 5, 2003, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/international/story/0,3604,991947,00.html. See generally MARTEN, supra note 338, at
123-33.
382. See Robert J. Delahunty, The Battle of Mars and Venus: Why Do American and
European Attitudes Toward International Law Differ?, 4 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 11
(2006). Earlier clashes included differences over the International Criminal Court and the
Kyoto Protocol.
383. See generally PAUL GALLIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. RL33627, NATO IN
AFGHANISTAN: A TEST OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE (2006), http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan was authorized as a Chapter VII operation by Security Council Resolution
1386 (2001), see S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001), and was extended
by Security Council Resolutions 1510, see S.C. Res. 1510, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1510 (Oct. 13,
2003), 1623, see S.C. Res. 1623, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1623 (Sept. 13, 2005), and 1707, see S.C.
Res. 1707, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1707 (Sept. 12, 2006). NATO assumed responsibility for
leading ISAF in 2003. ISAF is one of two Western military operations seeking to stabilize




the alliance 34-casts doubt on the assumption of NATO's effectiveness.385
Indeed, the German news magazine Der Spiegel recently reported that
"NATO, which sees itself as the world's most powerful military alliance,
faces the real possibility of political and possibly even military defeat in
its bloody war of attrition with the Taliban."3 6 Further, the burdens of
the campaign in Afghanistan have been shared very unequally between
the English-speaking coalition members and their continental European
counterparts, at least when measured in terms of casualties.3' 7 In short,
NATO may well be unsuited to play the lead role that Fukuyama envis-
ages for it.
388
That leaves the third possibility-reliance on the United States' domes-
tic political process, coupled with its coalition-building diplomacy, for
countermeasures to threats to international stability and peace. The cur-
rent United States national security strategy assumes that this approach
will couple effectiveness with at least a fair degree of legitimacy. More-
over, whatever one's final assessment of that strategy, it represents a rea-
sonable attempt to adapt to an international environment that is both
highly threatening to the United States and yet full of promise for it.
Two main characteristics of this post-cold war international environ-
ment have helped determine the United States' strategy. First, deter-
rence has become much harder than it was in the cold war, when the
384. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, COUNTERING AFGHANISTAN'S INSURGENCY 15
(2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south-asia/123-countering-afgh
anistansinsurgency/pdf ("'If NATO fails in Afghanistan, NATO fails,' reckons a senior
Western diplomat.").
385. See id. at 14-15.
386. Konstantin von Hammerstein et al., "The Germans Have to Learn How to Kill,"
SPIEGEL ONLINE, Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,
449479,00.html.
387. See Paul Koring, Bearing the Burden in Afghanistan, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 17,
2006, at A12. According to recent reports, the armed forces of just three countries (the
United States, Canada, and Great Britain) have accounted for ninety percent of all NATO
combat casualties in the NATO's Afghanistan campaign. Id. Germany, France, Italy, and
Spain, while providing significant numbers of troops to the campaign, have kept them out
of combat in the relatively peaceful north and west of the country. Id.
The problem of unequal burden sharing (or of "free ridership") has been a recurring
one in the history of NATO-as is to be expected on the economic theory of military alli-
ances. See Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future, 36 J.
PEACE RES. 665, 666-68 (1999); see also Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandier & Hirofumi Shimizu,
Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996, 42 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 176, 181-82 (1998). See generally Mancur Olson, Jr. & Richard Zeck-
hauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances, 48 REV. ECON. & STAT. 266 (1966).
388. See Zwanenburg, supra note 271, at 210 ("At least part of the reason why the
United States appears to have lost interest in the [NATO] Alliance is that there are major
differences of opinion between partners on the role of the Security Council in collective
security. These differences.., exploded during the Iraq crisis. It is not likely that these
differences will disappear soon.").
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United States and the Soviet Union arrived at a nuclear stalemate that, in
the end, protected the peace. But the United States' ability to deter, or
even to identify and trace, the sources of terrorist threats to use weapons
of mass destruction is considerably less. Second, the United States' cold
war victory appeared to leave it with an extraordinary, and likely unre-
peatable, opportunity to mold the international order more closely to its
own image. This combination of motive with opportunity led directly to
the two key components of the United States security strategy: first, the
emergence of a very robust doctrine of preventative self-defense because
the traditional Cold War reliance on the threat of massive retaliation
would not work against elusive terrorist enemies; and second, the will-
ingness to act unilaterally because the support of other nations was
deemed not worth the cost of securing their consent. Both of these
American strategic doctrines have put the Charter system under severe
strain: the first, because it requires a reconsideration of the limits of an-
ticipatory self-defense that had taken hold under the sway of the Charter;
the second, because it encouraged the United States and at least some of
its allies to bypass the Charter's procedural requirements for authorizing
collective action under Article 42.
With the benefit of more than four years' hindsight after the U.S.-led
intervention in Iraq in the Second Gulf War, many have come to the con-
clusion that the American strategic approach is neither legitimate nor, for
that matter, effective. But even accepting that the Second Gulf War has
brought out the drastic limitations of the American strategy, it would be
wrong to draw the lesson that the United States should hereafter remain
strictly within the legal parameters of the Charter. To begin with, it is
questionable whether even explicit authorization by the Security Council
would have added much "legitimacy" to the Iraq intervention- at least in
the minds of the Iraqis, if not of Western Europeans.8 Given Iraq's dis-
astrous but deeply entrenched domestic political culture,3'9 Security
Council authorization would likely have made no difference whatever to
the post-war difficulties that the occupying coalition encountered in that
country."' The Council's post-war Resolution 1483, which recognized the
389. See ANATOL LIEVEN & JOHN HULSMAN, ETHICAL REALISM: A VISION FOR
AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD 145-46 (2006) (arguing that it "misses the point almost
completely" to attribute U.S. difficulties in Iraq to the fact that "the United States lacked a
mandate from the United Nations" rather than to the existence of a "regional consensus"
among Iraq's neighbors against U.S. intervention).
390. See FOUAD AJAMI, THE FOREIGNER'S GIFT (2006).
391. See Jacques de Lisle, Illegal? Yes. Lawless? Not So Fast: The United States, In-
ternational Law, and the War in Iraq, FOREIGN POL'Y RES. INST., Mar. 28, 2003,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030328.americawar.delisle.intllawwariraq.html.
Moreover, why attribute those post-war difficulties to the absence of a Security Council
resolution, rather than to the United States' unsuccessful strategy of seeking to obtain a
fresh authorization? The United States might have been better advised not to have sought
[Vol. 56:871
Paper Charter
occupation of Iraq, vested interim powers in the Coalition Provisional
Authority, and carved out a significant role for the United Nations in the
occupation29 conferred little "legitimacy" on the occupying forces, which
remained targets of the insurgency. Indeed, the Iraqi resistance demon-
strated how little esteem it had for the United Nations by destroying the
UN headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad on August 19, 2003-an
attack in which Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Secretary General's Special
Representative for Iraq, was killed.9 Iraqis had suffered an estimated
400,000 "excess" deaths and had seen their standard of living collapse
during twelve years of United Nations economic sanctions, and while
these sanctions were the consequence of Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion
of Kuwait, Iraqis felt that they had no control over Hussein's decisions
and should not have been held responsible for them.394 The UN thus had
no more legitimacy in Iraqi eyes than the coalition forces did.3 95
authorization at all, and to have gone forward without taking account of the Council's
wishes. Hans Morgenthau argued long ago for such a "pragmatic and instrumental ap-
proach to the United Nations," observing that "the issue of whether or not to submit a
certain problem to the United Nations or even whether or not to remain a member of the
organization must be determined exclusively by the usefulness of the United Nations for
the protection and promotion of the interests of the nations concerned." Hans J. Morgen-
thau, The Yardstick of National Interest, 296 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 77, 77
(1954).
392. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
393. See Press Release, United Nations, Bomb Blast Rips Through UN Headquarters
in Baghdad (Aug. 19,2003), http://www.un.org/av/photo/subjects/unhqbombing.htm.
394. See ARMED S. HASHIM, INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN IRAQ 31-
32 (2006) (citing Gwynne Dyer, A Guerilla War Takes Root, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 20,
2003, at A21); David Chandler, The UN-Just There To Help?, SPIKED-POLITICS, Aug. 22,
2003, http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000006DEDF.htm.
395. The failure of the Secretary General's special emissary to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi,
also testifies the lack of regard in which the United Nations is held in that country. Bra-
himi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister and Arab League functionary, "hailed from the
same political class that had wrecked the Arab world. He partook of the ways of that class:
populism, anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism." AJAMI, supra note 390, at 222. Brahimi had
demonstrated an extraordinary lack of sympathy for both Iraq's Shi'ite and Kurdish popu-
lations:
As undersecretary of the Arab League between 1984 and 1991, Brahimi stood silent
as Saddam massacred more than 100,000 Iraqi Kurds, and then perhaps 400,000 Iraqi
Shia.... Visiting Baghdad on U.N. business in 1997, Brahimi added insult to injury, as
Iraqi television showed Brahimi embracing Saddam's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq
Aziz.
Michael Rubin, "Betrayal," NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Apr. 19, 2004, http://www.national
review.com/rubin/rubin2004O4l9O843.asp. After a brief visit to Iraq in 2004, Brahimi
proposed an interim government composed mostly of "technocrats" including Adnan
Pachachi, a former Iraqi Foreign Minister in the 1960s. To both Iraq's Sunnis and Shi'ites,
Pachachi "was a man of the old order ... [who] offered the reassuring [for Sunnis] pros-
pect of Sunni primacy but without the violence and cruelty of [Saddam Hussein]." AJAMI,
supra note 390, at 220-21. Shi'ite leaders, sensing that Brahimi's "technocratic scheme ...
was [but] a thinly veiled attack on the gains that the Shia and the Kurds had made after
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More importantly, to revert to Charter rules because of the coalition's
unhappy experience in Iraq would hardly solve contemporary problems
of international security. As Robert Keohane has argued, such an ap-
proach
assumes that the status quo is sufficiently acceptable that dead-
lock will not generate disaster. In a world of weapons of mass de-
struction, actively sought by governments and potential terrorist
groups, this assumption is not realistic. It is based not on theI1396
world as we know it, but on a more benign, imaginary world.
Those who advocate strict compliance with the Charter's use of force
regime are offering a formula, not for peace and security, but for inaction
in the face of danger. Are we really safer in a world in which the Security
Council routinely issues resolutions condemning Iraq's or North Korea's
weapons programs, while Iraq and North Korea routinely and with im-
punity defy them?
Still, even if American unilateralism might promise a safer and more
peaceful world order than the Charter security system-or even a secu-
rity system based on regional defense organizations -it would suffer from
severe weaknesses. There is, again, the incurable problem of legitimacy.
To quote Keohane once more:
Organizations, from hegemonic states to "coalitions of the will-
ing" or alliances, that exclude large numbers of people from rep-
resentation, cannot be legitimate on a global basis. No claim that
a given state or organization has superior morality or superior
knowledge (for instance, because of its political history or reli-
gious faith) can provide a valid basis for people who do not share
such beliefs to accept their authority. 7
Worse still (from an American perspective), there is the danger that the
United States, in a hegemonic attempt to underwrite the costs of provid-
ing international security and other global public goods, will enmesh itself
in unending peripheral conflicts, inflame rivalries with other powers, ex-
haust its wealth and substance, wither in the face of emerging challengers,
and go the way of empires and hegemons of the past."'
[Saddam's] fall," moved quickly to denounce the proposal, saying that the U.N. envoy had
attempted "to 'bypass the Iraqi reality and to leave out those political forces"' hostile to
the restoration of Sunni dominance. Id. at 222-23. In their view, Brahimi's proposals
"'opened the door for the return to power of men of the old regime ... and.., would
guarantee instability."' Id. at 223. Lacking Iraqi support, Brahimi's proposed candidates
to head the interim Iraqi government were rejected.
396. Keohane, supra note 367, at 13-14; see also Benvenisti, supra note 283, at 688
("[R]elegating risk assessment to the Security Council-the solution preferred by many
scholars as well as states-has become a rather precarious policy .... (footnote omitted)).
397. Keohane, supra note 367, at 14.
398. Cf JAMES, supra note 368, at 99-117; LAYNE, supra note 361, at 152-58. For the
idea that a hegemonic system is self-stabilizing insofar as it produces collective global
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In truth, then, none of the three options considered-the Charter secu-
rity system, regional organizations, and American-led coalitional activ-
ity-offers a plausible solution to the problem of global peace and secu-
rity. All three suffer from substantial deficits in legitimacy, effectiveness,
or (since the two are intertwined) both. Yet, the problem of providing
international security and peace is arguably worse than it has been for
several decades, possibly even for generations. The confluence of three
distinct trends-the rise of mass terrorism, the proliferation or readier
availability of weapons of mass destruction, and the presence of many
failed or dysfunctional states that may serve to incubate terrorism-has
created a singularly dangerous period in world affairs.3
What, then, is to be done? For the longer term, it will be necessary for
legal scholars, international relations experts, government advisors, po-
litical scientists, and others to attempt to design international institutions
that combine effectiveness and legitimacy more successfully than existing
institutions do. This would enable collective security measures against
the threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and failed states.
These institutions may not completely displace the United Nations, but
they will likely overshadow it as a provider of international security. This
is not the place to consider and evaluate some of the proposed designs for
such institutions,4° which may well include regional organizations like
NATO or the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS),4°' or more informal groups consisting primarily of regional
stakeholders. But in the near term, the global system will probably re-
main obliged to look to the United States and its allies, whether in
NATO or in ad hoc coalitions, for stabilization efforts requiring the use
of force.
goods, see Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT'L ORG. 579
(1985) (providing a technical analysis); Michael C. Webb & Stephen D. Krasner, Hege-
monic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment, 15 REV. INT'L STUD. 183, 184 (1989)
(distinguishing "collective goods" version from "security" version of hegemonic stability
thesis).
399. See Benvenisti, supra note 283, at 681-83 (explaining how the dynamics of provid-
ing global security underwent transformation in post-cold war period).
400. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A
Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal, ETHICS & INT'L AFF., Winter 2004, at 1; see also
Benvenisti, supra note 283, at 697-99.
401. NATO's 1999 strategic concept envisaged the possibility of collective enforcement
actions not authorized by the Security Council, and NATO military doctrine likewise
keeps that option open. See Zwanenburg, supra note 271, at 201-03. Likewise, ECOWAS,
which has intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone without clear authorization from the
Council, has adopted a Protocol permitting it to take such measures without the Council's
approval. See N.D. White, On the Brink of Lawlessness: The State of Collective Security
Law, Hilaire McCoubrey Memorial Lecture at the University of Hull (May 15, 2002),
available at http://www.hull.ac.uk/law/downloads/mcccoubreylecture02.pdf.
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In these circumstances, the United States should not consider itself
bound to follow the Charter's prescriptions and to seek authorization
from the Security Council before taking the security measures it consid-
ers necessary. As argued at length in this Article, the sixty-year long fail-
ure of the Charter system to provide collective security absolves the
United States from any legal obligation to comply with the Charter's use
of force rules. But the United States is not forced to the binary choice of
either remaining within the United Nations system or withdrawing from
it. Nor, if it rejects those false alternatives, is it committed to a policy of
seeking to modify or subvert the Charter rules from within.
American policymakers should instead consider looking for an oppor-
tune occasion on which to announce that the United States will consider
future Security Council action - or inaction-with respect to Article 42 of
the Charter to be merely advisory. On this proposal, the United States
would make clear that although it might seek Council "authorization"
under Article 42 for the use of force by itself or its coalition to suppress
threats to or breaches of the peace, it would not consider the failure to
obtain such an authorization binding. Consistently with that approach,
the United States would also make clear that although it might continue
to participate in Council deliberations regarding authorizations for the
use of force under Article 42, it would not use its veto to block such en-
forcement measures when sponsored by other member states against
third parties. Equally, however, it would not consider itself obliged ei-
ther to provide assistance to carry out such enforcement measures, or
even not to resist them, if they were adopted by the rest of the Council.
In other words, its failure to veto an enforcement proposal should not be
construed to constrain in any way how it would respond to that measure,
if the Council adopted it.
This interim proposal, if adopted, might serve to quiet some of the
criticism that the United States is an international "scofflaw" for not
complying with Charter use of force rules: the policy would have a rea-
soned legal justification, based on the persistent and incurable failure of
the Charter collective security system to work. More, the policy could
force the pace of innovation, serving as a catalyst for the introduction of
well-designed institutional alternatives to the currently available interna-
tional security systems. Further, it is a fairer and more candid approach
than that of working within the overall Charter framework for the very
purpose of undoing it: just as the United States would not consider itself
bound by the votes or vetoes of other Council members, neither would it
attempt to hold them bound by its votes or vetoes. Surely the logic and
the equities of renouncing the constraints of the Charter security system
necessitate a renunciation of its use to constrain others. Finally, the pro-
posal would not represent a radical departure from established American
policy, except as to the renunciation of the use of the veto. Rather, it
would clarify and formalize what has, in effect, been the position of
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American policymakers for several decades. That is, it would merely
carry a stage further the policy that led then U.N. Ambassador (later Sec-
retary of State) Madeleine Albright to declare during the Clinton admini-
stration that the United States would "act 'multilaterally when we can
and unilaterally as we must"' with regard to Iraq. That prompted Sec-
retary of Defense William Cohen, also during the Clinton administration,
to say that NATO would not need Security Council authorization to in-
tervene in Kosovo and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot to affirm
that "'[w]e must be careful not to subordinate NATO to any other inter-
national body .... [T]he Alliance must reserve the right and the freedom
to act when its members, by consensus, deem it necessary.' 43 And that
caused Secretary of State Colin Powell in the present administration to
say that while the "Council could 'decide whether or not action is re-
quired,' . . . the United States would 'reserve our option of acting' and is
'not bound' by" the Council's determinations. 401 Even more telling than
our leaders' speeches, the United States' actions in Kosovo and Iraq
demonstrate the consistency of this policy and the tenacity with which it
has been pursued. It seems time to place the policy on a sounder legal
footing.
402. Elias Davidsson, The U.N. Security Council's Obligations of Good Faith, 15 FLA.
J. INT'L L. 541, 563 (2003) (quoting Noam Chomsky, U.S. Policy: Rogue States,
ZMAGAZINE, Apr. 1988, http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/z9804-rogue.html).
403. See O'Connell, supra note 85, at 76 (quoting Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and
the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 15 (1999)).
404. Glennon, Unipolar World, supra note 58, at 102 (quoting Face the Nation: Colin
Powell Discusses the UN Resolution Telling Iraq to Disarm (CBS television broadcast Nov.
10, 2003)).
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